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A DISCOURSE 



OF THE 



BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY, 



BY SAMUEL TYLER, 

OF THE MARYLAND^ BAR. 



It ought to be eternally resolved and settled that the understanding can- 
not decide otherwise than by induction, and by a legitimate form of it. — Ba- 
con's Works. 3d vol., page 340, Jim. Ed. 

Num fingo ? num mentior ? cupio refelli ; quid enim laboro, nisi ut Veri- 
tas in omni quasstione explicetur. — Cicero, Tusc. Disp. Lib. 3d, page 105, 
Glas. Ed. 



SECOND EDITION ENLARGED. 



NEW YORK: 
BAKER AND SCRIBNER 



1850. 






Entered according to the Act of Congress, in the year 1846, by 

SAMUEL TYLER ; 

in the Clerk ; s office, of the District Court of the District of Maryland. 



4 

A? 



DEDI CATION. 



To Dr. Grafton Tyler, Georgetown, D. C. 

Beloved Brother: — Our pleasures and 
our interests have always been so identified., 
that I cannot but desire that jour name may 
be associated with mine, in a work which 
has amused so many of my leisure moments, 
and made it necessary that I should look over 
some of the ancient Greek and Roman auth- 
ors, where almost every page suggested to 
me the time when we first read them over 
together, and like our play-grounds, brought 
back to my mind, the happy days of our 
youth. To you then, whom of all men, God 
has made nearest to me, in that we are the 
only children of our parents ; and as the near- 
ness of our relation has been so excellently 
illustrated in your brotherly love, which has 
contributed so much to my happiness through 
our childhood, and our youth, and increases 
as we walk up the hill ofjife together; I ded- 



4 DEDICATION. 

icate these reflections of my leisure hours, 
hoping that the doctrines set forth, may re- 
ceive the sanction of a judgment, that is so 
certain a measure of truth as yours. 
Your brother, 

SAMUEL TYLER. 

Frederick, Md., March IQth, 1844. 



PREFACE. 



Believing with Bacon, that, "It ought to 
be eternally resolved and settled, that the un- 
derstanding cannot decide otherwise, than by 
Induction, and by a legitimate form of it," 
I have endeavoured in the following dis- 
course, to do something towards settling the 
great problem. The discourse therefore* lies 
within the province of logic in the most com- 
prehensive meaning of that term, as embrac- 
ing the method of investigation, the grounds 
of human belief, and the origin of all knowl- 
edge. It is true, that in the first part of the 
discourse, I have endeavoured, not only to 
show the grand results of Induction as an or- 
gan of Investigation, but also, to vindicate 
the philosophy which it has built up from the 
grave accusations that have been preferred 
against it. But this is nothing more, than a 
vindication of Induction from objections urged 
against it, on account of the imputed conse- 



PREFACE. 



quences to which it leads. The discourse 
therefore, in all its parts, lies strictly within 
the province of logic. 

The whole empire of human thought has 
been traversed in the discourse, revelation as 
well as nature has been searched, and Induc- 
tion has been found every where, the true 
method of Investigation. And so far from 
its being the Organon of Infidelity and 
Atheism, as has often been asserted, it is 
found, that all the lines of investigation which 
it lays open, whether in physics or psycholo- 
gy, ultimately converge and point upwards, 
to an inquiry that results by the strictest log- 
ical necessity in the belief of a God. And 
when the province of revelation is entered, 
it is found, that the very truths which Indue- 
tion has discovered in the province of nature, 
are assumed as true, in its teachings : and 
that nothing is told in revelation which does 
not consist with the inferences which Induc- 
tion has established in the province of nature. 
And on the other hand, whenever man has 
cast aside Induction, and let go the thread of 
experience as an inadequate clue to the lab- 



PREFACE. 



arynths of knowledge, and attempted by an 
a priori method of investigation and its cor- 
responding doctrine of fore-knowledge, to 
ascertain the truths whether of nature or rev- 
elation, we find that nothing but ever-vary- 
ing and ever-increasing error has been the re- 
sult. It would seem therefore, to be a legit- 
imate conclusion ; " that the understanding 
cannot decide otherwise than by Induction. " 
In undertaking a task so foreign to my ha- 
bitual pursuits, I have been influenced by a 
love of truth, and a strong desire to vindicate 
a Method of Investigation, which by its great 
doctrine, that experience is the only light to 
our path, and lamp to our feet in the pursuit 
of knowledge, is pushing forward the front- 
iers of science in every possible direction, 
with such triumphant success. And when I 
reflect, how far the task was beyond my abil- 
ities, I rejoice to know, that all the errors 
which I may have committed in the execu- 
tion of it, will be corrected in the progress of 
truth. Num fingo? num mentior? cupio re- 
felli: quid enim laboro, nisi ut Veritas in om- 
ni quaestione explicetur ? 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 



ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 



PART THE FIRST 

The Influence of the Baconian Phi- 
losophy. — Some one nation always at the 
head of the rest. England at the head of 
modern civilization. In modern civilization 
there have been three great revolutions : the 
religious, the philosophical and the political. 
The philosophical revolution originated in 
England. Lord Bacon stands at the head of 
this movement. The object of this revolu- 
tion. Bacon's writings — their publication 
and their circulation. Royal Society of Lon- 
don. The leading discoveries of the physi- 
cal sciences made in England. These dis- 
coveries enumerated, and the method oi 
their discovery pointed out. These discov- 
eries objects of the most delightful contem- 
plation. Contrast between the physical dis- 



10 TAfiLE OP CONTENTS 

coveries of the ancients and the moderns as 
objects of intellectual contemplation. Baco- 
nian philosophy practical. The application 
of its discoveries to the mechanic arts. The 
benefits conferred on England by the Baco- 
nian Philosophy. This philosophy not con- 
fined to physical nature ; but embraces intel- 
lectual and moral science. The opinion that 
this philosophy leads to a mean standard of 
beauty, refuted ; and the question examined 
at large both by philosophical analysis and 
historical fact. English literature examined, 
and its distinguishing features pointed out. 
The opinion that the Baconian philosophy 
leads to materialism and atheism refuted. 
The Baconian philosophy likely to form the 
type of universal civilization. 

PART THE SECOND.— CHAPTER -I. 

The Baconian Method of Investiga- 
tion. — The Aristotelian logic. The reason- 
ing process in its form, is the syllogism. All 
reasoning proceeds by comparison. The 
fundamental principle of the syllogism. Ba- 
con did not design .to teach a new mode of 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. II 

reasoning, but a new mode of investigation. 
The a priori method of investigation nothing 
more than a misapplication of the Aristoteli- 
an logic. The influence of the a priori meth- 
od of investigation upon philosophy. Bacon 
appears. His installation of the sciences. 
The Novum Organon, its object, the spirit of 
its philosophy, and the nature of its method 
of investigation. This method called Induc- 
tion. It is the reverse of the syllogism. 
Analysis and synthesis considered, and both 
shown to be inductive processes. The appli- 
cation of mathematics to the inductive scien- 
ces considered. Induction carried on by 
principles of evidence and not by principles 
of logic. The nature of analogy considered* 
The inductive process founded on analogy. 
The great fundamental principle of philo- 
sophical evidence developed ; and it is shown 
to bear the same relation to induction that 
the fundamental principle of logic does to 
the syllogism. Whether Bacon discovered 
the inductive process considered. 

PART THE SECOND.— CHAPTER II. 

The Theory of Mind assumed in the 



12 TABLE OF CONTENTS. 

Baconian method of Investigation : — 
Only two theories of mind, the theory of 
innate ideas, and the theory, that all our 
knowledge is founded ultimately upon expe- 
rience. The theory of innate ideas, is the 
theory of mind assumed in the a priori meth- 
od of investigation ; and the theory, that all 
our knowledge is founded upon experience, 
is that assumed in the Baconian method of 
investigation. Plato the leading Philosopher 
amongst the ancients, and Des Cartes amongst 
the moderns, who maintained the theory of 
innate ideas. Both these Philosophers main- 
tained the a priori method of investigation. 
Bacon's theory of mind, the same with that 
of Locke and Reid. They all maintained 
the theory that all our knowledge is founded 
upon experience. Locke solved the funda- 
mental problem of psychology ; and Reid de- 
veloped the fundamental laws of thought. 
The Baconian method of investigation the 
psychological correlative of the theory of 
mind that all our knowledge is founded ul- 
timately upon experience. The theory of 
mind taught in the sacred scriptures. The 



TABLE OF CONTENTS. 13 

philosophy of Kant examined. The Bacon- 
ian method of investigation traced up to the 
first impressions made upon the senses. 

PART THE THIRD. 

Natural Theology: its place amongst 
the Sciences^ and the nature of its 
evidence : — Natural Theology a branch of 
the inductive or Baconian philosophy. The 
errors of Lord Brougham's discourse of Na- 
tural Theology pointed out. The place of 
Natural Theology amongst the sciences and 
the nature of its evidence pointed out by 
Bacon. 

Hume's essay on a special Providence and 
a future state considered. The error of the 
essay shown to consist in confounding a mere 
physical cause with an intelligent creator. 
This error shown to lie at the foundation of 
all atheistical arguments. The evidences of 
Natural Theology traced up to the idea of 
causation developed in consciousness. 

PART THE FOURTH. 

The connection between Philosophy 
and Revelation : In the interpretation of 



14 TABLE OF CONTENTS 

scripture, revelation must not be subordinated 
to philosophy. The subordinating revelation 
to philosophy is now, and has always been 
the chief source of theological error. The 
influence of various systems of philosophy 
on Christianity examined. The Baconian 
Philosophy the only one consistent with Chris- 
tianity. 



ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 



The Baconian Philosophy is emphatically 
the philosophy of protestantism. Luther de- 
nounced the Aristotelian logic, because it was 
the foundation of the scholastic theology, the 
frame-work which supported its superstruc- 
ture, and the cement which held together all 
Its parts. And Bacon denounced it, because 
it was the foundation, and frame-work and 
cement of the a priori philosophy. Protes- 
tant Christianity and the Baconian philosophy 
originate in the same fountain, and flow to- 
gether in the same channels. And it is very 
remarkable that just now, so much attention 
is directed to the two great revolutions of 
modern times — the religious revolution ef- 
fected by Luther, and the philosophical revo- 
lution effected by Bacon. Two more elabo- 
rate histories of the reformation than any ev- 
er submitted to the world, are now being 



16 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 

written, and are nearly completed, — the one, 
by D'Aubigne in Switzerland, and the other, 
by Ranke in Germany. The first, as far as 
completed, has been translated into English, 
and published and read with the deepest in- 
terest over all Great Britain, and has been 
republished and read more extensively, in 
this country, than almost any other book. 
And from the high reputation of Ranke, and 
the absorbing interest of the subject, his his- 
tory will doubtless soon be translated into 
english and circulated through all the multi- 
plied channels of publication. And the most 
animating interest in the great theme, will be 
kept alive. And within a few years, Mont- 
agu's edition of Bacon's complete works, 
with translations of those written in latin, 
which had engaged the attention of the edit- 
or more than twenty years, has been publish- 
ed in England, and is now republished in 
this country; and the popular publications of 
England, and the great periodicals of both 
that and this country, have been for a long 
time teeming with commentaries and exposi- 
tions of the Baconian philosophy. The 



KNAXTTICAL introductiox. 1? 

mighty spirit of modern civilization appears 
to be stirring' up society anew, by rehearsing 
the history of its triumphs, and proclaiming 
again to the world, its great doctrines. It 
seems to be gathering up its strength, for a 
new onward movement. 

Impelled, by the same influence which is 
operating upon so many minds in the differ- 
ent nations of Christendom, we have endea- 
vored in this discourse, to exhibit a popular 
and succint, but yet a more thoroughly de- 
veloped exposition of the Baconian philoso- 
phy than any which has appeared. 

In the first part of this discourse, we have 
set forth, as the leading truth, that the Bacon- 
ian philosophy has for its primary object, the 
investigation of the laws of the material 
world, and the application of these laws, 
through the instrumentality of the useful arts, 
to the physical well-being of man. That this 
philosophy does not think it beneath its dig- 
nity, to solve the homely problems : "What 
shall we eat, and what shall we drink, and 
and wherewithall shall we be clothed ?" But 
admitting, that philosophers like other peo- 



18 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 

pie, must feed their hunger and clothe their 
nakedness, it teaches how to make with more 
facility and in greater abundance, the food 
and raiment necessary for our bodies, and 
proclaims not in whispers, but in its very 
loudest accents., that Franklin did not more 
fully exemplify the true spirit of philosophy 
when he brought down fire from heaven, than 
Fulton did, when he yoked it to the car of 
commerce.. 

And as England originated the great phi- 
losophical movement of which we are speak- 
ing, and stands at the head of modern civili- 
zation, we have cited the chief discoveries in 
the sciences made by the Anglo-Saxon race, 
and then showed how these discoveries, by 
their application to the useful arts, have ex- 
tended the dominion of man over the empire 
of nature, and in this way conferred on Eng- 
land so much wealth and power. 

After thus showing the connection of the 
Baconian philosophy with the useful arts, and 
how much it has through them, contributed 
to the physical comforts of man, we next 
show that this philosophy does not Lead v to a 



ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 19 

selfish morality, as some have alleged; but 
that in all its principles, and in all its aims, it 
tends to produce a noble and disinterested 
morality. The next question discussed, is 
the bearing of this philosophy upon the arts of 
beauty ; and it is shown by an analysis of its 
fundamental principles, that it maintains a 
.most exalted ideal. And this fact is further 
•proved and illustrated, by spreading out in 
microscopic view, the literature of England 
with all its rich and various and masculine 
beauties, which has grown up under the in- 
fluence of the spirit of this philosophy. 

We next defend this philosophy from the 
charge of materialism and atheism with which 
it is so often assailed, and show that this 
charge has no foundation either in its princi- 
ples or the influence which it has actually ex- 
erted upon the opinions of men ; for that the 
nation which has most assiduously cultivated 
it, has also done more to advance the doc- 
trines of natural theology, than any nation 
known to history. 

We conclude this part of the discourse, by 
showing that the Baconian philosophy is not 



20 ANALYTICAL INTHODUCTION, 

like the ancient philosophies, adapted to the 
culture of one .epoch .and one people only ; 
but that like Christianity it is catholic in its 
spirit and equally suited to all times and to 
every people, and that it is likely to extend 
its blessings to all nations, and gather them 
under its wings as a hen doth gather her 
chickens. 

In the second part of the discourse, we en- 
ter upon the consideration of the Baconian 
method of investigation. This part is divided 
into two chapters. The first chapter treats 
in the first place, of the Aristotelian Logic, 
and shows that it analyzes the reasoning pro- 
cess, and developes the form in which every 
argument passes through the mind, and that 
this form is the syllogism. It then shows, that 
the truth of the conclusion of an argument is 
always assumed in the premises, and is not in 
reality a new truth : but merely a particular 
instance of a general truth already known, 
and stated in the premises. It is then shown 
that the a priori method of investigation is 
nothing more than a misapplication of the 
Aristotelian logic as a method of investiga- 



ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 21 

tion. The effect of this misapplication upon 
ancient philosophy, is then shown, and the 
peculiar errors produced by it, pointed out. 
This effect is then traced down through the 
middle ages of European history, and the 
futility of the philosophy of that period is 
signalized. 

We next enter upon the consideration of 
the method of investigation taught by Bacon 
in the Novum Organon, and show that it is 
just the reverse of the syllogistic method of 
Aristotle, which had been previously used. 
It is shown that the Baconian method of in- 
vestigation proceeds from particulars to uni- 
versal, and that the syllogistic or a priori 
method proceeds from universals to particu- 
lars. And it is shown that the Baconian 
method of investigation is not a process of 
reasoning at all — is not carried on by rules 
of logic : but is carried on by rules of evi- 
dence. And that though the mathematics 
are applied to the verification of the inferen- 
ces of induction in the physical sciences, that 
still this does not take those sciences out of 
the pale of induction and put them within 



22 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 

the precincts of reasoning: the reasoning 
process being in such application of the math- 
ematics, a mere touch-stone to test the truth 
of the inductive conclusions, and not to elicit 
any new conclusion not already reached by 
induction. Analysis and synthesis are also 
considered ; and are shown to be in the sci- 
ences o( contingent truth, inductive process- 
es and not processes of reasoning, and that 
they are what Bacon called the ascending and 
descending processes of induction. And as 
we show that induction is carried on by means 
of principles of evidence and not by princi- 
ples of logic, we enter upon the considera- 
tion of the nature of philosophical evidence \ 
and show that all evidence may be divided 
into analogy and identity ; and that the whole 
inductive process, as long as that process is 
founded on mere probability, no matter how 
great is the probability, proceeds on analogi- 
cal evidence. And we show that all the 
great discoveries in physical science have 
been made by the evidence of analogy. We 
then distinguish between philosophical anal- 
ogy, and rhetorical analogy ; and show that 



ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION, 23 

the distinction is an important one, and that 
for want of this distinction men have contin- 
ually fallen into error. And finally we evolve 
out of our analysis of the inductive process-, 
the great fundamental principle of philosoph- 
ical evidence, which hears the same relation 
to induction, that the Dictum de omni et nullo 
of Aristotle, does to the syllogism. And thus 
we have rendered induction just as systematic 
as Aristotle did the syllogism. And surely 
it is much more difficult to develop a princi- 
ple which shall embrace in its application the 
innumerable particular instances which occur 
in every science or department of nature, 
and show the connection between them and 
the inductive inference properly inferrible 
from them, than it is to develop a principle 
which shall show the connection between the 
premises and conclusion of an argument : 
and therefore such a principle is so much the 
more important. 

Mr. Macaulay in his celebrated review of 
Bacon's writings seemed to think that no 
such principle as the one just mentioned could 
be developed — that no precise rule can ho 



24 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 

given, marking the difference between instan- 
ces from which a sound inductive inference 
can be drawn, and instances from which such 
an inference cannot be drawn. And with a 
levity characterized more by the spirit of a 
coquette, than of a philosopher — with strong 
words and weak arguments — he has attempt- 
ed to ridicule by the reductio ad absurdum, 
the value of Bacon's delineation of the in- 
ductive process in the second book of the 
Novum Organon. He amuses himself, and 
as he supposed, his readers too, with a ludi- 
crous caricature of the inductive process, in 
showing that it is by it, that a man finds out 
that he has been made sick by the mince pies 
which he had eaten. It would have been 
quite as philosophical, to have attempted to 
depreciate the inductive process^ by showing 
that it was by that process, that Hudibras ar- 
rived at the conclusion that it was not neces- 
sary to have more than one spur ; because he 
had ascertained by actual experiment, that 
one side of his horse could not move without 
the other, and that therefore, if one spur 
could make one side go, it would make the 



ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION, 25 

other go too. Mr. Macaulay well knows that 
ridicule is not argument. And doubtless he 
would readily perceive, that the fact, that 
Hudibras 



••* by geometric scale, 



Could take the size of pots of ale ; 
Resolve by signs and tangents, straight, 
If bread or butter wanted weight," 

does not detract from the dignity of New- 
ton's Principia or prove that the rules of 
geometry are useless. And yet he does not 
perceive the folly of attacking by ridicule, 
the development of induction which Bacon 
has given in the second book of the Novum 
Organon. But smitten with the ambition of 
critical display, he sacrifices truth to rhetoric. 
And in his attempts to reduce to absurdity, 
the reasonings of others, he plunges into that 
predicament himself. Flying upon the wings 
of antithesis, and in his onward course show- 
ing first one wing of the antithesis and then 
the other, in order that his readers may ad- 
mire their brilliancy and their contrast, and 
more intent upon the grandeur of his flight 
than the point to which he is moving, he i& 
3 



26 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 

sometimes carried to the most preposterous 
conclusions. And on the point which we are 
now examining he goes the whole length of 
declaring that grammar and logic and rhetoric 
are useless studies. When it is a knowledge 
of these very studies, which has strengthened 
and plumed his own wings, and enabled him 
to soar aloft so boldly and gracefully, that we 
cannot but admire his flight, even when it is 
beyond the regions of truth and common 
sense. 

But not content with ridiculing induction 
by general remarks, Mr. Macaulay, as if to 
signalize its absurdity, ridicules it in all its de- 
tails, until his criticism rivals m the minute- 
ness of its anatomy, the celebrated curse 
which Dr. Slop, at the request of Mr. Shan- 
dy, read aloud, to the so great horror of my 
uncle Toby. " We have heard (says he) 
that an eminent judge of the last generation 
was in the habit of jocosely propounding, 
after dinner a theory, that the cause of the 
prevalence of Jacobinism was the practice of 
bearing three names. He quoted on the one 
side Charles James Fox, Richard Brinsley 



ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 27 

Sheridan, John Home Tooke, John Philpot 
Curran, Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Theobald 
Wolfe Tone : These were instantiae con- 
venientes. He then proceeded to cite in- 
stances absentiae in proxime : — William Pitt, 
John Scott, William Wyndham, Samuel 
Horsely, Henry Dundas, Edmund Burke 
He might have gone on to instances secundum 
magis et minus. The practice of giving chil- 
dren three names, is more common in Ameri- 
ca than England. In England we have a 
King and a House of Lords, but the Ameri- 
cans are republicans. The rejectiones are ob- 
vious. Burke and Theobald Wolfe Tone 
were both Irishmen; therefore the being an 
Irishman, is not the cause of Jacobinism. 
Horsely and Home Tooke were both Clergy- 
men; therefore the being a Clergyman, is not 
the cause of Jacobinism. Fox and Wynd- 
ham were both educated at Oxford; and 
therefore the being educated at Oxford, is 
not the cause of Jacobinism. In this way our 
inductive philosopher arrives at what Bacon 
calls the vintage, and pronounces that the hav- 
ing three names is the cause of Jacobinism." 



ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 



" Here is an induction corresponding with 
Bacon's analysis, and ending in a monstrous 
absurdity. In what, then does this induction 
differ from the induction which leads us to 
the conclusion that the presence of the sun 
is the cause of our having more light by day 
than night ! The difference evidently is not 
in the kind of instances, but in the number of 
instances; that is to say, the difference is not 
in that part of the process for which Bacon 
has given precise rules, but in a circumstance, 
for which no precise rule can possibly be giv- 
en." Now we join issue with Mr. Macaulay 
and say that it is the kind of instances as well 
as the number of instances which constitute 
the difference between the two cases which 
he puts. For if the instances of the three 
names had been as numerous as the whole 
Jacobin party, though it would have been a 
marvellous coincidence, yet no man in his 
senses w T ould have believed that the bearing 
three names was the cause of the prevalence 
of Jacobinism ; and simply because, the in- 
stances are not of the kind from which an in- 
ductive inference can be drawn : they being: 



ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 29 

the mere coincidence of chance, and not 
kindred facts conjoined by a law of nature. 
It is true that if every Jacobin had borne three 
names, it might have been inferred that there 
was some cause for such a conjunction of facts ; 
that their parents, perhaps, from some com- 
mon motive gave their children three names, 
just as'the old Puritans from a common motive, 
gave their children whole verses of scripture 
for names. But under no circumstances what- 
ever could it be inferred that the bearing 
three names was the cause of the prevalence 
of Jacobinism. The fact that the presence 
of the sun is the cause of more light by day 
than night is a fact in nature, and is support- 
ed as every fact in nature always is, by innu- 
merable analogies. But is the naming chil- 
dren a fact in nature — a work of the Creator? 
Is the bearing three names and the being a 
Jacobin, a relation established by the Creator 
of the universe ? Is there any analogy in na- 
ture from which it can be inferred that the 
one is the cause of the other? Certainly 
none. It might as well be supposed that the 

wearing pantaloons is the cause of one per- 
3* 



20 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION 



son's being a man, and the wearing petticoats, 
the cause of another person's being a woman, 
as that the bearing three names is the cause 
of one's being a Jacobin. 

This then is the difference between the two 
kinds of instances, and "the circumstance for 
which a precise rule can be given :" the one 
is the constant connection between ttvo facts 
in nature, the other, the casual coincidence of 
two facts totally irrelevant, and dependent on 
the acts of man. Their difference is perceiv- 
ed intuitively, and therefore cannot be made 
plainer by illustration. Our remarks in the 
discourse, on analogy, appear to us, to throw 
light upon the subject. 

Mr. Macaulay after exhausting his weapons 
of ridicule, becomes very serious, and says 
"that the difference between a sound and 
unsound, or to use the Baconian phraseology, 
between the interpretation of nature and the 
anticipation of nature, does not lie in this — 
that the interpreter of nature goes through 
the process analzyed in the second book of 
the Novum Organon and the anticipator 
through a different process. They both per- 



. 



ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 31 

form the same process. But the anticipator 
performs it foolishly or carelessly ; the inter- 
preter performs it with patience, attention 
and sagacity, and judgment. Now precepts 
can do little towards making men patient and 
attentive, and still less towards making them 
sagacious and judicious." JN T ow these sober 
remarks of Mr. Macau] ay are not entitled to 
one tittle more respect as exhibitions of truth 
than those which we have been examining. 
Precepts of no use! Why ; are not precept 
and example the only guide of man ? and is 
not the whole force of example in its being 
the expression of a precept? The mere 
general precept which lies at the foundation 
of the Baconian philosophy, that we should 
scrutinize with caution the phenomena of na^ 
ture, before we draw our inferences, has rev- 
olutionized philosophy ; and yet it is gravely 
asserted, by one of the most brilliant writers, 
and adroit critics of the age, that precepts 
are useless in philosophical investigations, and 
in every thing else. We readily admit, that 
as long as induction is confined, to ascertain- 
ing what article of diet has made a man sick, 



32 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 

or whether one side of a horse can move 
without the other, precepts are of very little 
use. But then, it must be remembered, that 
induction " resembles the tent which the 
fairy Paribanou gave to Prince Ahmed. 
Fold it, and it seemed a toy for the hand of 
a lady. Spread it, and the armies of power- 
ful Sultans might repose beneath its shade." 
When it is the toy for the hand of a lady, we 
may use it without the aid of precepts, but 
when it is spread out so that the armies of 
powerful sultans may repose beneath its shade, 
we cannot manage it by our unaided strength. 
Having thus, in the first chapter of the 
second part of the discourse, considered the 
Baconian method of investigation, in the sec- 
ond chapter, we consider the theory of mind 
assumed in that method. We show, there 
never has been, and that there never can be, 
more than two theories of mind : and these 
two theories are the theory of innate ideas, 
and the theory that all our knowledge is 
founded ultimately in experience. We show 
that the theory of innate ideas is the theory 
assumed in the a priori method of investiga- 



ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 33 

tion ; and that the theory that all our knowl- 
edge is founded ultimately in experience, is 
that assumed in the Baconian method of in- 
vestigation. It is shown that Plato was the 
leading philosopher amongst the ancients and 
Des Cartes amongst the moderns, who main- 
tained the theory of innate ideas ; and that 
both these philosophers maintained the a pri- 
ori method of investigation. It is next shown 
that Bacon had a distinct view of the the- 
ory of mind that all our knowledge is founded 
ultimately in experience ; and that this is the 
theory of mind which has been developed by 
Locke and Reid. We show that Locke solv- 
ed the great fundamental problem of this the- 
ory of mind, and showed that all our knowl- 
edge originates in sensation and conscious- 
ness. And that Reid established this theory 
still more firmly by developing the great psy- 
chological laws which lie at the foundation of 
this theory, and which govern human belief 
in the knowledge derived through these orig- 
inal sources of information. He developed 
the law which governs our belief in the tes- 
timony of sensation, and the law which gov- 



34 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 

erns our belief in the testimony of concious- 
ness. He also developed the law which gov- 
erns our belief in the testimony of memory, 
and the law which governs our belief, that 
the future will be like the past, and that like 
causes will produce like effects. This last is 
the fundamental law of induction. And 
thus we trace up the Baconian method of in- 
vestigation through the theory of mind which 
it assumes in every step of knowledge until 
we trace the process up to the very first im- 
pressions made upon the senses, and we 
show the psychological law for every act of 
the mind in the process. We next examine 
the philosophy of Kant, and show that his 
doctrine of a priori conceptions of the rea- 
son, has the same logical characteristics as the 
doctrine of innate ideas; and that it assumes 
the a priori method of investigation. We 
have therefore in the two chapters of this 
part of the discourse, exhibited an outline of 
a complete system of logic in the largest sense 
of the term ; and furnished in it a touch- 
stone of philosophical criticism by which the 
reasonings of all philosophies may be tested. 



ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 35 

In the third part of the discourse, we ap- 
ply the second part by way of philosophical 
criticism, to Lord Brougham's Discourse of 
Natural Theology, and Hume's Essay on a 
special Providence and a future State. We 
show that Lord Brougham in the very outset 
commits a logical blunder, which vitiates much, 
of his subsequent reasonings. And that he 
does not solve the problem which he has pro- 
posed to himself; but that he always dodges 
it, or passes it over, by a mere assertion. We 
show that this results from his overlooking 
some of the logical and psychological princi- 
ples which we have developed in the second 
part of our discourse. We then show how 
by an application of these principles, the 
problem which Lord Brougham has proposed 
to himself can be solved. We next show 
that the great doctrine of Lord Brougham's 
discourse, that Natural Theology is a branch 
of the inductive or Baconian philosophy, and 
is founded on the same sort of evidence as 
that philosophy, had been distinctly advanced 
by Bacon, and set forth with the most accu- 
rate discrimination ;, and from the fact that 



36 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION 

Brougham comments in his discourse up- 
on this portion of Bacon's writings, we are 
at a loss to determine whether he could have 
misunderstood Bacon, or whether he wished 
to pervert Bacon's doctrine, in order that he 
might have the credit of having first shown 
the true place of Natural Theology amongst 
the sciences. 

After having examined Lord Brougham's- 
discourse, we proceed to examine Hume's 
Essay on a Special Providence and a future 
State ; and we show by an application of the 
psychological and logical principles developed 
by us in the second part of the discourse, 
that the whole fallacy of Hume's doctrine 
consists in his confounding an intelligent 
Creator with a mere physical cause. And 
we show that this is the clue by which the 
sophistical labyrinths of his argument are to 
be traced. As soon as the distinction between 
an intelligent Creator and a mere physical 
cause is applied to Hume's reasonings, hie 
whole argument point after point, falls to the 
ground, as if touched by the wand of a talis- 
man ; and we feel astonished that the essay 



ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 37 

should^ by the apparent strength of its for- 
tresses, have so long kept off the attacks of 
natural theologians : and should at this day 
be considered so formidable as to lead Lord 
Brougham to remark that,- -"we -may the rath- 
er conclude that it. is not very easily answer- 
ed, because in fact it has rarely if ever been 
encountered by writers on theological sub- 
jects." And it is remarkable that no writer 
on natural theology, as well as we can recol- 
lect, has shown the importance in our rea- 
sonings on natural theology, of the distinct- 
ion between an intelligent Creator and a mere 
physical cause, and yet it is the confounding 
of so obvious a distinction that has caused the 
chief difficulty on this subject. We have 
shown that with this distinction there is no 
difficulty whatever in maintaining on the prin- 
ciples of the inductive philosophy, the truth 
of natural theology ; but that without this 
distinction j natural theology must fail. 

In the fourth part of the discourse, the 
connection between philosophy and revela- 
tion, is examined. It is shown, that when 

we interpret revelation according to the light. 

4- 



38 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 

of reason, we in reality, interpret it accord- 
ing to philosophy, as reason has no light, but 
that of experience, and this is philosophy. 
From this consideration, it is shown that the 
proper way to interpret the scriptures, is by 
a sound interpretation exercised upon their 
own proper teachings. It is also shown, that 
the scriptures, on account of the fact, that 
their author knew the future as well as the 
present and the past, and has directed some 
of his doctrines accordingly, cannot be inter- 
pretted altogether as a mere human writing. 
It is also shown, that the scriptures, are not 
confined to the doctrines of revelation, but con- 
tain much which lies within the province of 
philosophy ; and as they do not teach philoso- 
phy, but theology, they must follow philoso- 
phy in all things upon which it can speak au- 
thoritatively as belonging to its province. A 
difference however, is pointed out in the ap- 
plication of this rule, between physics and 
psychology ; as the scriptures throw no light 
over physical science, but throw much over 
psychology. 

From this view of the connection between 



ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 39 

philosophy and revelation, it is shown that 
the a priori method of interpreting the scrip- 
tures, — of forcing one's philosophy upon its 
teachings — is altogether erroneous. That we 
should never subordinate revelation to philos- 
ophy. And it is shown, that the neglect of 
this great truth has been the chief source of 
error in every age of Christianity. That at 
the present day, the scriptures are continually 
perverted by subordinating their teachings to 
philosophy. This is shown to be the case, in 
the recent work of Prof. Bush on the Resur- 
rection ; and to be the case, in the heterodox 
theology of New England ; and also to be 
the case, in the perversions o^ theology in 
Germany and France. It is shown too, that 
during the middle ages, the philosophy of 
Aristotle exerted a pernicious influence over 
Christianity by cramping its vital spirit within 
its own dry and meagre forms. It is shown 
also, that in the earliest ages of Christianity, 
the scriptures were perverted by forcing upon 
them the doctrines of the different systems of 
philosophy which then prevailed. The Eb- 
ionises, the Gnostics, and the Platonists, &\l 



40 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 

perverted^ the doctrines of revelation, by 
forcing upon the scriptures in their interpre- 
tation of them, the peculiar doctrines of their 
respective philosophy. And thus, the a 
priori method of interpretting scripture, is as 
false, as the a priori method of interpretting 
nature. 

It is next shown, that there is however a 
philosophy which is consistent with Christian- 
ity in both its method of investigation and its 
principles — a philosophy which bows down 
in humility before Christianity, and acknowl- 
edges its ignorance of the great truths which 
it proclaims. This is shown to be the Baco- 
nian or Inductive philosophy. The inductive 
method of investigation is shown, to corres- 
pond with the nature of Christianity. The 
great truths of Christianity upon which sal- 
vation depends, are shown to be, like the 
truths of nature upon which natural life de- 
pends, so plain, that "the way-faring man 
though a fool need not err therein. " The 
great cardinal doctrine of justification by faith, 
and also the doctrine of the paramount im- 
portance of truth in the conversion of man, 



ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION, 41 

which holds so prominent a place in the sys- 
tem of theology called evangelical, are shown 
to stand under those psychological laws, 
which the inductive philosophy has discover- 
ed. And thus the evangelical theology and 
the Baconian philosophy are shown to be 
parts of one great system of thought. 

We have then, in the first part of the dis- 
course, shown the nature of the Baconian 
philosophy ; in the second part, the Baconi- 
an method of investigation, and the theory 
of mind assumed in that method ; in the 
third part, we have shown, how by the appli- 
cation of the logical and psychological princi- 
ples developed in the second part, it may be 
used as a touchstone of philosophical criti- 
cism, and at the same time it is shown, that na- 
tural theology is a branch of the inductive phi- 
losophy; and in the fourth part, we have 
shown the connection between philosophy 
and revelation. And now, all that we ask of 
the reader is, that he will not read one part 
of the discourse, without reading the whole ; 
as the discourse is arranged in a sort of logi- 
cal perspective, so that every part casts light 



42 ANALYTICAL INTRODUCTION. 

upon the others, and it is impossible to see the 
full import of either part without reading 
them all. 



PART THE FIRST. 



INFLUENCE OF THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY, 



In every age of the world, since the human 
family has been so numerous as to be divided 
into separate communities, some one nation 
has exerted a predominant influence over the 
rest. This appears to be the economy of civ- 
ilization. The Grecian Republics, (for they 
all were but one nation,) and Rome, in their 
successive order in history, have, of all the 
nations of antiquity, exerted the most import- 
ant influence on the destinies of man. But, 
in modern times a new order of civilization 
has arisen ; and for more than two centuries, 
England has stood at the head of this new 
order of things. Enthroned upon the riches 
of a universal commerce, enlightened by the 
knowledge of every science, armed with the 
power, and accomplished with the embellish- 



44 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY, 

ments of every art — baptized into the spirit 
of Christianity, she is influencing and control- 
ling the destinies of the human race towards 
a glorious consummation. 

In the progress of this civilization, there 
have been three great revolutions, the religi- 
ous, the philosophical, and the political. After 
the human mind had thrown off the coercive 
authority of the Papal Church, the moral au- 
thority of the ancient philosophers still re- 
mained ; and what Luther did in the eman- 
cipation of the mind from the first, Bacon did 
in the emancipation of the mind from the last. 
Luther burnt the Pope's bull in 1520, and Ba- 
con published his Novum Organon in 1620. 
The religious revolution, therefore, preceded 
the philosophical, and both of these, the poli- 
tical. Not, however, that these revolutions 
did not move on simultaneously ; but, that in 
their progress, they were in advance of each 
other, in the order which we have indicated. 
Though they grew together they differed in 
maturity. Their crises were successive. Per- 
haps, the divine wisdom is displayed in this 
order of things — perhaps any other order is 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 45 

impossible in the moral economy of the world : 
it being necessary that the restraints upon 
man, should be thrown off, not all at once, but 
separately, as he advances in mental and mor- 
al improvement. These then, are the move- 
ments, which Europe has made in civilization. 
She has thrown off religious despotism, she 
has thrown off philosophical despotism, she 
has thrown off political despotism. And she 
has advanced to this position, through many 
a bloody agony. The treasures of the indus- 
try of ages have been spent, the chivalry of 
thousands of heroes, the studies by day and 
by night of scholars and philosophers, the 
genius of poets exhibiting in their composi- 
tions those actions which ennoble the soul, the 
patriotic and humane sentiments of orators 
clothed in the thunders of impassioned dic- 
tion — all these have been spent in purchasing 
the civilization of modern Europe. It be- 
comes then, an important inquiry to ascertain 
the character of the philosophy of that peo- 
ple, into whose keeping, so far as human a- 
gency is concerned, the destinies of Europe 



46 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

appear ; in the progress of history, to have 
been confided by divine providence. 

We will, therefore, pass over the religious 
and political revolutions, and even the litera- 
ture of modern times, and confine ourselves 
entirely to the philosophical revolution which 
originated in England, and which is exerting 
so important an influence over the destinies of 
man, through the agency of that great people. 

We propose then, to sketch the rise and pro- 
gress of the most wonderful philosophical rev- 
olution, and the most glorious in its results up- 
on the pursuits and happiness of man, of any 
within the whole history of the world. We 
propose to give some account of the philoso- 
phy of utility — the philosophy of lightning 
rods, of steam engines, safety lamps, spinning 
jennies and cotton jins — the philosophy which 
has covered the barren hills and the sterile 
rocks in verdure, and the deserts with fer- 
tility — which has clothed the naked, fed the 
hungry, and healed the sick — the philosophy 
of peace, which is converting the sword into 
the pruning hook, and the spear into the 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHT. 47 

ploughshare. This is the philosophy of which 
we propose to give some account. 

It was Lord Bacon, who launched the hu- 
man mind upon this new career of discovery. 
He is the great reformer, who stands at the 
head of the teachers of this philosophy. 
Physical nature seemed perfectly impenetra- 
ble to the acutest intellects of the ancients. 
They could not get over even the threshold of 
physical science. Indeed, they cannot be said 
to have had any natural philosophy at all; so 
absurd were all their doctrines about physical 
nature. Neither did the philosophers of the 
middle ages, with all their assiduity, succeed 
in exploring this field of knowledge. And, 
though the discoveries of Copernicus, Kepler, 
Galileo and Tycho Brahe show that Provi- 
dence was preparing the way for a new era in 
physical science, and the discoveries of Roger 
Bacon in the thirteenth century indicate the 
same fact, yet it remained for Lord Bacon to 
generalize the idea which philosophers were 
begining to see obscurely and in single instan- 
ces, and to reveal to the philosophical world, 
what it had been prepared to comprehend : — 



48 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

That true philosophy must be connected with 
the arts, that while it satisfies the highest facul- 
ties of the speculative intellect it may be appli- 
ed to the physical wants, and the general well- 
being of man. That living as we do in a 
world where general and permanent laws ob- 
tain, and under their dominion, it is the object 
of natural philosophy to ascertain these laws, 
in order that we may not, in our endeavours 
to promote our comforts, act against these 
laws, and thus attempt impossibilities ; and 
also, that " these laws are not only invincible 
opponents, but irresistible auxiliaries. " Ba- 
con wished to make every* power of nature 
work for man, the winds, the waters, gravity, 
heat and all the mighty energies, which lie 
like the fabled giants of old under the moun- 
tains. These he wished to unloose from their 
fetters^ and bring as servants under the domin- 
ion of man. Such are the grand conceptions 
which Bacon proclaimed to the world. 

Scarcely had Bacon published his writings 
before they were republished upon the con- 
tinent of Europe. The treatise De Augmen- 
ts was republished in France in 1624> the 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 49 

year after its appearance in England ; and it 
was translated into French in 1632. Editions 
were also published in Holland in 1645, 1652 
and 1662. The Novum Organon was thrice 
printed in Holland, in 1645, 1650 and 1660; 
and men of every cast in the higher walks of 
life on the continent of Europe were conver- 
sant with his writings. Gassendi, Des Cartes 
Richelieu, Voiture, and at a later period Leib- 
nitz, Boerhave and Puffendorf were loud in 
his praise. Indeed, his fame spread beyond 
the bounds of his own country, more rapid- 
ly than that of any philosopher within the 
whole history of letters. What an impulse-, 
then, must the philosophy of Bacon have 
given directly and indirectly to the progress 
of the human mind upon the continent of Eu- 
rope ! for its advances there, have been made 
by pursuing the Baconian method of investi- 
gation. But let us see the progress of his 
philosophy in England, and cite some exam- 
ples of the leading, discoveries which have 
been made by the Anglo-Saxon race. 

Not long after the death of Lord Bacon, in 
1626, the Royal Society of London- was es--- 



50 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

tablished for the promotion of the sciences^ , 
and all England resounded with his praise. 
The philosophers of England almost adored 
his genius. They felt that he had a true En- 
glish mind. That he was the father of En- 
glish philosophy. That the English mind 
had at last given to it a method of philosophi- 
zing suited to its practical and common sense 
turn. And, behold the results written upon 
the glorious records of English philosophy! 
In every department of physical science, 
England has made the leading discoveries; 
and other nations, though their scientific la- 
bours have been so brilliant, have done little 
more than extended her researches and veri- 
fy her theories. In physiology, the two 
greatest discoveries were made by philoso- 
phers of the British isle. Harvey discover- 
ed the circulation of the blood, and publish- 
ed his treatise Exercitatio de motu cordis, as 
early as 1628. He was the cotemporary and 
intimate friend of Bacon. Sir Charles Bell 
discovered that there are two distinct sets of 
nerves, those of sensation and those of mo- 
tion. And it is worthy of remark that both 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 51 

these great discoveries, so important to medi- 
cal science, were discovered by considera- 
tions founded upon the evidence of final 
causes. Harvey discovered the circulation 
of the blood, by reflecting on the use of those 
valves in the veins whose structure is such as 
to prevent the reflox of the blood towards 
the extremities. And Sir Charles Bell tells 
us in a notei to his Bridgewater treatise on 
the hand, that the views taken of the nervous 
system in the chapter of that work on " Sen- 
sibility and Touch, " where the uses and en- 
dowments of the different nerves are consi- 
dered, guided him in his original experiments 
by which he established the great doctrine, 
that there are two sets of nerves prevading 
the whole animal system. By observation 
and experiment, he had ascertained that each 
nerve of sense has a distinct endowment, so 
:that one nerve can never subserve the pur- 
pose of another, the nerve of vision for ex- 
ample, can never serve for hearing, nor that 
of taste for smelling, and so forth. And he 
further observed, that each of these nerves 
arose from a distinct part of the brain. He 



52 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

therefore concluded, that for the brain at 
least, different nerves have different functions 
derived from the spots whence they originate. 
It therefore occurred to him, that perhaps, 
the two great nervous functions of the body, 
sensation and motion, are performed by differ- 
ent nerves having different functions. This 
however did not appear to be the case, as far 
as observation and experiment had been 
made ; for on cutting the trunk of a nerve, a 
limb was found to be deprived of both feeling 
and motion. Still, such was the force of the 
inductive principle which he had established 
relative to the nerves of the head, that he con- 
jectured that what appeared to be one nerve, 
might in reality be a bundle of nerves tied 
and packed together for convenience of dis- 
tribution. And on further investigation, he 
discovered, that these apparently single nerv- 
es, did really run into the spinal marrow by 
two roots, one originating in the anterior, the 
other, in the posterior column. He then pro- 
ceeded to experiment upon the important fact 
thus discovered. He laid bare the spine of 
an ass, and on irritating the anterior root, the 






THE BACONIAN THILOSOPH¥. '53 

muscles supplied by the nerve were convul- 
sed, while a touch of the posterior root made 
the animal wince, as from pain. 

But though this v/as strong proof, that mo- 
tion belonged to the anterior root, and sensa- 
tion, to the posterior, still, it was not conclu- 
sive ; as it could not be determined with cer- 
tainty, whether the pain indicated by the ani- 
mal when the nerve was irritated, did not re- 
sult from wounding the raw surface. In pur- 
suing his investigations, he observed, that the 
nerve to which he had ascribed sensation, 
throughout the whole course of the spine, 
had a ganglion or bulge on its roots, and that 
rthe nerve to which motion had been ascribed, 
had none. This difference in structure, 
which in itself is some evidence of difference 
in function, became a salient point to a cer- 
tain proof, that there is a difference in the 
functions of the two sets of nerves. For 
upon further investigation, he discovered a 
nerve of the head which arose from two roots, 
on one of which there was a ganglion, but 
none on the other ; and that these nerves in- 
stead of being bound together in one sheath 
5* 



,54 THE .-BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

as is the case with the spinal nerves, run sep- 
erate, and also instead of being covered with 
much flesh, come to the very surface of the 
face. Inferring therefore, with that sagacity 
which can interpret every intelligible indica- 
tion, that these nerves were specially design- 
ed to give sensation and motion to the head, 
he by a slight puncture of the root, ascertain- 
ed that the nerve with the ganglion on it, 
was a nerve of sensation. And thus the 
strongest proof was adduced, that the nerves 
of the posterior column of the spine anala- 
gous to this one in structure, were so in func- 
tion, as had been supposed; for this nerve 
being separate from any other, and lying at 
the very surface, could be punctured without 
wounding a raw surface, and still it exhibited 
indications of a function analagous to that 
which had been ascribed to those analagous 
to it in structure. And thus the fact, that the 
two great nervous functions of the body, sen- 
sation and motion j are performed by two dif- 
ferent sets of nerves having different endow- 
ments, was discovered. 

Modern medicine also may be said to 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 55 

have arisen in England. Sydenham, who 
had maturely studied Bacon's writings, laid 
the foundation of the science of medicine 
by pointing out, both by precept and ex- 
ample, the true method of observing the 
symptoms of disease, and of applying cura- 
tive means according to the natural indica- 
tions. Since his time, medicine has, by the 
aid of its auxiliary sciences, made rapid 
progress : but still his works are of much 
-value, even yet, on account of their profound 
general views. And John Hunter may be 
said to have originated the science of com- 
parative anatomy and physiology, by bringing 
experiment into the study of these branches 
of knowledge, thereby showing how to lay 
open the great mysteries of the human or- 
ganization. Surgical and medical pathology, 
which before his time were entirely conjec- 
tural, assumed from his principles a more pos- 
itive character. But to a disciple of Hunter, 
belongs the most important as well as the 
most extraordinary discovery ever made in 
medicine. From the fact that small-pox, like 
some few other diseases, cannot, as a general 



56 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

fact^ afflict the same subject but once, the 
practice of inoculation had been introduced ; 
as the inoculated disease, on account of the 
healthful condition of the patient when the 
virus is introduced into his system, and the 
treatment to which he can be subjected by 
way of preparation, was found less virulent 
than the disease taken in the natural w T av, and 
yet retained its power to protect from a se- 
cond attack. Though this was true, still 
thousands died of the inoculated disease ; and 
many contracted the disease from the inocula- 
ted patients; and thus was ever kept open 
new sources of the dreadful malady. Yet so 
awful was the natural disease, that inoculation 
though so terrible an expedient, was justly 
considered a valuable remedy. 

In this state of medical science relative to 
this awful disease, Dr. Jenner of England, 
having when a youth, heard a country girl re- 
mark, that she was not afraid of small-pox, 
for she had had the cow-pox, caught at the 
idea, and continued to enquire and reflect 
about it, year after year, until he evolved the 
important doctrine of vaccination. With that 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 57 

inductive sagacity which seizes upon those 
analogies between dissimilar things that are the 
clues by which the labyrinths of nature's se- 
crets are to be explored, he conceived the bold 
idea of introducing the disease of a beast into: 
the human frame, as a means of preventing a* 
worse disease natural to man. From a careful 
examination of facts suggested by the remark 
of the country girl he had been led to believe^ 
that cow-pox, when taken by milk-maids from 
the udders mi cows, will prevent the small- 
pox. He therefore conjectured that it might 
advantageously supersede the inoculated small- 
pox, as it was a perfectly harmless disease 
even when taken in ;the natural way, and 
would, he supposed from analogy to the 
small-pox, be still milder when taken by 
inoculation, and yet like inoculated small-pox., 
would retain its protecting power. Experi- 
ment was therefore made. On the four-" 
teenth day of May 1796, he inoculated a boy 
in the arm, with vaccine virus taken from a 
pustule on the hand of a young woman who 
had been infected by her master's cows. The 
disease took effect. On the first of the sue- 



58 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOBHY. 

ceeding July he inoculated tthe boy with 
small-pox virus, and as he had predicted, 
without the least effect. And thus was made 
a discovery which has saved the lives of mil- 
lions of the human race ; and has rescued 
youth and beauty from the loathsome em- 
braces of a disease, which even when it 
spares the life of its victim, leaves upon him 
forever the indelible marks of its malignity. 
We delight to record, such triumphs of sci- 
ence over human woe.; and to listen to the 
joy of the great discoverer in announcing his 
success to the world. " While the vaccine 
discovery (says Jenner) was progressive, the 
joy 1 felt at the prospect before me, of being 
the instrument destined to take away from 
the world, one of its greatest calamities, blend- 
ed with the hope of enjoying independence 
and domestic peace and happiness, was often 
so excessive, that in pursuing my favourite 
subject among the meadows, I have some- 
times found myself in a revery. It is pleas- 
ant to me to recollect, that these reflections 
always ended in devout acknowledgments to 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 59 

that being from whom this and all other mer- 
cies flow. M 

In Chemistry too, the greatest discoveries 
have been made in England. The laws of 
chemical combination, which are of so much 
practical as well as scientific utility, were dis- 
covered by Dalton. But in showing what 
England has done for Chemistry, Ave must 
not give too much prominence even to this 
grand discovery, though it extends over the 
whole domain of chemical investigation, and 
lies at the very foundation of the science. 
For not only have other brilliant discoveries in 
chemistry been made in England, but indeed, 
modern chemistry may be said to have origi- 
nated there, or rather in the British isle. In 
1752 Dr. Black of Edinburg, in experiment- 
ing with the alkalies and alkaline earths 
discovered, that causticity (which had been 
commonly believed to be acquired by lime 
from the fire in the process of calcination, 
which is then called quick-lime, and that all 
other alkaline substances derived it from the 
quick-lime, as they with the exception of mag- 
nesia can only be rendered caustic by being 



60 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

treated with it) is in reality owing to the loss 
of an aeriform substance with which they had 
been combined, and that they become mild 
again by a re-union with that substance. 
This aeriform substance or gass, which is 
now called carbonic acid, Black called fixed 
air, to denote that it is found fixed in bodies 
as well as in a separate elastic state. He dis- 
covered that this fixed air is separated from al- 
kalies and alkaline earths by heat, or by acids 
which have a greater affinity for them than 
the fixed air has. He also discovered that 
the very same elastic substance was produced 
by the fermentation of vegetable bodies, also 
by the combustion of charcoal, and that it 
is also evolved in the breathing of animals. 

The importance of this discovery consists 
in the fact that contrary to the universal be- 
lief, it w T as thereby discovered that atmospher- 
ic air is not the only permanently elastic body, 
but that there are others which though trans- 
parent and invisible like atmospheric air, yet 
possess very different qualities, and are ca- 
pable of loosing their elasticity by entering 
fcto chemical combination with either solids 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 61 

or liquids, and of regaining their elastic state 
on being separated from them. What a new 
view of things, must the discovery thus made, 
that the solid marble is nothing but dust 
bound together by an invisible gas, have 
given ! What a wide field of investigation 
did this strange insight into nature, open be- 
fore the philosopher ! 

And Black made another discovery quite 
as remarkable as this. About the year 1763, 
from the fact ascertained by him, that when 
heat converts a solid into a liquid, as when 
ice is reduced to water, by putting it into its 
own weight of hot water, or a liquid is con- 
verted into a vapour, the liquid or vapour re- 
sulting is no hotter than the solid or liquid 
from which they are produced, though in the 
process a great amount of heat has actually 
entered into the substances; and from the 
fact, that when the water freezes or the va- 
pour condenses an unexpected amount of 
heat is given out, he drew the inference, that 
the quantity of heat which could not be indi- 
cated by the thermometer, remained latent in 

the body. For in converting water into ice. 
6 



62 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

as much as one hundred and forty degrees of 
heat are expended, and yet the water will be 
as cold as the ice — the thermometer will 
stand at thirty two (freezing point,) instead, 
as might be expected, at one hundred and 
seventy two. And thus was revealed the 
mysterious doctrine of latent heat. 

This discovery and that of fixed air are 
auxiliary to the illustration of each other, and 
are the basis, or at all events, the chief salient 
points of modern chemistry. As it was now 
ascertained that there are other permanently 
elastic bodies besides atmospheric air, and 
as it appeared to be a fundamental fact in 
nature, chemical investigation necessarily 
took the direction which it indicated, as the 
way to important truths; and a mere 
talent for experiment might now proceed 
with the most brilliant success in a path, 
which none but the highest genius for induc- 
tive research could have laid open to the in- 
quirer. And such was the course of chem- 
ical enquiry. All chemists at once entered 
upon the field of pneumatic chemistry, 
which Black had laid open. Dr. Priestly 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 63 

in 1774 discovered oxygen gas, by exposing 
red-lead in a close vessel, to the sun's rays 
concentrated by a burning glass, when a per- 
manently elastic aeriform body was evolved, 
which had the property of greatly increasing 
the intensity of flame. At a later periodj he 
discovered the important fact that the absorp- 
tion of this gas in the act of respiration gives 
its red colour to the arterial blood ; and he 
also found that when plants grow in close ves- 
sels, and restore the purity of the air in 
which a candle has been burnt, or an animal 
breathed, a fact which he had before discov- 
ered, they do so by evolving this gas. He 
also discovered nitrogen gas, about the same 
time that Dr. Rutherford of Edinburgh did, 
by the fact, that if air is exposed to sulphur 
and iron filings, its bulk is diminished, and 
the residue is lighter than common air and 
unfit for respiration, which residue is ni- 
trogen. And Watt and Cavendish who 
had entered upon this new field of investi- 
gation, discovered some of its most important 
truths. The composition of water, the knowl- 
edge of which is an element in so many chem- 



64 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

ical reasonings as to make it one of the most 
prolific of chemical discoveries, was discov- 
ered by Watt and verified by Cavendish who 
burnt oxygen and hydrogen in a dry glass ves- 
sel, when a quantity of pure water was gen- 
erated equal in weight to that of the gases 
which had disappeared in the formation of 
water, a proof incontestable, that the water 
was formed of the two gases which had dis- 
appeared. Cavendish showed also the first 
example of weighing permanently elastic 
bodies ; and thus gained an important con- 
troul over these evanescent substances. He 
also discovered that nitrous acid is composed 
of the two gases deprived of latent heat, 
which compose our atmosphere, oxygen and 
nitrogen. 

But it was the glory of another English- 
man to make the most brilliant discoveries 
which have yet adorned the history of chem- 
istry. Sir H. Davy with an experimental 
skill and a daring intrepidity which have 
never been excelled, entered at this stage of 
the science into the field of chemical inqui- 
ry which his countrymen were exploring 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 6£ 

with such extraordinary success. And as if 
it were specially designed to be wielded by his 
giant arm, in the noble conquests of science, 
Volta had just invented the pile which bears 
his name. Immediately after its invention, it 
was sent to England, and Nicholson and Car- 
lisle discovered that water could he decom- 
posed by its action. They plunged two plati- 
num wires connected with the opposite poles 
of the battery, into the same cup of water, 
without their touching each other, when hy- 
drogen gas was disengaged at the negative 
wire, and oxygen at the positive, each passing 
off in bubbles, which when'collected in sepa- 
rate tubes were found to be pure, and in the 
exact proportion of which water consists. 
With this wonderful fact before him, Sir H. 
Davy exposed other compound bodies, such 
as acids and salts, to the action of the battery, 
and all without exception were decomposed, 
one of their elements appearing at one side 
of the battery, and the other at the opposite 
extremity. And he found that there was a 
uniformity in these decompositions. That their 
law was, that the acids and oxygen and all 



66 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

bodies of a like kind are transferred to and ac- 
cumulate around the positive pole, while hy- 
drogen, metals, alkalies and such like bodies 
are transferred to the negative pole ; and he 
discovered that these transfers will take place 
through considerable spaces, and that acids 
would pass through vessels containing alkaline 
solutions, and alkalies, through vessels filled 
with liquids containing free acids, without the 
least combination, and appear at their respec- 
tive poles with their peculiar properties. Sir 
H. Davy observing the analogy between these 
phenomena and the attractions and repul- 
sions effected by ordinary electricity, inferred 
that chemical attraction is an electric force ; 
and that the reason why any substance, as 
water for instance, is decomposed, by a batte- 
ry, is that one end of the wire has a greater 
affinity on account of its intense electrical 
condition, for oxygen and the other for hy- 
drogen, than these elements have for each 
other. Guided by this view of the nature 
of chemical attraction, he inferred that any 
compound substance whatever, might be de- 
composed by a battery of sufficient power, by 



THE BAC05IAN THILOSOPHY. 67 

subverting the chemical affinity of its ele- 
ments, in presenting to it, a wire of such in- 
tense electrical condition as to attract its ele- 
ments with more force, than they attract each 
other. Directing his experiments according- 
ly, he succeeded in decomposing the alkalies 
and alkaline earths, showing that they are 
composed of oxygen and an inflamable me- 
tal, the oxygen accumulating at the positive 
pole, and the metal at the negative, thus 
bringing to light entirely new substances in 
these inflamable metals, and rendering still 
more probable by the decomposition, the cor- 
rectness of his view of the nature of chemi- 
cal attraction. 

What a grand step was this from the sim- 
ple discovery of Black, that an elastic fluid is 
sometimes found fixed in a solid, as carbonic 
ascid in limestone ! For here the lime which 
Black considered an element and which had 
revolved as an element at the points of other 
batteries, is now shown to be composed of an 
inflamable metal, and a gas which is one of 
the elements of the very gas which Black 
had discovered to be the ligature which binds 



68 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

limestone together. And thus the path of 
inquiry which Black opened, had led to such 
rich discoveries. 

But the career of discovery does not end 
here. The field of chemical research which 
had been laid open by Black, had been so 
successfully explored, that Sir Humphrey 
Davy was enabled to lay the foundations of 
agricultural chemistry, upon the truths which 
had been discovered, and thereby elevate the 
culture of the soil from the most empirical 
drudgery, to a scientific art. 

It had been ascertained that vegetables are 
composed of the four simple gases, Carbon, 
Hydrogen, Nitrogen, and Oxygen, which the 
disciples of Black had discovered, and a mi- 
nute quantity of inorganic matter. The 
question then occurred, whence do plants 
obtain these elements? And it is at once 
seen that they must obtain them either from 
the atmosphere or the earth ; or from both. 
It had long been known that marine plants 
reaching the enormous height of three hun- 
dred and sixty feet, and which nourish thous- 
ands of marine animals, grow upon the naked 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 69 

recks. But as the surfaces of these rocks 
undergo no change, it was obvious that the 
plants did not draw their nourishment through 
their roots from them. They must then derive 
it through their leaves from the sea-water, in 
which they float, spread out in their enor- 
mous ramifications, so that every part of the 
plant is presented to the surface of the water. 
This is made clear, by the fact that sea-water 
is found by analysis to contain all the constit- 
uents, carbonic acid, ammonia and the alkaline 
and earthy phosphates and carbonates, re- 
quired by these plants for their growth, and 
which are found to be the constituents of 
their ashes. It is therefore seen that these 
plants may derive all their nourishment 
through their leaves. But do terrestrial 
plants derive all their nourishment through 
their leaves ? This cannot be so ; because 
the only medium from which these plants can 
derive nourishment through their leaves and 
bark, is the atmosphere; and it does not 
contain, like sea-water, all the elements of 
plants. Its constituents are oxygen, nitrogen 
together with watery vapour, carbonic acid 



70 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

and ammonia. And these are not all the 
constituents of plants — the inorganic matter 
being wanting. Terrestrial plants, must 
therefore derive some nourishment at least, 
from the soil. For though the earth is a 
magazine of organic matter as well as inor- 
ganic, yet as plants are found to flourish up- 
on soils where the quantity of carbon and ni- 
trogen contained in them cannot have been 
In the soil, as well as from many other facts, 
the conclusion is irresistible, that terrestrial 
plants derive their nourishment, from the 
atmosphere as well as the soil. 

Thus is opened the whole field of agricul- 
tural chemistry. For it is obvious, that if 
plants are composed of certain elements, some 
of which are derived from the soil, and others 
from the atmosphere, it is necessary that the 
soil and the atmosphere should each contain 
the elements proper to it, as food to the plants. 
For otherwise, the plants must be as it were 
starved to death. And as it is certain, that 
the atmosphere has not changed since the 
earliest period at which an accurate analysis 
of it has been made, we may conclude, as we 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 71 

know how its equilibrium is kept up, that it 
will always contain those elements of plants 
which it is its province in the economy of na- 
ture, to furnish to vegetation. But this is not 
the case with the soil; for by a succession of 
crops, all the elements necessary for the 
growth of plants may be removed from the 
stiil, and then the plants cannot grow from 
want of food. It is seen then how important 
it is to know what elements of plants are 
furnished by the soil, and what by the atmos- 
phere. For otherwise, we might, at a great 
expenditure of labour and capital be endea- 
vouring to furnish to the soil, the elements 
which the plants derive from the atmosphere ; 
whereas all that is necessary, is to furnish 
those to the soil, which it gives to the plant. 
And as chemistry informs us of the nature of 
manures, what elements each kind contains, 
we are enabled to put on the soil, the precise 
kind it wants; and thus make an economical 
expenditure of labour and capital, and also, 
direct our means with certain success. By 
such a course of reasoning did Sir H. Davy 
lay the foundation of agricultural chemistry; 



72 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPh. 

though some facts here exhibited have been 
discovered since his time. 

The first inductive generalization ever made 
in electricity, was made by Grey and Wheel- 
er of England, who discovered that some sub- 
stances are conductors and others non-conduc- 
tors. And the great truth that the lightning 
of Heaven is identical with electricity was 
discovered by one speaking : the English as 
his vernacular language. Franklin, by the 
beautifully simple apparatus of a kite having 
a key attached to the lower end of a hempen 
cord, and being insulated by means of a silken 
thread, by which it was fastened to a post, 
demonstrated that the electric fluid and light- 
ning are identical. The kite was raised, 
while a heavy cloud was passing over, and 
after some time, the loose fibres of the hemp- 
en cord began to bristle. Franklin touched 
the key with his knuckle, and the electric 
spark was received, and thereby the identity 
of electricity and lightning was verified. 

The fundamental truth of optics was also dis- 
covered in England. Newton discovered that 
a beam of light, as emitted from the sun, con- 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 73 

sists of seven rays of different colours pos- 
sessing different degrees of refrangibility. 
This great discovery was made by darkening- 
a room and boring a hole in the window 
shutter, and letting a convenient quantity of 
the sun's light pass through a prism. The 
light was so refracted by its passage through 
the prism, as to exhibit all the different colours 
on the wall, forming an image about five times 
as long as it was broad ; instead of forming a 
circular image, according to the received laws 
of refraction at that time, and of a white 
colour, according to the nature of light as 
then understood. In order to ascertain the 
true causes of the elongation and colours of 
the image, Newton then placed a board with 
a small hole in it, behind the face of the 
prism and close to it, so that he could trans- 
mit through the hole any one of the colours, 
and keep back all the rest. For example, he 
first let the red light pass through and fall on 
the wall. He then placed another board, with 
a hole in it, ; near: theow all where the red ray 
fell, so as to let * it t pass through the hole in 
the Second board,' and ithen he placed a prisma 



74 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

behind this board, and let the red light pass 
through it near the wall. He then turned 
round the first prism so as to let all the 
colours pass in succession through these two 
holes, and he marked their places on the 
wall, and he saw by their places, that the red 
rays were less refracted by the second prism, 
than the orange,, the orange, less than the 
yellow, and so on, all being less refracted 
than the violet. From this experiment, 
Newton drew the grand conclusion that light 
is not homogeneous, but is composed of rays 
of different colours and of different degrees 
of refrangibility. 

And the greatest of all human discoveries, 
the universality of the law of gravity, the 
foundation of physical astronomy, was discov- 
ered in England. Copernicus had discover- 
ed the motion of the earth on its axis around 
the sun; Kepler, that this motion around the 
sun, is in an elliptical orbit, with the sun in one 
of its foci ; and that an imaginary line drawn 
from the planet in its revolution, to the sun, 
describes equal areas in equal times ; and that 
the square of the time that the planet takes 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. '75 

in moving around the sun is equal to the cube 
of its distance from that body. This is the 
starting-point where the discoveries of the 
English begin. It remained to inquire into 
the causes of these general facts which had 
been discovered by Copernicus and Kepler. 

In the year 1666, Newton, while sitting 
alone in his garden and reflecting upon the 
nature of gravity which causes all bodies to 
descend towards the centre of the earth, con- 
sidering that this power suffers no sensible 
diminution at the greatest distances from the 
centre of the earth to which we can reach, 
being as great on the summits of the highest 
mountains as at the bottom of the deepest 
mines, conjectured that perhaps it extended 
further than was commonly supposed. He 
therefore began to consider what would be 
its effects if it extended to the moon. That 
the motion of the moon was affected by this 
power, he conceived to be beyond a doubt; 
and further reflection led him to suppose that 
this body might by this power be held in 
its orbit around the earth. For, though 
gravity suffered no sensible diminution at the 



76 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

comparatively small distances from the centre 
of the earth to which we can go, yet he 
thought it highly probable, that it was great- 
ly diminished at the distance of the moon, 
and that therefore it did not cause that body 
to fall to the earth. And he inferred, that if 
the moon be held in; its orbit by the principle 
of gravity that the planets also must be held 
in their orbits by the same power ; and that 
by comparing the periods of the different 
planets with their distances from the sun, he 
might ascertain in what proportion the .power 
by which they were held in their orbits de- 
creased. By this process he arrived at the 
conclusion that it decreased in the duplicate 
proportion, or as the square of their distances 
from the sun. In order then to test the truth 
of the conclusion, that the law of the force 
by which the planets are drawn to the sun 
was that it decreased as the square of their 
distances from that luminary, he endeavored 
to ascertain if such a force emanating from 
the earth and directed to the moon was suffi- 
cient to retain her in her orbit. To do this, 
it was necessary to compare the space through 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 77 

which heavy bodies fall in a given time to a 
given distance from the centre of the earth., 
viz : to its surface, with the space through 
which the moon, as it were, falls to the 
earth in the same time, while revolving in a 
circular orbit; for in all his reasonings, he 
supposed the planets to move in orbits per- 
fectly circular. At the time Newton made 
this calculation, he adopted the common es- 
timate of the diameter of the earth, as then 
used by geographers and navigators, which 
was erroneous. Therefore his conclusions 
were erroneous also. Some years afterwards, 
the discovery that a projectile would move in 
an elliptical orbit, when acted upon by a force 
varying in the inverse ratio of the square 
of the distance, led Newton to demonstrate 
that a planet acted upon by an attractive 
force varying inversely as the square of the 
distance, will describe an elliptical orbit in 
one of whose foci the attractive force resides. 
But though Newton had thus established an 
hypothesis which explained the elliptical or- 
bits of the planets, and this hypothesis wag 
founded upon an induction of facts made by 



78 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Kepler, and demonstrated by the application 
of mathematics by himself, yet an indis- 
pensable condition of the induction had not 
been fullfiled. He had not yet obtained any 
evidence that a force varying inversely as the 
square of the distance, did actually reside in 
the sun and planets; because his calculations 
for testing this, founded upon the comparison 
of the space through which heavy bodies fall 
in a second of time to a given distance from 
the centre of the earth, with the space 
through which the moon, as it were, falls to 
the earth, in a second of time while revolving 
in a circular orbit, assumed an erroneous es- 
timate of tjie diameter of the earth, as we 
have shown, and consequently did not test 
what it was intended to verify : but showed 
that the force which retains the moon in its 
orbit as deducted from the force which causes 
the fall of heavy bodies to the earth is, as one- 
sixth greater than that which is actually in- 
dicated in her circular orbit. But M. Picard 
having in 1679 executed the measurement of 
a degree of the meridian, Newton afterwards 
deduced from it the true diameter of the 



THE BACOMAN PHILOSOPHY. 



earthy and trying his former calculation, he 
realized his expectations ; and found the force 
of gravity which regulates the fall of bodies 
at the earth's surface, when diminished as the 
square of the distance of the moon from the 
earth, to be nearly equal to the centrifugal force 
of the moon as deduced: from her observed dis- 
tance and velocity; and he thus fulfilled the 
fundamental condition of the inductive meth- 
od of investigation, of always ascribing a cause 
known to exist, to explain an effect. By this 
course of reasoning Newton connected the 
physics of the earth with the physics of the 
heavens, and established the universality of 
the law of gravitation. 

What more delightful employment can the 
speculative philosopher have than the con- 
templation of the grand discoveries which we 
have been considering ! To one who loves 
truth for its own sake, and feels delight in 
the mere contemplation of harmonious and 
mutually dependent truths, the knowledge of 
such great truths is of sufficient value to re- 
pay him for the labour of discovery, even if 
they did not admit of any practical applica- 



80 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY^ 

tion. To know what it is that paints the 
beautiful colours of the rainbow, and covers 
the hills and valleys in green, and gives the 
delicate tints to the flowers which picture the 
fields ; to know that the scathing lightnings 
which rush with such tremendous fury from 
the vast magazines of the heavens, is the 
same with the spark rubbed from the cat's 
back ; to know that the water which we drink 
and which appears so simple, is composed of 
two gases, one of which is; more combustible 
than gunpowder, and produces instant death 
when inhaled, and the other is the supporter 
of combustion, though the two united is the 
chief agent by which we extinguish fire ; to 
know that the planets of such vast magni- 
tude, and moving with such velocity through 
such boundless space are held in their 
orbits by the same force which causes an 
apple to fall to the ground ; to know the times 
of eclipses and the returns of comets dashing 
with a velocity quicker than thought over mil- 
lions of miles of space and returning with 
unerring certainty to the goal whence they 
set out : and all other wonders which natural 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



81 



philosophy reveals, must forever, as mere 
matters of intellectual contemplation, be con- 
sidered as inestimable treasures. And the 
mere process of investigation according to 
the Baconian method, is one of the noblest 
and most delightful employments. The phi- 
losopher at almost every stage of his progress, 
is meeting with hints of greater things still 
undiscovered, which cheers the mind amidst 
its toil, with the hope of making still further 
progress ; and new fields of discovery are con- 
tinually opening in prospect and the light of 
his present discoveries throwing enough of 
their rays across the darkness before him, to 
reveal as much of other new truths as will 
stimulate him to continued exertion for their 
discovery : thus curiosity is ever kept alive, 
and exhausted energies renovated in the la- 
borious pursuits of knowledge. 

How utterly insignificant as mere matters 
of intellectual contemplation, is all the phys- 
ical philosophy of the ancients in compari- 
son with these magnificent discoveries in the 
different sciences ! And what can form a more 
striking contrast than the sublime argumenta- 



S2 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

tion of Newton and the petty sophistry of the 
philosophers of the middle age ! What are the 
eloquent reveries of Plato and the ingenious 
reasonings of Aristotle in comparison with the 
mighty mensuration by which Newton begin- 
ning with the dust on the balance measures 
the earth ; and rising in the sublime argument, 
measures planet after planet and weighing 
them, balances one against the other, and not 
content with holding as it were, worlds in the 
hollow of his hand, he measures and weighs 
systems of worlds; and his mighty calculus 
still not exhausted, he balances systems of 
worlds against systems of worlds, and embra- 
ces in his argument the infinitude of the uni- 
verse, until the words of the sacred poet, 
" he weighed the mountains in the scales and 
the hills in a balance," intended to describe 
the omnipotence of the deity, fall short in 
describing the power of one of his creatures. 
The wisdom of the Academy; and the Ly- 
ceum have been overshadowed by the glory of 
Cambridge, and Greece yields to England in 
philosophical renown ! 

We see then, that as a mere matter of in- 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 83 

tellectual contemplation to satisfy the specu- 
lative mind, the Baconian philosophy is pre- 
eminently sublime. We will now show that 
it is also eminently practical ; and in this par- 
ticular^ it differs from all the philosophies of 
the ancients, who thought that the only use of 
philosophy, was in its influence upon the 
mind in elevating it above the concerns of 
life, and thus purifying and preparing it for 
the philosophical beatitude of their heaven, 
into which none, but philosophers were to 
enter ; and that the practical affairs of life be- 
longed to those of common endowments who 
are fated by destiny to be mere " hewers of 
wood and drawers of water." But far differ- 
ent is the spirit of the Baconian philosophy. 
Humbling itself before Christianity, it ac- 
knowledges it to be a revelation from heaven, 
pointing out the same way to future bliss, for 
the peasant and the philosopher, and that it 
only, has the power "to -deliver man from the 
bondage of corruption into the glorious ^lib- 
erty of the sons of God" ; and that though 
philosophy enlarges and elevates the mind 
and affords us unspeakable intellectual pleas- 



84 TUE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

ure, yet that its chief office is to promote the 
general well-being of man in this life, by con- 
necting the sciences with the arts, and arm- 
ing them with a power which mere empiri- 
cism can never attain. 

It is then the great excellence of the Ba- 
conian philosophy, that even those of its dis- 
coveries which bave contributed most to the 
satisfaction of the speculative intellect and* 
are apparently the most remote from every 
thing like practical application to the comforts 
of man, have frequently been applied to the 
most useful purposes of life. The discovery 
of the nature of light by Newton, at once 
led him to attempt a practical application of 
it ; and though nothing of importance result- 
ed from his labours, yet Hall and afterwards 
Dolland constructed achromatic telescopes, 
which could never have been done, if the fact 
of the different refrangibility of the different 
rays of light had not been known ; and this 
discovery, was thus applied to the arts in ac- 
cordance with the utilitarian spirit of the Ba- 
conian philosophy. Scarcely had Franklin 
discovered the nature of lightning, before he- 



THE BACONIAN FHILOSOPHY. 85 

constructed an apparatus to protect our build- 
ings on land and our ships on the sea from 
the ravages of the electric fluid. And thus 
by a discovery apparently so remote from all 
practical utility he disarmed the spirit of the 
storm of his thunders, and thereby showed 
to the world that knowledge is power. But 
the most fruitful practical applications have 
been made of Chemistry. It has been appli- 
ed to agriculture, to medicine, and to the 
mechanical arts. By applying the principles 
which we have exhibited, to the improve- 
ment of agriculture, it has made the most 
sterile waste so fertile, as to yield all the va- 
rious fruits of the earth in the richest abun- 
dance. Where not a blade of grass grew, 
now the most abundant harvests gladden the 
sight, as they spread out in ocean waves over 
the fields where chemistry has shed its fertil- 
izing dews. And by its magic power, chem- 
istry has released the various medical agents 
which lie embedded in the innumerable veg- 
etable and mineral products of nature, and 
handed them over to the healing art, to aid 
the vital powers in throwing off from the 



86 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

body the many diseases which prey upon 
man. And its application to the mechanic 
arts, has bestowed the richest blessings upon 
man. Sir H. Davy applied its principles in 
the construction of the safety lamp ; by which 
man is enabled to walk with comparative 
safety in the bottoms of dark mines, with a 
light, amidst a gas more explosive than gun- 
powder, where, without this lamp, the miner 
is frequently exposed to as much danger as 
though he were walking in a magazine of 
powder with a lighted torch ; and thus thous- 
ands of lives and millions of money are saved 
by this one application of science to art 
But the crowning invention of all, the one 
which constitutes the chief glory of science 
in its application to art, is the steam-engine. 
A profound chemical knowledge applied by 
the most exquisite mechanical skill, enabled 
James Watt to bring the steam-engine, which 
had been invented by Savery and Newco- 
men, to a degree of perfection which renders 
it the most valuable of all inventions of art. 
It brings under the control of man, an agent 
more potent than a hundred giants, swifter 



TUB BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 87 

than the Arabian horse, and capable of as- 
suming more forms in mechanism, than a 
Proteus, so as to apply itself to all kinds of 
work. It can pull a hundred wagons as easily 
as one — perform one kind of labour as easily 
as another. It is on the ocean, it is on the 
rivers, it is on the mountains, it is in the val- 
leys, it is at the bottom of mines, it is in the 
shops, it is every where at work. It propels 
the ship, it rows the boat, it cuts, it pumps., it 
hammers, it cards, it spins, it weaves, it 
washes, it cooks, it prints, and releases man 
of nearly all bodily toil. This mighty agent 
is revolutionizing the world — annihilating 
time and space by its speed, and bringing the 
most remote parts of the earth together. 
And all this mighty power is gained by a 
scientific knowledge of the nature of the at- 
mosphere which we breathe, and the water 
which we drink, and applying this knowledge 
to mechanism, so as to make these so familiar 
objects work for man. 

Here let us pause, and reflect upon the 
benefits conferred on England by the Bacon- 
ian philosophy. It has made her the great- 



88 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

est nation in the world. It has done more to 
develop her wealth, than all the legislation of 
all the statesmen who have adorned her his- 
tory by their financial skill It has given her 
hundreds of bushels of wheat, thousands of 
yards of cloths, and bestowed innumerable 
comforts, where without its instrumentality, 
there would have been but one. It has en- 
abled her to extend her commerce over the 
whole earth, and bring into her treasury count- 
less millions of wealth. And this commerce 
is the source of her great power, both in war 
and peace, and is the means by, which she is 
controling the destinies of the world. And 
though her whole policy is to extend her com- 
merce by cultivating the arts of peace, yet it 
is true, that she sometimes (and we abhor 
the wickedness of it) pushes her commerce 
by the thunders of her cannon into regions 
where ignorance forbids its entrance ; but the 
people who are thus treated, will in time 
learn, that it is equally for their benefit, with 
that of England, that her trade is extended 
to their shores, and they will feel that peace 
is the true policy of the world, and that all 



THE BACOMAX PHILOSOPHY. 89 

men are mutually interested in each other's 
welfare and should live like members of one 
family. The commercial spirit of England 
is also the power which pioneers the way for 
the other great influences which she is exert- 
ing upon the civilization of the world. Her 
sciences, her arts and her literature are car- 
ried on the wings of her commerce over the 
whole earth. And the Christian religion is 
soon found smoothing the thorny pillow of 
the dying man, and pouring the balm of con- 
solation over his drooping spirit, in every 
clime where British commerce has placed her 
foot. 

But the Baconian philosophy is not confined 
to physical nature, as has been often asserted. 
It embraces all knowledge. Bacon express- 
ly says that his method of investigation is in- 
tended to be applied to all the sciences. 
"Some may raise this question (says he) 
rather than objection, whether we talk of 
perfecting natural philosophy alone according 
to our method, or the other sciences also, 
such as logic, ethics, politics. We certainly 

intend to comprehend them all. And as 

8* 



90 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

, common logic, which regulates matters by 
syllogisms, is applied not only to natural, but 
also to every other science, so our inductive 
method likewise comprehends them all." 
And in his Advancement of Learning, where 
lie defines the boundaries of the different 
sciences, he has devoted as much attention to 
the intellectual and moral sciences as to the 
physical. But it is nevertheless true, that his 
labours were directed chiefly towards physi- 
cal science, because, in this, there was the 
greater necessity for exertion ; as it was prin- 
cipally through ignorance of this part of 
knowledge, that man was delayed in his 
career of civilization. And many, from the 
fact that Bacon has said so much about phys- 
ical nature, misconceiving the scope and spirit 
of his philosophy, have asserted that it is 
confined to sense, and is utilitarian, in the 
gross meaning of avarice, and that it necessa- 
rily leads to a selfish moral philosophy. 

It has happened to Bacon, as to other phi- 
losophers, who have originated a new move- 
ment of the human mind, that the errors of 
many of his successors who claimed, and 



,-XPK BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 91 

many who did not claim to be his disciples, 
have been charged to his philosophy, as its 
legitimate fruits. The doctrines of Hobbs, 
and Hume, and Hartly, and others in Eng- 
land, and of Condillac, and Helvetius, and 
D'Holbach and the host of infidels and athe- 
ists in France, have been again and again 
proclaimed as the legitimate and necessary 
deductions from the principles of the Bacon- 
ian philosophy The doctrines of the phi- 
losophers just mentioned, resulted from these 
philosophers seizing upon some one only of 
the great principles of the Baconian philoso- 
phy, and carrying it out to the wildest ex- 
tremes, without modifying it by the other 
principles of the system, and are, therefore, 
at most, nothing more than the errors which 
necessarily result in the development of the 
Baconian philosophy, and are not a part 
of that philosophy, but merely the exuviae 
thrown off from it as it passes through the 
process of development. Cicero, in his De 
Oratore, has remarked the very same thing 
of Socrates which we are now remarking of 
Bacon. "For, as they all," says he, "arose 



92 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

from Socrates, whose discourses were so va- 
rious, different, and universally diffused, that 
each learned somewhat that was different 
from the other; hence families, as it were, 
of philosophers were propagated, widely dif- 
fering among themselves and vastly uncon- 
nected with, and unlike one another; yet all 
of them affected to be called, and thought 
themselves the disciples of Socrates. For, 
in the first place, Aristotle and Xenocrates 
were the immediate scholars of Plato; the 
one of which was the founder of the Peripa- 
tetics, the other of the Academics. Then 
from Antisthenes, who admired chiefly the 
patience and abstemiousness of Socrates in 
his discourses, arose first the Cynics and then 
the Stoics. Next from Aristippus, who was 
charmed with the sensual part of Socrates' 
discourses, the sect of the Cyrenians flowed, 
whose doctrines, he and his successors main- 
tained without any disguise of sentiment. 
There were also other sects of philosophers, 
who generally professed themselves to be the 
followers of Socrates. 55 We see then, that 
all the different sects of philosophers, who 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 93 

succeeded Socrates, the morose and abstemi- 
ous Stoic, and the gay and voluptuous Cyren- 
ian, all claimed to be the true disciples of So- 
crates, and that Cicero says that their errors 
resulted from their seizing upon one princi- 
ple only of the philosophy of Socrates, and 
losing sight of the other principles. The 
Stoics seized upon patience and abstemious- 
ness, and the Cyrenians upon sensual enjoy- 
ments, both of which, when modified by the 
other, are correct principles, but when carri- 
ed to extremes, each is wrong, and will lead 
to false moral philosophy. Having thus indi- 
cated the source of the error which we are 
combating, we will now show that it is an error. 
The position that the Baconian -philosophy 
leads to a selfish morality, is maintained by 
many on the ground that the Baconian phi- 
losophy admits but one source oi ideas, viz : 
sensation. The argument is, that within the 
sphere of sensation, there is no idea of right 
and wrong — that pleasure and pain are the 
only ideas furnished by sensation to denote 
the moral qualities of human actions, and 
that we approve of some acts, because they 



94 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

give pleasure, and disapprove of others, be- 
cause they give pain ; and that, therefore, 
according to this theory of mind, utility is 
virtue, and self-interest the ground of moral 
obligation. But we shall show in the second 
chapter of the second part of this discourse 
that theBaconian philosophy admits two sour- 
ces of ideas, viz : sensation and conscious- 
ness;; and therefore this argument falls to the 
ground; because the ideas of right and wrong 
are developed in consciousness, and it is in 
consciousness, that the Baconian philosophy 
lays the foundation of morality, and not in 
sensation. 

According to the Baconian philosophy, we 
must examine all the facts of man's moral 
constitution, and establish the fundamental 
truths of moral -philosophy by psychological 
observation. Rejecting all innate moral prin- 
ciples or notions, it appeals to experience, to 
both the light of nature and revelation. It 
therefore leaves man perfectly free to exam- 
ine all the facts of his moral constitution, and 
to establish whatever system of morals, a 
sound induction may warrant, whether the 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 96 

selfish or the disinterested system. When 
then we look into the heart of man, we there 
find certain instinctive affections, such as love, 
hope, fear, anger, pity and many others which 
are all certainly disinterested in their nature ; 
as they seek their respective objects, by natu- 
ral impulse or sympathy, without the mind's 
thinking of anything beyond, whether their 
satisfaction or disappointment will be agreea- 
ble or disagreeable. We also find in the 
mind, the power to distinguish moral good 
and evil. It is upon these attributes of our 
spiritual nature, that the Baconian philosophy 
founds morality. But let us inquire into these 
facts further, and ascertain the relation. in 
which the affections stand, to the power in 
the mind to distinguish good and evil, or in 
other words, ascertain the connection between 
the feelings and the intellect. 

If a beautiful object be presented to the 
mind either through sense, memory or ima- 
gination, and occupies its attention exclusive- 
ly, the emotion of love, is by a great psycho- 
logical law, necessarily excited in the mind, 
and will continue until the object is removed, 



96 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

or forgotten ; or some other object is present- 
ed in its stead. For it is a law of our mental 
constitution, that every emotion whether of 
love or hatred is allied to some object of per- 
ception or memory or imagination, and is de- 
pendent upon it ; as its antecedent or cause, 
and the emotion can never be excited in the 
mind except by its appropriate object being 
in the view of the mind, and never can cease 
to exist in the mind until the object is forgot- 
ten or removed from its view. Just as the 
mind sees so the heart feels. It is thus manifest 
that considerations of self have no agency in 
producing our emotions whether of love or 
resentment, in the natural operations of the 
mind, and consequently the great law of the 
affections on which morality is based, is dis- 
interested, — operates uninfluenced by consid- 
erations of self. But this connection between 
the perceptions and the affections shows that 
the correctness of our moral philosophy will 
depend upon the enlightenment of our intel- 
lect and the purity of our affections. That 
goodness is goodness is hard to be perceived 
by the greatest minds, if the moral feelings 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 97 

are corrupt. This is a truth written in blood 
upon the pages of history. But whenever 
the mind perceives goodness or moral beauty, 
the heart is necessitated by the great law of 
the affections just indicated, to feel the emo- 
tion proper to it, of love, and when it sees 
vice or moral ugliness, to feel the emotion 
proper to it, of aversion, and this without any 
consideration of self mingled in it. We see 
then by this analytical induction, that the prin- 
ciple of morality is disinterested; because 
the Creator by the great law of the affections 
has made it imperative on us to love virtue for 
its own nature, having made it natural for the 
mind to love virtue and hate vice by creating 
the relations of love and hatred between 
them. But as man is not under a law of ne- 
cessity like mere brute matter and incapable 
of change, the obliquity of his mind may 
become such as to render him unable to see 
the loveliness of virtue, which is the same as 
not seeing virtue at all, for loveliness is its 
very essence, just as the eye may be so dis- 
eased, as in jaundice, as to render him unable 
to see the real colours of objects, and the 



98 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY, 

sinfulness of his own heart will cast its hue^ 
over virtue, just as the jaundice of the eye 
will cast its hue over the objects of vision, 
and neither the loveliness of the one nor the 
colours of the other can be perceived. The 
truth is, the perception and the emotion con- 
stitute the state the mind is in, when any 
object is present in thought, and they cannot 
be separated. They are not distinct acts of 
the mind, but are elements which make up 
the act of apprehension or spiritual discern- 
ment. And it was from the fact, that Helve- 
tius did not discern the truth, that perception 
and emotion are both elements of spiritual 
discernment, and dwelt too exclusively upon 
the phenomena of emotion;, that he fell into 
the error that all mental acts are nothing but 
feeling — that to think and to judge are but 
to feel ; and that Diderot in criticising this/ 
obvious error of Helvetius fell into the oppo- 
site one, and maintained in his essay on the 
origin and nature of the beautiful, that the 
perception of beauty by the mind is a matter 
of reason alone, like the perception of the 
truth that two and two make four. We see 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 99 

then, that according to the phsychological 
facts which the Baconian philosophy points 
out as the foundation of morality, that its 
principle is disinterested. Man does certain- 
ly feel the moral rightness of truth and 
justice, without any view at the time to their 
consequences, just as he feels an appetite for 
food without any view to its utility upon the 
animal economy — the one feeling terminates 
on virtue for its own sake and the other on 
food for its own sake. But God in his great 
benevolence has so organized the system of 
things, as to make that which is right, useful 
in such a vast majority of instances, as to 
induce us in cases where it is doubtful what 
is right, to use the relative utilities of the acts 
as the standard of their rightness, and it has 
indeed induced some to maintain that utility 
is the essence of right. 

But some contend that the Baconian phi- 
losophy leads to a selfish morality, in a differ- 
ent mode from that which we have just ex- 
amined. That it tends to corrupt the moral 
feelings by infusing into them, the spirit of 
selfishness, in directing so much inquiry into 



100 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

the developement of the resources of physical 
nature ; and thus making man to think con- 
tinually about his physical comforts, and to 
place too much value upon the riches of 
this world. That the Baconian philosophy 
has done more than all other philosophies 
put together, to develop the resources of 
physical nature, and thereby to multiply the 
physical comforts of man, we have already 
shown ; and so far from shunning this result, 
or wishing to conceal it, it has been the main 
purpose of this part of our discourse, to ex- 
hibit the fact in all its amplitude, and to pro- 
claim it as the chief glory of the philosophy 
which we expound. If such a result makes 
man selfish, then is the destitution of barbar- 
ism, better fitted to produce a sound morality 
than the wealth of civilization. Then is man, 
clothed in skins, possessed of more generous 
sympathies, than when clothed in the comfort- 
able fabrics of cultivated art ; and his heart 
contracts to a narrower selfishness, when he 
accumulates wealth by millions, than when he 
saves it by mites. If these be true proposi- 
tions, then, have we entirely misread human 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 101 

history. The fallacy of these conclusions, 
shows the falsity of the premises from which 
they are deduced. And it is evident, that 
the whole tendency of the Baconian philoso- 
phy is to elevate the condition of man. It 
enables him to supply his physical wants by 
a small portion of labour, and to devote his 
consequent leisure to the cultivation of science 
and art. And it dignifies and ennobles the 
employments which are devoted to the promo- 
tion of our physical comforts, by connecting 
them with the sciences. Under its influence, 
mechanics are no longer mere handicrafts- 
men, but are men of science, possessed of en- 
larged views of human advancement. Watt 
and Fulton occupy the highest places amongst 
the benefactors of mankind ; and are quite 
as fit to join that divine assembly of spirits, 
where Cicero in his De Senectute, rejoices 
that he shall meet Cato, as either of those 
sages of antiquity. 

But let us throw aside all speculation, and 
look to facts. Where is the nation that can 
boast a literature pervaded by a loftier moral- 
ity than England ? It is true that some of 



102 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

her writers maintain the selfish system of 
morals, and some the disinterested. But this 
has been the case at every era of philosophi- 
cal developement, in every nation of the civ- 
ilized world. In morals, as in every thing 
else, men often bewilder themselves in the 
minuteness of analysis. Those who main- 
tain the system of disinterested morals differ 
as to the basis of morals. One class refer- 
ring our moral ideas to a special faculty, 
termed the moral sense, others to reason, and 
others to both the reason and the sensibility. 
And those also who maintain the selfish 
system differ widely, as to the basis of their 
principle. This is inseparable from the nature 
of the subject, for it is not purely a philosoph- 
ical subject : but derives more of its light 
from revelation than from nature ; and there- 
fore, in attempting to ascertain the philosoph- 
ical foundation of moral obligation, we shall 
often find our line too short to reach the 
bottom. The difficulties are inherent in the 
subject; and they have been more nearly 
overcome by the English than any other 
people. And not only is the literature which 



THE .BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 103 

has grown up under the influence of the Ba- 
conian philosophy pervaded by a lofty moral- 
ity, but the people who have drunk most co- 
piously at its fountains, and whose mental 
habits and moral principles have been formed 
under its influence, are distinguished by their 
disinterested benevolence. They dispense 
millions annually in charities at home; and 
their benevolent societies are healing the sick, 
clothing the naked, and feeding the hungry, 
and instructing the ignorant in every clime 
of the earth. 

In examining this question, we must dis- 
tinguish the commercial spirit of England, 
from the spirit of philanthropy. While the 
first toils by day and by night to accumulate 
wealth, the latter toils by day and by night to 
expend it in alleviating the sufferings of the af- 
flicted of all nations, and kindreds and tongues. 
How superficial and ignorant then, is the 
opinion so often expressed, that the Baconian 
philosophy leads to a selfish morality ! We 
have shown the contrary, both by philosophi- 
cal analysis and historical fact, which are the 



104 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

only two modes of proof of which the sub- 
ject is susceptible. 

The same class of thinkers who maintain 
that the Baconian philosophy is purely sensu- 
al, a mere pander to our animal comforts, 
maintain also, that it has no ideal, and is utter- 
ly inconsistent with all the arts of beauty. 
That its main object is to make money plenty 
in men's pockets; and that the spirit and 
style of its kindred poetry is exemplified in 
the following couplet : 

•" A penny sav'd is two-pence clear, 
A pin a day 's a groat a year." 

Let us examine the truth of this charge. 
The Baconian philosophy, as we shall show 
in the second chapter of the second part of 
this discourse recognises consciousness as fully 
as it does sensation, as a source of ideas, 
and consequently just as fully embraces with- 
in its scope, the world of mind with all its 
subjective realities, as it does the world of 
matter with all its objective realities. It takes 
therefore in its view, all the phenomena of 
the spiritual world, as well as of the material, 
and all the adaptations between these differ- 



TIIE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 105 

ent worlds, from which the sublime and beau- 
tiful in art, can be educed. And it teaches a 
grander and a nobler, because a truer style of 
literature, than any philosophy which has 
been the source of culture to any people 
known in history. It takes nature for its 
model — the archetype which God has made-— 
and repudiates all that is speculative in taste, 
as it does all that is speculative in reasoning. 
And the true theory of taste, is to imitate na- 
ture, not it is true, by a servile copy, but by 
exalting her — by making her beauty more 
beautiful, and her sublimity mors sublime-^ 
but still by letting the beauty and sublimity, 
be the beauty and sublimity of nature, merely 
exalted. For the human heart was formed 
to suit the natural, and the natural was form- 
ed to suit the human heart, to call forth all its 
powers. Some things, by a great pathological 
law are agreeable to the human heart, and 
others, disagreeable. Some things naturally 
excite the feelings of sublimity, and others the 
feelings of beauty. These things are formed 
respectively by the Creator for the very pur- 
pose. It is an adaptation cf the external 



106 THE BACONIAN" PHILOSOPHY. 

world, to the spiritual constitution of man. 
The province then, of the science of taste, 
is to ascertain, what those things are, and 
the distinguishing property which constitutes 
them, in both the material and spirtual worlds, 
which naturally, and of their own original 
adaptation, excite the emotion of the beauti- 
ful or the sublime, or any other emotion, 
which it is the object of art to call forth. For 
some things will excite these emotions by 
association, and not of their own nature ; 
and consequently are not so well calculated 
to produce these emotions, as the things from 
which they have derived this power by asso- 
ciation ; and in fact cannot excite these emo- 
tions at all, in minds in which, they have not 
been associated, with the things from which 
they have derived this adventitious power. 
Truth or conformity to nature, then, is the 
great standard of taste. For there is a true in 
taste, a true in morals, as well as a true in 
matter ; and all of them are to be ascertained 
by inductive observation, and not by specula- 
tive conjecture. Surely then, the literature 
which springs up as an offshoot of that phi- 



THE B AC OMAN PHILOSOPHY. 107 

losophy which directs all our observations to 
nature, and admits no criterions whether in. 
science or art, but the natural, is most like- 
ly to approach nearest to nature in its repre- 
sentations of the sublime and the beautiful 
and all that affects the human heart. And 
did the speculations of the philosophers of. 
ancient times and of the middle age, ever 
present such sublime and such beautiful visions 
before the fancy, as the Baconian philosophy 
has spread out in the vast perspective of mod- 
ern discoveries ? The truth is, the views of 
nature as presented in these discoveries have a 
grace and a grandeur, a beauty and a sublimi- 
ty far above all the visions of fancy that ever 
lay in the enchanting walks of speculation or 
poetry. Induction has in fact evolved higher 
standards of sublimity and beauty, than ima- 
gination ever bodied forth in its most raptur- 
ous visions of the ideal. How then, can the 
Baconian philosophy lead to a mean literature, 
when it familiarizes the mind to the most sub- 
lime and beautiful objects of contemplation ? 
It must have the opposite effect. It must 
give a loftier ideal to the orator and the poet 



108 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

than the mere speculative philosophies ever 
furnished. And no writer has presented a 
more exalted estimate of' poetry, and deline- 
ated its high behests with more accuracy than 
Bacon himself. "The use of poesy (says he 
in the Advancement of Learning) hath been 
to give some shadow of satisfaction to the 
mind of man in those points wherein the 
nature of things doth deny it, the world being 
in proportion inferior to the soul ; by reason 
whereof there is agreeable to the spirit of 
man a more ample greatness, a more exact 
goodness, and a more absolute variety than 
can be found in the nature of things. There- 
fore, because the acts or events of true histo- 
ry have not that magnitude which satisfieth 
the mind of man, poesy feigneth acts and 
events greater and more heroical : because 
true history propoundeth the successes and 
issues of actions not so agreeable to the merits 
of virtue and vice, therefore poesy feigns 
them more just in retribution, and more ac- 
cording to revealed providence : because true 
history representeth actions and events more 
ordinary and less interchanged, therefore 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 109 

poesy endueth them with more rareness and 
more unexpected and alternative variations : 
so as it appeareth that poesy serveth and 
conferreth to magnanimity, morality and 
delectation. And therefore it was ever 
thought to have some participation of divine- 
ness, because it doth raise and erect the mind 
by submitting the- shows of things to the de- 
sires of the mind ; whereas reason doth buc- 
kle and bow the mind unto the nature of 
things." This admirable delineation of the 
objects and nature of poetry, sounds doubt- 
less, in the ears of those whose opinions we 
are examining, more like the language of 
Homer or Dante or Milton discanting on his 
divine art, than like the language of the father 
of the experimental philosophy. The truth is, 
the mighty and various and finely-fashioned 
mind of Bacon is as little understood by this 
class of thinkers as the spirit and scope of 
his philosophy. His mind was a mirror held 
up to nature, which reflected it, in all its vast- 
ness and all its minuteness, all its sublimity and 
all its beauty : revealing as much from the spir- 
itual world as from the material — from tho 
10 



110 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

dark abysses of the human heart, as from the 
hidden depths of matter. 

The chief ground, on which, the opinion 
that the Baconian philosophy leads to a mean 
literature, appears to rest, as far as any thing 
definite can be gathered from the loose and 
vague generality of the language in which it 
is usually expressed, is that this philosophy 
directs the mind so exclusively to considera- 
tions of utility, that it renders it incapable of 
appreciating the beautiful. This is a singu- 
larly erroneous view of the matter. For it is 
not immediate considerations of utility which 
prompt the Baconian philosopher to his in- 
quiries. But it is the love of truth — the de- 
light of viewing new truths evolved in ever 
varying forms of beauty from the multifarious 
facts which beset the path of investigation — 
the felt triumph of the march over the difficul- 
ties of science, as the enquirer steps from alti- 
tude to altitude on the before untrodden steeps 
of investigation, until he reaches a summit, 
from whence he can descry the goodly classi- 
fications and the harmonies of principle evolv- 
ing themselves from the chaos of facts which 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. Ill 

lie spread out in such boundless profusion 
over the vast regions of the universe. These 
are the considerations which prompt the Ba- 
conian philosopher to his inquiries. And af- 
ter he has discovered some new principle, 
then it is, that in accordance with the spirit 
of his philosophy, he enters upon considera- 
tions of utility in its applications to the relief 
of human wants. The Baconian philosophy, 
though considerations of utility embrace so 
much of its aim, and constitute so much of 
its glory, does not reject the beautiful, but 
embraces both it and the useful in perfect 
harmony, within the universality of its doc- 
trines. And though the physical sciences to 
which this philosophy has directed so much 
attention, are emphatically the sciences of 
utility, still their study, as the opinion which 
we are examining presupposes, does not ne- 
cessarily lead the mind off from the study of 
the beautiful, or blunt its relish for objects of 
taste. The relation between the different 
branches of knowledge is much more inti- 
mate than this supposition assumes. Such is 
this intimacy, that the physical science, which 



112 THE EACONI AN" PHILOSOPHY,, 

of all others, appears to the superficial obser- 
ver, to be the most remote from any affinity 
to the arts of beauty, has been applied to two 
of these arts with the most felicitous success. 
Sir Charles Bell has applied his discoveries 
in the nervous system to the arts of painting 
and sculpture. Having discovered that, be- 
sides the two great systems of nerves of sen- 
sation and motion, other nerves went to the 
muscles and moved them, and that these 
arose from a tract of the spine separate from 
either of the two columns originating the 
other nerves, and that they went chiefly to 
those muscles which subserve the purposes of 
respiration; and that as the function of respi- 
ration in man was not designed for the sole 
purpose of vitalizing the blood in the lungs, 
but also, for communicating the thoughts and 
passions of his soul, he had the genius to per- 
ceive, that the nerves regulating respiration, 
must be the nerves of expression and emotion. 
He therefore under the impluse of a most ex- 
alted genius for the arts of beauty, developed 
this grand idea, and wrote his celebrated 
work, the ■" Philosophy of Expression, ?? and 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 113 

in this way applied his discovery of the 
nerves of respiration to teaching the painter 
and the sculptor, .a knowledge by which he 
may imitate and understand and correctly 
depict the evervarying play of human passion. 
And thus a man who spent his life in dissect- 
ing the bodies of his fellow men and of the in- 
ferior animals, could pass out of this butcherly 
employment, as those whose opinions we are 
examining would esteem it, and teach us how 
to breathe life and feeling into the canvass and 
the marble. And Bell himself was one of 
the finest painters of his day — was no less 
skilful with the pencil of the painter, than 
with the knife of the Surgeon. Though, af- 
ter the battle of Waterloo, he went to the 
scene of slaughter and spent days and nights 
amidst the dead and dying, sleeping only one 
hour and a half out of the twenty four, for the 
purpose of perfecting himself in military surg- 
ery, yet at a later period of his life, we find him 
making a pilgrimage to Rome, to view in that 
imperial city the noble remains of ancient art, 
to enable him to put the finishing touch upon 
his "Philosophy of Expression." See then! 
10* 



114 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

how extraordinary and mysterious, is the con- 
nection between utility and beauty, between 
the anatomy of the nervous system and the 
arts of painting and sculpture. The same 
discoveries are applied to the arts of utility 
and to the arts of beauty, to medicine and to 
painting and sculpture. 

But let us illustrate this point a little fur- 
ther. Geometricians have discovered what 
is the curve of the greatest resistance or so- 
lidity, and have thus established a fact of the 
greatest utility in architecture. Michael An- 
gelo in forming the model of the dome of St, 
Peter's at Rome, gave it that oval or curve 
which appeared to his judgment as an artist, 
to be the most beautiful as drawn on the giv- 
en breadth and height. And such is the ex- 
quisite beauty of the dome that it fills every 
beholder with admiration. It is said, that 
the distinguished geometrician M. de la Hire 
being at Rome, was so struck by the elegance 
of this structure, that he determined to in- 
quire into the rationale of its impression on 
the mind ; and on examining the geometrical 
properties of the curve of its outline, he found 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 115 

that it was that of the greatest resistance or 
solidity. And thus it is ascertained, that in 
this instance, what is the most solid or useful 
in art is also the most beautiful. And what 
an extraordinary proof does it furnish of the 
sublimity of the genius of Michael Angelo for 
the beautiful in art, that in his attempts to 
sketch the oval outline of the greatest beauty 
for the dome, he should by the mere exercise 
of his judgement as an artist, have hit upon 
the exact curve with mathematical precision. 
For the identity of the curve of the greatest 
beauty with that of the greatest utility could 
never have been ascertained, except by some 
sublime genius in the felicity of his judg- 
ment, ascertaining the first, as it were, by an 
inspired intuition, and then the geometrician, 
by the unerring calculus of his science, dis- 
covering that what the artist has thus con- 
ceived to be the most beautiful oval outline, is 
the exact mathematical curve of the great- 
est resistance. And this, upon the doctrine 
of probabilities, amounts almost to a demon- 
stration, that the curves of utility and beauty 
are the same. 



116 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

But the fact, that utility and beauty are of 
a very kindred nature, or rather, that the 
first is often an important ingredient of the 
last, does not need further illustration. For 
so frequently are they found conjoined both 
in art and nature, that some philosophers, 
though very erroneously, have been led to 
insist, that utility is the essence of beauty — 
that beauty consists in the fitness of things or 
the adaptation of parts ; just as some philoso- 
phers have been led by a like partial view, 
to insist that utility is the essence of moral 
good, from the frequency of the union of 
the expedient and the right in the moral 
economy of the world. 

We can now, from the altitude to which 
our analysis has carried us take a wide sur- 
vey of the topic which we are discussing, 
and see by the light of science, how ignorant 
and grovelling is that view of the Baconian 
philosophy, which sees in its vast range noth- 
ing but a sordid utility, while, that utility 
which is consistent with all that is noble in 
morality and sublime and beautiful in art, is 
the doctrine which it teaches from the first 



1-HK BACOMAN PHILOSOPHY. 117 

aphorism in the Novum Organon, to the end 
of its last lesson. 

But it is useless to dwell longer upon phil- 
osophical analysis, when we have historical 
proof that the Baconian philosophy is consist- 
ent with the arts of beauty, in the noble pro- 
ductions of English literature ; for the liter- 
ature of every nation partakes of the nature 
of its philosophy, as the very charge which 
we are considering assumes. Where then is 
there a nobler literature, than that which has 
been cultivated in the same soil and by the 
same people, with the Baconian philosophy ? 
Shakspeare, who was the cotemporary and 
friend of Bacon, and whose productions are 
so signally marked with the common sense 
which, arising in the Baconian philosophy, 
pervades the whole of English civilization, 
stands at the head of the dramatic writers of 
the world. As though he had borrowed the 
magic wand of nature herself, he creates all 
beings with the same ease that -she does, and 
fixes them in their appropriate employments, 
and plans and executes their different offices, 
with an exactitude which shows that every 



IIS THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

act proceeds from its natural motive, and 
every destiny from a plan of coincidents in 
exact conformity to the dispensations of Prov- 
idence. The most dreadful passions are 
managed with as easy a conformity to nature, 
as the most gentle. Murder, with its ferocity 
and its relenting, its determination and its hes- 
itancy, before it reddens its hands in blood, 
and its remorse, and its imaginative agony, 
after it has done the dark deed, is dramatized 
with as much perfection as if the poet had 
seen with his eye the naked heart of the mur- 
derer throbbing in guilt. And with equal 
ease, true love is presented in all its artless- 
ness, whispering its affection in words as soft 
and simple and sweet, as the attic bee ever 
distilled upon the lips of a Grecian shepherd- 
ess; or else, sitting silent, under the restrain- 
ing diffidence of a pure heart, u until conceal- 
ment, like a worm in the bud, feeds upon her 
damask cheek."" — And jealousy, that monster 
of suspicion, to whom, " trifles light as air, 
are confirmation strong as proofs of holy 
writ," is presented in all his odiousness. 
And avarice standing by his bond, and humor 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 119 

Molding both his sides, and every human pas- 
sion are presented in ideal perfection. The 
dark, and awful, and mysterious abyss of the 
human heart is completely fathomed and the 
poet sees by the light of Christianity, how, 
fearfully and wonderfully it is made, and 
paints it, as with a pencil dipped in inspira- 
tion. And though Greece had her Homer. 
England has her Milton ; and never since 
the angels' harps, which hailed the morn of 
the creation, has a nobler been strung than 
his. The angels sang the joys of life, Milton 
the woes of death. And did a deeper melo- 
dy, and fuller of the dirgelike sounds of woe, 
ever flow from the versification of poetry ? 
Was the great epic of eternal death in all its 
horrors, ever before made a reality to the 
living ? Catching the sublime pathos of the 
old poets of Judea, and the lire and finish 
and copiousness of Greece, and transforming 
and subordinating all to the type of his own 
mighty genius, he has made a poem worthy 
of the great theme of the fall of man. The 
contrast between paradisaical innocence and 
happiness and infernal wickedness and mise- 



120 THE BACOxVIAN PHILOSOPHT. 

ry is presented in terrific reality. Such is 
the grace and beauty and loveliness of the 
first woman as she appears to the creative 
fancy of the poet, that he represents Satan, 
though with a bosom filled with the malice of 
hell, and intent upon the destruction of man, 
merely because man was innocent and happy, 
as captivated for a moment by her charms as 
he beheld her alone, amidst the rich shrubbery 
of Eden, enchanting the scene of bliss she 
moved in. But this exquisite sympathy of 
the poet for true loveliness, does not, for one 
moment, lead his judgement astray, so as to 
make him soften the character of Satan. For 
the unconquerable malignity and insatiable 
hate of the arch fiend, is depicted in all its 
dreadful deformity ; and the horrors of hell 
are seen amidst the " darkness visible," in 
such horrifying import as to show that u there, 
hope never comes, that comes to all." The 
poet is always master of himself; is never 
overpowered by the sublimity, nor enchained 
by the beauty of his conceptions : but with 
the self-possession of a great artist, he sets 
forth every thing in its proper position, and 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 121 

in its proper character, and in language so ex- 
pressive and so suited to every topic, as to 
place him perhaps at the very head of the 
great masters of diction. And Butler, in his 
Hudibras, has given to the world, the great 
epic of ridicule. With a fancy alive to the 
ludicrous, he has caught its minutest shades in 
every action of life, and presented them in an 
epic poem ; and thereby the majestic epic be- 
comes ludicrous. The conceptions of the 
poem are ludicrous, the language is ludicrous, 
and even the very rhymes. The poet, it is 
true, shoots keen shafts at his fellow-men, but 
they are dipped in the unction of good-na- 
ture, and not in the venom of malice. Such 
a poem furnishes entertainment to one of the 
most important faculties of the human soul, 
the sense of the ludicrous — which ministers 
so much to the smiles of home, the gaieties 
of companionship, and by its goodly influ- 
ences so often sweetens the sourness of our 
feelings amidst the annoyances and the ills of 
life, and opens the heart to the frailties of hu- 
man kind, and makes us sympathize with the 

whole race, rich and poor, learned and ignor— 
11 



122 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

ant, as we see their extravagances through; 
the amiable medium of a laughing heart — - 
and is therefore worthy of a place amongst 
the great works of art. And Robert Burns, 
with his harp tuned, now to merry, and now 
to sorrowful music, is heard amidst the choir 
of English poetry, reviving by his natural 
strains, the youthful freshness of human feel- 
ing, and keeping in harmony, those delicately 
tuned chords of the heart, which in the trials 
of life are so apt to loose the sweetness of their 
primitive melody. But, we will not particu- 
larize further; for the English muse has sung 
of every theme in original strains ; and has al- 
so proved the beauty, and strength, and co- 
piousness and flexibility of the English lan- 
guage by translating into it the master-pieces 
of antiquity, and showed that the streams are 
almost as pure in these channels, as in their 
Grecian and Roman fountains, 

The prose literature of England also, is 
rich in its abundance of matter and excellence 
of style and the wide range of its topics, 
Her historians are superior to any of modern 
times, and perhaps equal to those of ancient, 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 123 

Her orators, as suited to the sphere of modern 
civilization, are equal to any, in any period of 
human history. In profound views of human 
nature, in far insight into the policy of legis- 
lation, and in all the knowledge of statesman- 
ship, English oratory is far before that of an- 
tiquity. And in the mere art, English orato- 
ry is not easily surpassed. In the choice of 
those topics, both local and general, which 
lead the intellect and the heart captive ; and 
in the easy and shining fluency of narrative^ 
the sparkling ripples of wit, the bold, and 
headlong and dashing cataracts of declama- 
tion, and the full and swelling, and sweeping 
and overwhelming tide of argument, and the 
lightning's flash of suddenly provoked invec- 
tive which illuminates the whole flood of 
speech, and falls mercilessly upon its victim, 
it may well compare with that of any nation 
ancient or modern. In criticism also, wheth- 
er exegetical or purely rhetorical, English 
literature is highly distinguished. And as a 
specimen of historical criticism, there is noth- 
ing so ingenious, so original, so masterly, so 
triumphant and so to be marvelled at, as Pa- 



124 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

ley's " Horae Paulinae, " It is a wonder of 
ingenuity — a miracle of logical acumen. 
Facts in the epistles of Paul, which separately 
send forth a mere glimmer of light, and which 
are apparently so unconnected as never to be 
at all associated in thought, by even careful 
readers, are selected and brought together in 
logical order, and the feeble lights of each are 
so concentrated upon the fact sought after, 
and the fact is so illuminated in every point, 
that you can no more doubt of its truth, 
than you can of the reality of day, when the 
sun ascends the -meridian. In prose fiction 
too, what literature can compare with the 
English ? Where else, can-so unique a group 
of such masterly productions of their kind be 
found, as the Pilgrim's Progress of Bunyan, 
the Robinson Crusoe of De Foe, the Gulliv- 
er's Travels of Swift, and the Tristram Shan- 
dy of Sterne ? And how many thousands of 
all cultivated nations, have been charmed by 
the magic writings of Walter Scott! The 
young and the old, the learned and the ignor- 
ant, the wicked and the pious, have all been 
carried along on the enchanting tide of his 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 125 

narrative as it flowed from its exhaustless 
fountain, through the ever-varying scenes of 
an epitomized world, and all have been equal- 
ly delighted with the wonderful exhibition. 
Such then, is the literature, laden with so 
many masculine beauties, which has been cul- 
tivated in the same soil and by the same peo- 
ple, with the Baconian philosophy. How 
erroneous then is the opinion, that the Bacon- 
ian philosophy has no ideal, but is confined 
to sense, and leads to a mean literature. 

While answering the charge just consider- 
ed, we have admitted that the literature of 
every nation or epoch partakes of the nature 
of the philosophy of that nation or epoch ; 
because it is a well-established historical fact, 
and is in truth, nothing more than the exhi- 
bition, by a people, of the same bent of mind 
in literature and philosophy. The common 
sense of the Baconian philosophy is manifest- 
ed throughout every department of English 
literature. The characters in Shakspeare's 
plays are not mere personified qualities like 
the persons in an allegory ; but are real men 

and women, such as we meet with in the 
11* 



126 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

world, actuated by the same diversity of mo- 
tives and seeing the same objects. The 
particular passion sought to be delineated is 
individualized in some person, and the excel- 
lence of the delineation consists in the har- 
mony between the passion though exhibited 
in all its ideal exaltation, and the character in 
which it is set forth. For example, murder, 
and avarice, and jealousy and humor are not 
exhibited each in some metaphysical creature, 
which has no other passion than the one ex- 
emplified, but in real characters, which can 
sympathize with the circumstances of real life, 
and are at times under the influence of all 
the other passions of man, as different sit- 
uations call them forth. Murder is exhib- 
ited in Macbeth, avarice in Shylock, jealousy 
in Othello and humour in FalstafF, who are 
all men full of the common sympathies of 
humanity. This is the greatest triumph of 
the dramatic art, to invest the ideal with hu- 
manity. It is true that Shakspeare also cre- 
ated such characters as Calaban ; but this 
was merely a wayward freak of his genius. 
And the same characteristic is exhibited in the 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 127 

writings of Milton. His fiends and angels 
are not metaphysical abstractions ; but are 
men exalted into superhuman greatness. 
Though Satan does not appear " less than 
archangel ruined/' still he appears like a 
wicked man of superhuman powers. And 
the angels appear such as we may imagine 
good men may become in a world where all 
their powers are exalted. This likening of 
spirits to men, we are well aware has been 
censured by some critics as a great impro- 
priety, and the Mephistophiles of Goethe, 
which is a metaphysical incarnation of sin, 
has been reckoned a finer delineation of the 
spirit of wickedness than the Satan of Mil- 
ton. But this criticism, we apprehend, is 
founded in a misconception of the nature of 
the poetic art, whose province it is to seize 
upon practical criterions, and not upon spec^ 
ulative — to deal with realities,, and such 
things as can be made so much like realities, 
as to awaken the common sympathies of the 
human heart, and not with metaphysical ab- 
stractions — to be like Shakspeare, and not 
like Goethe, like Robert Burns, and not like 



128 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Coleridge. But be this as it may, Milton 
has certainly taken a common sense view, and 
not a metaphysical one, of his great theme, 
and thereby showed the national trait of his 
mind. And Butler has taken a common 
sense view of human nature in his great 
poem. Hudibras, with all his ludicrous fa- 
naticism and solemn folly, is still a man ; and 
so of every other character. And as to the 
poetry of Burns, it expresses more of natu- 
ral feeling, such feeling as all men have, than 
that of any poet known to history. But it is 
useless to dwell upon this topic; for all the 
late writers upon the history of literature on 
the continent of Europe, have made special 
reference to the fact that English literature is 
pervaded by a vein of common sense. The 
English have even examined the evidences 
of Christianity according to the principles of 
the inductive method, or of common sense. 
Butler in his analogy, has drawn conclusions 
as to the truth of Christianity from the anal- 
ogy which exists between it and the course 
of Providence as exhibited in nature; which 



THE BACONIAN 'PHILOSOPHY, 129 

is as strictly an inductive process, as any used 
in the investigations of natural philosophy. 

But there is a still graver charge brought 
against the Baconian philosophy. It is said 
to lead to materialism and atheism. DeMa- 
istre, in his commentary on the philosophy 
of Baco^ says : " Every line of Bacon con- 
ducts to materialism : but in no part has he 
shown himself a more skilful sophist, a more 
refined, profound and dangerous hypocrite, 
than in what he has written on the soul." 
And Schlegel, in his history of literature, 
says : " The philosophy of sensation which 
was unconsciously bequeathed to the world by 
Bacon, and reduced to the shape of a regu- 
lar system by Locke, first displayed in France, 
the true immorality and destructiveness of 
which it is the parent, and assumed the ap- 
pearance of a perfect sect of atheism." In 
the second chapter of the second part of this 
discourse, it will be shown, that the Baconian 
philosophy recognises the testimony of con- 
sciousness, as fully as it does that of sensa- 
tion. If this be so, how can that philosophy 
lead to materialism ? Consciousness tells us 



•130 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 



that the soul is not material ; for we are cer- 
tainly conscious that its attributes are not those 
of matter. Sensation informs us of the ma- 
terial world ; consciousness of the spiritual 
world ; and we have no right; according to 
any rule of evidence or logic, to predicate in 
the way of philosophical affirmation; any idea 
derived from the material world; of the ob- 
jects of the spiritual world ; because the 
ideas of the qualities or attributes of spirit; 
we get from consciousness; and we cannot pre- 
dicate of spirit; any quality but what is ascer- 
tained by consciousness; and neither can we 
predicate of matter; any quality but what is 
ascertained by sensation. We have no evi- 
dence therefore; that the soul is material ; 
because the knowledge of its nature is de- 
rived from a source ; from which not one idea 
appertaining to matter is derived. The Ba- 
conian philosophy, therefore, admits the same 
amount of evidence in favour of the immate- 
riality of the soul, that the a priori philosophy 
does; and therefore rests upon the same 
foundation in this particular. 

And so far from the Baconian philosophy 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 131 

being atheistical, Bacon has defined the boun- 
daries, and pointed out the nature of the ev- 
idence upon which natural theology rests 
upon the principles of his philosophy, with 
admirable precision, as will be shown in the 
third part of this discourse. And no nation 
has cultivated natural theology with such as- 
siduity and success^ as the English. The 
more the Baconian philosophy has been culti- 
vated, the more has natural theology advanc- 
ed. It is in fact the boa&t of this philos- 
ophy, that it has revived the study of natural 
theology, after it had been abandoned and 
scouted by the philosophers of the continent 
of Europe, as an unprofitable study. "It 
gave a particular pleasure to Sir Isaac New- 
ton," (says Maclaurin in his account of the 
writings of Newton,) " to see that his philo- 
sophy had contributed to promote an atten- 
tion to final causes, as I have heard him 
observe, after Des Cartes and others had en- 
deavoured to banish them." And where is 
the great work of Paley ? the two first chap- 
ters of which approach as near to the certain- 
ty of mathematical demonstration, as it is pos- 



132 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

sible for moral reasonings to do. The eviden- 
ces of natural theology pass through the achro- 
matic mind of the author, without being dis- 
coloured by prejudice or passion, and paint 
upon his pages, their doctrines with all the 
life and precision of daguerreotype. And 
yet there never was a mind more thoroughly 
imbued by the philosophy of sensation, as 
Schlegel calls it than Paley's. And the 
Bridgewater treatises have brought all the 
discoveries of the Baconian philosophy to 
prove and illustrate natural theology. And 
Bishop Butler even in his day, considered 
natural theology as so well' established in 
English philosophy, that he assumed its truth 
as the foundation of his great work on the 
analogy between natural and revealed reli- 
gion. So we see that in English philosophy, 
revelation, natural theology and physical sci- 
ence, are united in perfect harmony, pro- 
claiming with one voice that there is a God. 
Such then is the character of the Baconian 
or English philosophy : it embraces every 
thing that is sublime in speculation, useful in 
practice, lofty in morality, beautiful in art, and 
reverential. in religion. 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 133 

We now feel ourselves free to declare, that 
Bacon has done more to advance the progress 
of the human mind than any uninspired man 
known to history. There are no writings in 
the whole of literature, which take so pro- 
found a view of human nature, and point out 
so exalted a destiny for man, as his. With a 
philosophical forecast unparalleled in the 
world, he has given anticipations of some of 
the greatest discoveries of modern science. 
Even the law of gravity is conjectured, and 
its application to the explication of the tides 
of the ocean is distinctly stated. And his 
philosophy possesses within itself the princi- 
ple of perpetual progress ; for, it is not like 
the ancient philosophies, confined to specula- 
tive principles, from which an explanation of 
all things is to be deduced, and as these prin- 
ciples are in time found to be incapable of ex- 
plaining the phenomena of nature, the an- 
cient philosophies all sink into skepticism and 
become extinct, but it is commensurate with 
the phenomena of the universe, as it deals 
with phenomena, and deduces its principles 

from them, and not them from its principleSo 
12 



134 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

It is therefore, not like the ancient philoso- 
phies, a means of culture and progress for one 
people or epoch only, exhausting itself upon 
that people or epoch, but it is the means of 
culture and progress for all the nations and 
periods of the world. The nations which 
have been most under its influence have risen 
superior to all the rest of the human family, 
and have advanced progressively, and their 
speed is daily accelerated, to a degree of in- 
tellectual developement,and moral superiority, 
and political power, which seem to indicate 
that it is destined to form the type of the 
civilization of a greater part, if not of all the 
human race. And that this progress is like- 
ly to be perpetual, is also indicated by the 
fact, that England, the nation which has most 
assiduously cultivated this philosophy stands 
at the head of modern civilization, and is not 
only the great progressive and regenerative 
nation of modern times, but is also eminently 
conservative, possessing in happy combination 
the element of both progress and stability. 
She never loses sight of ancient landmarks in 
her progressive movements. How often, for 



THE BACOXIAN PHILOSOPHY. 135 

example, has she thrown her conservative in- 
fluence over the troubled waters of European 
politics, even when the commotion received 
its first impulse from the influence of her own 
principles of government! Scarcely has a 
quarter of a century elapsed, since she exer- 
ted all her power to rescue Christendom 
from political and moral ruin, brought about 
by a revolution with which at first she sympa- 
thized strongly. And it seems, at this dis- 
tance of time from the event, that if it had 
not been for her, all Europe would have ret- 
rograded in civilization. During the aw- 
ful storm of the French revolution, when al- 
most every government of Europe lay a 
wreck upon the tremendous tossings of the 
political waters, a gleam of hope still broke 
across the scene, as the wise men of the earth 
turned towards England and saw, that freigh- 
ted with the best interests of humanity, se- 
cure in her strength, she was riding out the 
storm. 

We have, therefore, strong reason to hope 
that the Baconian philosophy sanctified by the 
spirit of Christianity, will pour its sanative 



136 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

floods over all the earth, and bring back all 
nations from the delirious wanderings of the 
a priori philosophy, to walk in the plain and 
sober paths of common sense. 



PART THE SECOND, 

CHAPTER FIRST. 



THE BACONIAN METHOD OF INVESTIGATION, 



The object of this chapter is to exhibit the 
Method of Investigation taught by Bacon in 
the Novum Organon. As the best mode of 
doing this, we will first sketch an outline of 
the Logic taught by Aristotle in his Organon, 
and show its nature and its province, and then 
sketch an outline of the Method of Investiga- 
tion taught by Bacon in his Novum Organon, 
and show its nature and its province, and 
compare the two, and point out their differ- 
ences. Let us then commence with an anal- 
ysis of the reasoning process, as it is of this, 
that the Organon of Aristotle treats. 

We frequently observe in the best writers 
upon science, a vagueness and contradiction 
of expression in regard to the reasoning pro- 
cess, that evince the" greatest looseness of 
12* 



138 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



opinion in regard to its nature. We frequent- 
ly meet with such expressions as " the in- 
ductive process of reasoning," " the true 
method of reasoning, which Bacon taught," 
"the erroneous method of syllogistic reasoning 
which Aristotle invented," and many other 
such expressions, which clearly indicate that 
the writers suppose, that there is more than 
one mode of reasoning. Nothing can be more 
erroneous than such a supposition. No matter 
what be the subject upon which the mind is 
employed, whether in the spiritual or mate- 
rial world — whether in metaphysics, ethics, 
politics, mathematics, or in the different bran- 
ches of natural philosophy, the reasoning 
process is always the same. The process is 
always from the known, or that which is as- 
sumed as known, to the unknown ; and is al- 
ways reducible to a syllogism. The syllogism 
is in fact the process of reasoning ; for though 
every argument does not pass through the 
mind in the strict logical form of the syllo- 
gism, yet in every instance of reasoning, all 
the parts of a syllogism are contemplated by 
the mind. Some seem to entertain the notion, 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 139 

that the syllogism is a peculiar kind of rea- 
soning — that it is not the natural process of 
the mind in reasoning, but is an artificial mode 
invented by Aristotle. Let us test this notion, 
by analyzing an argument presented in its 
common form, " The world exhibits marks 
of design, it therefore has an intelligent au- 
thor." Now the process which takes place 
in the mind, in forming this argument, is the 
syllogism ; as will be seen, if we attempt to 
refute the argument. Suppose we deny the 
truth of the argument, we must do it upon 
one of two grounds. Either upon the ground, 
that the world does not exhibit marks of de- 
sign, or upon the ground, that even if does, 
still it may not have an intelligent author. An 
objection upon either of these grounds is a full 
denial of the argument. What does this 
prove ? Why, that the argument rests upon 
two assumptions. First, upon the assumption, 
that whatever exhibits marks of design has 
an intelligent author, and, secondly, that the 
world exhibits marks of design. The two 
assumptions are evidently the premises from 
which the conclusion is deduced ; for if either 



140 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

of them be false, the conclusion must be false, 
and if both of them be true, the conclusion 
must be true. As then both of these assump- 
tions are absolutely essential to the truth of 
the conclusion, the mind must have contem- 
plated them in coming to the conclusion; for 
otherwise it would not be warranted in form- 
ing any such conclusion. Indeed, it is im- 
possible to form such a conclusion, without 
considering both of these assumptions ; for 
they are the evidence upon which it rests. 

Now let us look back over what we have 
been doing, and we shall see that, in devel- 
oping the argument, we have formed it into a 
complete syllogism. As developed, it is 
thus : " Whatever exhibits marks of design 
has an intelligent author. The world exhib- 
its marks of design. Therefore, it has an in- 
telligent author." This is a complete syl- 
logism. The first sentence is the major 
premiss; the second, the minor; and the 
third, is the conclusion. The minor premiss 
was expressed in the argument as we first 
stated it ; but the major was not. When we 
denied the truth of the argument, we found, 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 141 

that in order to sustain it 3 we must adduce 
other evidence than was expressed 3 and the 
other evidence is the major premiss of the 
syllogism. The mind then, must have con- 
templated this major premiss ; else, it came 
to the conclusion upon insufficient evidence. 
In fact, the major premiss is implied in the 
minor ; as it must always be : and therefore, 
the mind must of necessity have contemplated 
it. The argument as we first stated it, is the 
form in which we generally speak or write 
our arguments ; for we never express all the 
evidence which passes before the mind in 
argumentation, but use expressions which 
imply the truth of what is considered evident. 
When, therefore, we wish to analyze and de- 
lineate the process which takes place in rea- 
soning, we must consider every step of the 
argument — take hold of the attenuated clew, 
and pass along all the most winding and intri- 
cate passages of the mental labyrinth, and 
find out what is not usually expressed. If 
we do this with any argument whatever, and 
add to it all that is understood, it will then be 
a syllogism, or series of syllogisms. The 



142 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

very argument by which we have endeavour- 
ed to establish the point under consideration, 
may be formed into a series of syllogisms, by 
merely supplying what is understood. 

As we have established the point, that 
every argument, when stated in full and in 
logical order, is a syllogism, or a series of 
syllogisms, we will next ascertain what are 
the acts of the mind, which take place in the 
syllogism, as we shall thus ascertain what are 
the acts of the mind which take place in rea- 
soning. 

The fundamental principles of the syllo- 
gism are ; first, if two terms agree with one 
and the same third term, they agree with 
each other ; secondly, if one term agrees and 
another disagrees with one and the same 
third term, these two disagree with each 
other. On the former of these principles, 
rests the validity of affirmative conclusions; 
on the latter, of negative. In the argument 
above, to prove that the world has an intelli- 
gent author, we found out a third term, with 
which both the subject and predicate of 
the proposition agree, which third term is, 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY". 143 

a whatever exhibits marks of design." Be- 
cause if both the subject and the predicate of 
the proposition agree with this third term, 
they agree with each other. We see, then, 
that in every affirmative syllogism there are 
three agreements. The major and minor 
terms agree with the middle term, and they 
therefore agree with each other. And that 
in every negative syllogism, there are two 
disagreements. Either the major or minor 
term agrees with the middle term, and the 
other disagrees with it, and they therefore 
disagree with each other. Now, how are 
agreements and disagreements ascertained ? 
Why, by comparison. The acts of the mind, 
therefore, which take place in the syllogism,, 
are a comparison of two terms, with a third, 
and if they agree with it, then an inference 
that they agree with each other; and if 
either of them agrees, and the other disa- 
grees with the third term, then an inference 
that they disagree with each other. All 
reasoning, therefore, proceeds by compari- 
son. We have exhibited this point, because 
we frequently meet with expressions, in the 



144 THE BACONIAPT PHILOSOPHY. 

best writers upon logic and metaphysics, and 
also in the writings of all classes of authors, 
which imply that all reasoning is not by com- 
parison : and also because we have seen some 
able writers running to the opposite extreme, 
and confounding the simple act of compari- 
son with the reasoning process, which as we 
have shown^ consists of several acts of com- 
parison, and an inference from them. 

We will now for the purpose of enquiring 
more minutely into the nature of the reason- 
ing process, take a syllogism to pieces, and 
examine its 'parts, so as to ascertain their 
nature and their mutual relations to each 
other. 

The syllogism is composed of three pro- 
positions, two of which are the premises, and 
the other is the conclusion. For example, 
in the syllogism which we have been using 
all along, the proposition, " Whatever has 
marks of design has an intelligent author," 
is the major premiss ; the proposition, "The 
world, exhibits marks of design," is the minor 
premiss ; and the proposition, " The world, 
therefore, has an intelligent author," is the 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 145 

conclusion. It is upon the mutual relations 
existing between these propositions; and upon 
the mutual relations existing between their 
respective parts, that all the rules of Logic are 
founded. It is intuitively manifest, that both 
the minor premiss and the conclusion, are 
embraced in the major premiss, as parts of a 
whole. If the major and minor propositions 
be granted, the conclusion must necessarily 
follow, indeed the truth of the conclusion is 
assumed in them. When, therefore, we as- 
sert the truth of the major and minor prem- 
ises, we virtually assert the truth of the con- 
clusion also. We see, then, that in every 
argument, the conclusion is contained or as- 
sumed in the premises, and that the conclu- 
sion is not a different truth from the premises, 
but is one of the truths contained or assum- 
ed in the major premiss, which is nothing 
more than a general truth, of which the con- 
clusion is a particular instance. When, there- 
fore, we draw a conclusion, we do not, strictly 
speaking, ascertain a new truth, but merely 
develop in a particular instance, a general 

truth known to us before. The great general 
13 



146 THE, BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

principle which governs these mutual rela- 
tions existing between the premises and con- 
clusion, is the fundamental principle of Logic, 
and is called in scholastic language the "Dic- 
tum de omni et nullo" ot Aristotle. It is 
this : " Whatever may be predicated (affirm- 
ed or denied) universally of any class, may 
be predicated (affirmed or denied) in like 
manner of any thing comprehended in that 
class. " The application of this principle to 
the major premiss, as comprehending the 
minor and the conclusion, is obvious : for if 
it can be affirmed universally of the class of 
things exhibiting marks of design, that they 
have an intelligent author, it can necessarily 
be affirmed so of the world, if it be one of 
the things comprehended in that class. This 
maxim may be called the formula of demon- 
stration, a general argument, of which every 
other is a particular instance. And the man 
who violates it in argumentation, is to the eye 
of enlightened reason guilty of as gross an 
absurdity as he who attempts to raise himself 
over a fence by the straps of his boots. 

We have now given an outline of the Logic.' 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 147 

taught by Aristotle in his Organon : and will 
next introduce to our readers the Method of 
i Investigation taught by Bacon in his Novum 
Organon. 

From the expressions quoted at the begin- 
ning of our analysis of the reasoning process, 
and from many such that are found in the best 
writers of every class, one might suppose 
that Lord Bacon had taught a new mode of 
reasoning : and that his Novum Organon was 
designed to supersede altogether the Organ- 
on of Aristotle. This is an entire misconcep- 
tion of the whole subject. The design of the 
Novum Organon was not to teach a new 
mode of reasoning ; but to teach a new method 
of investigation. The Novum Organon has, 
therefore a very different province from that 
of the Organon of Aristotle. The province 
of the latter is to analyze the process of the 
mind which takes place in reasoning ; and to 
furnish a model to which sound reasoning 
may be reduced and by which the correct- 
ness of every argument may be tested, in its 
conformity to the model : and to furnish rules 
relative to the whole matter, as we may have 
shown. 



148 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

But the Logic of Aristotle was supposed 
by its author and the other Greek philoso- 
phers to be an instrument of much more im- 
portance in the investigation of truth, than it 
really is, and was therefore applied to the in- 
vestigation of the sciences, and is called the 
a priori Method of Investigation, and it is as 
a method of investigation, that the Novum 
Organon is designed to supersede the Organ- 
on of Aristotle, as we will now proceed to 
show. 

The Greeks were an astute and exceedingly 
disputatious people, inordinately fond of dia- 
lectical disquisitions ; and it was in this spirit, 
that the Greek philosophers conceived that 
the reasoning process was the chief process 
in the investigation of the sciences, or in other 
words that, the a priori, was the true method 
of investigation. And it was at a period in 
the history of Greece when her philosophers 
were wholly given up to abstract studies, that 
Aristotle's Organon had its origin ; and it may 
be considered as a systematical developement 
of the method of investigation pursued by 
the Greek philosophers, who carried the a 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 149 

priori Method of Investigation which had 
proved so successful in mathematical inquiries 
to which it is adapted, into physicaVand meta- 
physical inquiries, supposing that as in the 
mathematics, so in physics and metaphysics, 
every thing can be reasoned out from a few 
simple notions or principles. And in accord- 
ance with this opinion the Greek philoso- 
phers were always endeavouring to find out 
these simple principles in nature, which they 
supposed would be productive of such rich 
results in science. In psychology, we find 
some maintaining the doctrine of innate gene- 
ral ideas or principles from which not only 
all metaphysical but all physical truths also 
were to be reasoned out ; and in physics, we 
find one making water, another, the infinitude 
of things, a third, air^ and at last Aristotle, 
making form and privation combined with 
matter, the principles of all things: and though 
Aristotle did not maintain that these simple 
notions or principles were an innate knowledge 
of the mind, yet he seemed to think that they 
might be recognised affirmatively at the first 

glace of contemplation of an instance furnish- 
13* 



150 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

ed through sensation, and that therefore, the 
chief process in the acquisition of truth, is in 
deducing conclusions from principles, and not 
in ascertaining principles. And these miser- 
able abstractions were the clews by which the 
labyrinths of nature's secret places were to 
be passed through, and the truths of physics 
and metaphysics ascertained by reasoning 
from them. This misapplication of Logic as 
a method of investigation could not but lead 
to error. For Logic does not guaranty the 
truth of the premises of an argument, unless 
they are conclusions from previous arguments, 
but always proceeds upon the hypothetical 
truth of the premises. It merely guarantys 
the truth of the conclusion, as an inference 
from the premises ; its province as we have 
shown, being to deduce conclusions from ad- 
mitted premises. Its tendency, therefore, is 
to make us overlook the truth of the premises; 
as it furnishes no rule in regard to their truth, 
but merely in regard to the truth of the con- 
clusion as an inference from them. And this 
is the very evil which it produced. 

This misapplication of Logic as a method 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 151 

of investigation, led inevitably to the most 
absurd theories in physical science imagina- 
ble. As an example, .we will cite Aristotle's 
argument in proof of the immutability and 
incorruptibility of the heavens, as it is exhib- 
ited by Galileo. 

"1st. Mutation is either generation or 
corruption." 

" 2d. Generation and corruption only hap- 
pen between contraries." 

" 3d. The motion of contraries is. contra- 
ry." 

" 4th. The celestial motions are circular." 

" 5th. Circular motions have no contra- 
ries." 

" A. Because there can be but three sim- 
ple motions." 

" 1st. To a centre." 
" 2d. Round a centre." 
" 3d. From a centre." 

" B. Of three things, only one can be 
contrary to one." 

" G. But a motion to a centre is manifestly 
the contrary to a motion from a centre." 

" D. Therefore, a motion round a centre 



152 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

(i. e. circular motion,) remains without a 
contrary." 

" 6th. Therefore, celestial motions have 
no contraries ; therefore, among celes- 
tial things there are no contraries ; there- 
fore, the heavens are eternal, immutable, 
incorruptible, and so forth." 
Such is a striking example of both the 
method and the results of the ancient mode 
of philosophizing. In it are exhibited a total 
disregard of facts and phenomena and a pom- 
pous and conceited affectation of system, 
which admirably illustrates the intellectual 
pride and vanity of the Greek philosophers, 
who paid no regard to their premises, as facts 
founded in nature ; but vainly hoped to rear 
up a system of natural philosophy correspond- 
ing with the indications of nature, merely by 
deducing conclusions from assumed premises 
not ascertained by observing nature, but pure- 
ly the fictions of their own imaginations. 
And to just as gross absurdities were the 
Greek philosophers led in mental philosophy, 
by their disregard of facts and phenomena, 
as they were in physical. We will cite as an 



THE BACONIAN" PHILOSOPHY. 153 

example, the doctrine of sensation, or the 
mode in which the mind perceives objects as 
taught in the Peripatetic school. A kind of 
images, or sensible species as they were call- 
ed, were supposed to come off from all ob- 
jects and to pass to our different organs of 
sense, and were by them admitted to the 
nerves, and through them conveyed to the 
brain, where they were impressed as the en- 
graving of a seal on wax, and were then re- 
lined into intellectual species, after the mind 
fully apprehended them. We might cite 
many other examples of like absurdity : but 
our object is merely to illustrate the point un- 
der consideration. 

The Logic and philosophy of Aristotle ob- 
tained the greatest favor at Rome under the 
Caesars. At an early period however, in the 
Christain world, Plato had displaced Aristotle, 
and his continued the most generally receiv- 
ed philosophy until the close of the fifth cen- 
tury, when the influence of Aristotle began 
to prevail again, and though it declined a lit- 
tle during the sixth century, at the close of 
die seventh, it was every where triumphant 



154 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

throughout the civilized portions of Europe, 
Asia and Africa. Christians, Jews and Ma- 
hometans bowed before his authority. Com- 
mentaries, paraphrases, summaries and disser- 
tations on his works were composed without 
number in both Arabic and Latin. His works 
were appealed to in all disputes as infallible au- 
thority : and none dared dissent from the 
" Great Master, " During this period, the 
study of nature was still more neglected than 
it had been by the Greeks. Mere abstrac- 
tions, figments of the mind, usurped the 
place of even the few facts contained in the 
Greek philosophy. Men's minds were in a 
continual ferment about occult qualities and 
essences — about proportion, degree, infinity, 
formality, and innumerable other abstractions ; 
and such was the height to which controver- 
sy ran about these chimeras of the mind, that 
it often resulted in bloodshed, and well-nigh 
convulsed kingdoms. Every one seemed to 
think that, " the chief end of : man, is to con- 
tradict his neighbour, and to wrangle with 
him forever. " The different parties had their 
rival chiefs decked out. in all the titles of phi- 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 155 

losophical heraldry, such as " the invincible, " 
" the most profound," u the angelical," " the 
irrefragible doctor, " to lead them on to the 
wordy war. And now the most absurd no- 
tions were worked up into systems of phi- 
losophy. As the great master Aristotle had 
taught, as we have shown, that a uniform 
circular motion was the only motion consis- 
tent with the perfection of the heavenly me- 
chanism, this notion was worked up into a 
most unwieldy and complicated theory of as- 
tronomy, exhibiting the sun, moon and plan- 
ets revolving in circles, whose centres were 
carried round in other circles, and these again 
in others, and so on without end — u cycle 
upon epicycle, orb on orb," throughout the in- 
finitude of space. But a still more absurd 
astronomical theory was gravely presented to 
the world in the sixth century by Cosmas 
Indoplcustes, who maintained, says Maclau- 
rin in his account of Sir Isaac Newton's phi- 
losophical discoveries, that u the earth was 
not globular but an immense plane of a great- 
er length than breadth,environed by an unpass- 
able ocean. He placed a huge mountain to- 



156 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



wards the north, around which the sun and 
stars performed their diurnal revolutions ; and 
from the conical shape which he ascribed to 
it, with the oblique motion of the sun ; he ac- 
counted for the inequality of the days and the 
variation of the seasons. The vault of Heav- 
en leaned upon the earth extended beyond 
the ocean, being likewise supported by two 
vast columns: beneath the arch, angels con- 
ducted the stars in their various motions. 
Above it were the celestial waters, and above 
all he placed the supreme heavens. " Such 
then was the state of knowledge produced by 
implicitly obeying authority, and following the 
ancient method of philosophizing, of endeav- 
ouring to deduce systems of philosophy from 
a few imaginary principles — of misapplying 
Logic as a method of investigation. 

It was during this state of knowledge, 
though light had begun to break in upon the 
darkness, that Lord Bacon was born. While 
yet a student at Trinity College, Cambridge, 
he discerned the vagueness and inutility of 
the existing state of knowledge ; and as he 
advanced in age, he saw the more clearlj 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 157 

the utter worthlessness of all the reigning 
speculations of the day ; for, there being no 
connection whatever between them and the 
arts, they did not minister at all to the com- 
forts of man, or arm him with any power o- 
ver nature. As this great genius meditated 
upon the immense growth of pernicious error 
which had sprung up in every province of 
knowledge, he plainly saw, that it was in a 
great measure the product of the extensive 
influence which Aristotle possessed in the 
schools, diverting the minds of men from the 
study of nature to the study of his doctrines j 
and that the authority of Aristotle must be 
overthrown, before man could be brought 
back into the true paths of science. For 
although the discoveries of Copernicus, Kep- 
ler and Galileo had in some degree broken 
the magic spell of the enchanter of Sta- 
gira, it remained for a genius of a loftier tone 
to show its delusion and folly by pointing out 
its nature ; and to rouse up the minds of men 
from slavish obedience to authority, by pour- 
ing into them the quickening influences of his 

own free spirit. All this Bacon designed to 
14 



158 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

accomplish by his Installation of the Scien- 
ces ; and to lead men back into the true paths 
of science ; from which they had so long wan- 
dered. 

The Installation of the Sciences, was de- 
signed by Bacon to consist of six parts : but 
as he wrote but little of the third, fourth, fifth 
and sixth parts, we will say nothing of them. 
The first part is the Advancement of Learn- 
ing in which he sketches out all the depart 
ments of knowledge and defines their limits ; 
and shows the degree of cultivation in each. 
In concluding this part of his great work, he 
says, " thus have I made, as it were, a small 
globe of the intellectual world as truly and 
faithfully as I could discover, with a note and 
description of those parts, which seem to me 
not constantly occupate or well converted by 
the labour of man. " 

The second part of the Instauration of the 
Sciences, is the Novum Organon, which it is 
our object now to illustrate. As, in the Ad- 
vancement of Learnings Bacon sketched a map 
of the sciences, in the Novum Organon, he de- 
velops the method by which they are to be 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 159 

investigated. He here proclaims the great 
truth, and develops it ; that the knowledge of 
the philosopher does not differ in kind but 
only in degree ; from that of the peasant — that 
the whole of philosophy is founded on obser- 
vation; and is nothing more than a classifica- 
tion of facts and phenomena presented in na- 
ture; rising first; from particulars; to classifi- 
cations of the lowest degree of comprehension; 
and then from these; to those of a higher de- 
gree; and so on ; until we arrive at classifi- 
cations of the highest degree comprehend- 
ing all the subordinate classifications. And 
that these classifications are the only true 
general conceptions ; as they are the only 
ones which have any thing corresponding 
to them in nature ; and that the ideas or 
forms of PlatO; and the empirical general 
conceptions of Aristotle have no counterparts 
in nature, but are the mere fictions of their 
own imaginations; and therefore are not a 
proper foundation of science. In -a word; he 
declared that all philosophy is written in the 
book of nature; the material and spiritual 
.worlds. He set forth this great truth in the 



160 TME BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

very first proposition of the Novum Organon: 
"Manas the servant and interpreter of nature, 
does and understands as much as his obser- 
vations on the order of nature, either with re- 
gard to things or the mind, permit him, and 
neither knows, nor is capable of more." The 
spirit of this philosophy is humility. It teach- 
es that in order to become philosophers truly 
so called, men must cast off that intellectual 
pride which vainly strives to find out the se- 
crets of nature by mere reasoning, and be- 
come as children, reading in humility the 
simplest lessons in the book oi nature. " The 
access to the kingdom of man which is found- 
ed on the sciences, M says Bacon, " resembles 
that to the kingdom of Heaven, where no 
admission is conceded except to children. " 
Noble and sagacious comparison ! With 
what philosophic forecast does it portray the 
spirit of true philosophy ! For as those who 
recognise the doctrine of humility in divine 
truth, have planted, upon the strongest for- 
tresses of paganism, the white banner of Chris- 
tianity, with the lonely star of Bethlehem 
shedding its mild beams from its ample folds 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 161 

as it waves over the worshippers of the true 
God, so those who recognise it in human 
truth, have pushed their conquests into every 
province of nature, and even scaled the very 
Heavens, and planted the standard of the Ba- 
conian philosophy upon the remotest star, de- 
monstrating by their success that the hum- 
bling precept, a become as little children, " 
is as true in philosophy as in religion. It is 
obedience to this precept which confers on 
man all his power over nature — gives him 
access to the kingdom founded on the scien- 
ces. 

The method of investigation, according to 
this view of philosophy, proposed by Bacon 
in his Novum Grganon, he calls Induction, 
which means " a bringing in;" because it 
proposes to bring into philosophical investi- 
gations facts diligently sought out in nature, 
and after carefully examining them in all pos- 
sible lights, to educe some general principle 
from them which they clearly indicate. The 
developement of this method, by showing its 
nature and efficiency, and exposing the sour- 
ces of error in philosophical investigations and 
14* 



162 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

laying down precepts for conducting them 
right ; so as to enable the humble and sincere 
inquirer to guard against error, constitute the 
Novum Organon. Such then is the remedy 
which Bacon proposed for rectifying the evils 
of the ancient philosophy ; and for enabling 
man to establish a true practical philosophy 
that would extend his empire over all the do- 
minions of nature. He sketched a chart to 
guide the humble voyager on the vast ocean 
of knowledge ; and erected beacons to warn 
him where his barque might be stranded. 

It is evident from this view of the subject 
that the Novum Organon, was not (designed 
to teach a new mode of reasoning ; and thus 
to supersede the Organon of Aristotle in its 
legitimate province of analyzing the process of 
reasoning, and exhibiting rules for conducting 
it aright : but merely to supersede it as an in- 
strument of investigation in the sciences, to 
which it had been misapplied both by its au- 
thor and his followers, especially those of mod- 
ern times. The Novum Organon is not in 
fact a treatise on logic at all : but rather a 
treatise on evidence ; for it treats more partic- 



TH'S BACONIAN FHrLOSOFKY, 



163 



ularly of premises, than of conclusions ; and 
the premises are the evidence, which prove 
the conclusion of an argument .; for when we 
set out with a conclusion which m then called 
a proposition, the evidence which we adduce 
to prove it would constitute the premises, if 
we set out with the premises, in order to de- 
duce the conclusion from them. Lord Bacon, 
after surveying (the whole of ancient philoso- 
phy, saw that it was not sustained by legiti- 
mate evidence— that the premises (so to 
speak) of the arguments were either plainly 
false, or mere assumptions not proved; and 
he proposed in his Novum Organon, that 
men should examine facts and phenomena 
(the only legitimate evidence,) before they 
form theories — interpret nature and have leg- 
itimate premises, before they deduce conclu- 
sions. He did not design to show that their 
conclusions were not logically deduced from 
their premises, or that the syllogistic rules 
laid down by Aristotle for conducting this 
process were eroneous. 

But if Bacon did design to teach a new 
mode of reasoning, he has signally failed of 



164 'ffiE BACONIAN 1THILO50PHT. 

his purpose; for we liave shown that the 
syllogism is the process which must take 
place in all correct reasoning ; and we will 
now proceed to show that Induction is a very 
different process, and not a process of reason- 
ing at all. What is Induction ? It may be 
defined, a process of investigation and of 
collecting facts and phenomena, either with 
or without a view, to establish some general 
principle already suggested to the mind. It 
is manifest that the mere investigation and 
collection of facts and phenomena without a 
view to establish some general principle al- 
ready suggested to the mind, is not a reason- 
ing process. It therefore, only remains to 
examine the other, the investigation and col- 
lection of facts and phenomena with a view 
to establish some general principle already 
suggested to the mind. In this last case, the 
investigation and collection of facts and phe- 
nomena, is conducted on the supposition or 
presumption of the existence of a general 
principle or law ; and is directed with a view 
to establish it, by the examination of a suffi- 
cient number of facts and phenomena. For 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 165 

example: — A naturalist, after seeing for the 
first time, a duck or any other water-fowl, 
might be led to infer that all water-fowl have 
web-feet; and might therefore proceed to 
search for other water-fowl, until he found the 
goose, the pelican, the swan, &c. ; and would 
then be convinced of the truth of the gene- 
Tal principle, that all water-fowl have web- 
feet. Now, this is certainly not a process of 
reasoning; for it is conducted upon the sup- 
position or presumption merely, of the exis- 
tence of the law or general principle, and not 
upon the absolute certainty of its existence ; 
for it would then not be investigation, but 
demonstration ©r reasoning from known pre- 
mises, to something taken for granted in those 
premises, as we have shown reasoning always 
to be. The inductive process is not governed 
by principles of logic, but by principles of 
evidence. For instance : — In the example 
above, the naturalist supposed from the fact, 
that one water-fowl, the duck, has web-feet, 
that all water-fowl have web-feet. Now, 
this is evidently a mere supposition from tes- 
timony not sufficient to convince the natura- 



166 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

list ; he therefore searches for other water- 
fowl (other testimony) and finds the goose, 
the pelican, the swan, &,., and is convinced 
by this accumulated testimony of the general 
principle that all water-fowl have web-feet. 
The mental determination is effected by tes- 
timony, and not by rules of logic. The con- 
clusion is not implied in the very conception 
of the premises, as is always the case in rea- 
soning ; but it is warranted by the probabili- 
ties founded in the analogies of nature and 
in the constitution of the human mind. The 
inference is founded upon material relations, 
and not upon logical. The conclusion is 
probable ; but not necessarily certain, as is 
always the case in logic ; for logic never 
proves with any butt the highest degree of 
certainty, the inference being never deduced 
from probabilities, but necessitated by the 
very laws of thought. The relation between 
the premises of an argument and the conclu- 
sion, is that of reason and consequent ; and 
the material relations of the objects express- 
ed by the terms have nothing to do with the 
inference of the one from the others ; for in 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 167 

reasoning^ the inference is effected, vi termini 
et rationiSy and not vi materiae. And reason- 
ing always proceeds from a class to a parti- 
cular, or from a class of greater comprehen- 
sion, to one of less ; and every class is estab- 
lished by induction : to make a class then, a 
prerequisite of induction, as we must do, if 
we make induction, reasoning, would be ab- 
surd ; for every induction would then be the 
result of some previous induction, in infinit- 
um ; and it would make our highest abstrac- 
tions or generalisations, the first in order of 
time in the acquisition of knowledge, which 
is a psychological doctrine that is repudiated 
by the whole Baconian philosophy ; as will 
be seen in the next chapter. 

It is manifest, we think, from this analysis, 
that induction is the reverse of the syllogism. 
Induction proceeds from particulars to a class 
of low degree, and from several classes of a 
low degree to those of a higher, until we ar- 
rive at those of the highest degree. On the 
contrary, syllogism proceeds from classes of 
the highest degree to those of a lower, and 
from those of the lowest degree to particulars. 



168 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

The two together constitute one complete 
system of precesses by which knowlehge is 
acquired and perfected. For very often we 
cannot be satisfied that we have arrived at a 
correct inductive conclusion or statement of 
a law of nature, until we make such conclu- 
sion or law a ground of argument, and show 
by strict reasoning that the phenomena ob- 
served are consequences of it. For exam- 
ple : in reasoning from the law of gravity, 
we discover, by the application of the gene- 
ral laws of dynamics, that all the planets must 
attract each other, and therefore draw each 
other out of the orbits in which they would 
have moved, if acted upon by the sun only ; 
and thus circumstances are discovered by 
which our general conclusion is strengthened, 
and which could not have been discovered 
otherwise, as it required some such conclu- 
sion which could only be obtained by strict 
reasoning, to direct attention to such minute 
inquiries ; and a correct theory is thus ob- 
tained. This use of reasoning in inductive 
inquiries will be more particularly explained 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 169 

in the sequel, when we speak of the appli- 
cation of mathematics to physical inquiries. 

In further illustration of the nature of in- 
duction, we will now inquire into the nature 
of the methods of Analysis and Synthesis. 

We frequently see Analysis called the induc- 
tive process, and Synthesis called the hypo- 
thetical process, the process of the ancients. 
This is very erroneous. Synthesis is just as 
much of an inductive process as analysis; and 
is, in fact, more extensively used by the Ba- 
conian philosophers than analysis. Analysis 
and synthesis are terms derived from the an- 
cient Greek geometricians ; and are of quite a 
different nature in the mathematics from what 
they are in the other sciences. In mathemat- 
ics synthesis is just the reverse of analysis ; 
but it is not so in the sciences of contingent 
truth. In these, analysis is the process of in- 
vestigation by observation and experiment; 
and synthesis is the process of explaining 
other phenomena by means of the general 
fact or law ascertained by analysis. Synthe- 
sis is just as much of a process of investiga- 
tion as analysis ; and is more frequently used, 



170 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

as such. For we are frequently led to an in- 
ference analytically, without our induction of 
facts being sufficiently extensive to satisfy us ; 
we therefore bring to our aid synthetically 
facts which we had not before examined. 
At the time we are explaining facts syntheti- 
cally we are establishing the inference which 
we derived analytically ; because if the infe- 
rence will explain the facts; the facts will, of 
course, support the inference. Analysis and 
synthesis are, therefore, both processes of in- 
duction ; for by both of them we enlarge the 
number of our facts. Indeed, most of the dis- 
coveries in the inductive philosophy have 
been made chiefly by synthesis. The phe- 
nomenon of the rainbow was explained by it. 
Sir Isaac Newton, by experiment with the 
prysmatic spectrum, discovered that light is 
composed of seven rays, of different colours, 
and of different degrees of refrangibility. By 
this fact, thus analytically established, he ex- 
plained the phenomenon of the rainbow syn- 
thetically ; and the phenomenon thus explain- 
ed, establishes the fact that light is composed 
of seven rays of different colours and differ- 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 171 

ent degrees of refrangibility. The phenom- 
enon of the rainbow could never have been 
explained analytically. We might have look- 
ed at it forever, and would still be unable to 
explain its cause from mere observation, no 
matter how minute. The science of astrono- 
my has been reared chiefly by synthesis. 
Newton, from an examination of the phenom- 
ena of motion on the earth, inferred the prin- 
ciple of gravity, and by the principle of 
gravity thus analytically ascertained, he ex- 
plained synthetically the phenomena of the 
whole solar system. It would have been 
impossible ever to have explained these phe- 
nomena by analysis. In the preface to his 
Principia, Newton says : "All the difficulty 
of philosophy sems to consist in this : from 
the phenomena of motions, to investigate the 
forces of nature, and then from these forces 
to demonstrate the other phenomena ; and to 
this end the general propositions in the first 
and second books are directed. In the third 
book, we give an example of this, in explana- 
tion of the system of the world; for, by the 
propositions, mathematically demonstrated, in 



172 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

the first book, we then derive from the celes- 
tial phenomena the forces of gravity, with 
which bodies tend to the sun and the several 
planets. Then, from these forces, by other 
propositions, which are also mathematical, 
we deduce the motions of the planets, the 
comets, the moon, and the sea. " Now, this 
is an outline of the method of investigation 
pursued in the Principia, given by Newton 
himself; and we see that synthesis is much 
more extensively used than analysis. Anal- 
ysis was employed in the first step of the in- 
vestigation — " from the phenomena of mo- 
tions to investigate the forces of nature. ?? 
The demonstration of the other phenomena 
from these forces is by synthesis, and consti- 
tutes the great portion of the immortal work. 
The copy of the Principia which we have be- 
fore us was edited by that distinguished 
mathematician Roger Cotes. In his preface 
to the work, in speaking of those who profess 
experimental philosophy^ he says: "They 
therefore proceed in a twofold method, syn- 
thetical and analytical. From select phenom- 
ena they deduce, by analysis, the forces of 
nature, and the more simple laws of forces ; 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. J 73 

and from thence, by synthesis, show the con- 
stitution of the rest. This is that incompara- 
bly best way of philosophising which our re- 
nowned author most justly embraced before 
the rest, and thought alone worthy to be cul- 
tivated and adorned by his excellent labours. 
Of this he has given us a most illustrious ex- 
ample by the explication of the system of the 
world, most happily deduced from the theo- 
ry of gravity, " We might adduce innumer- 
able other examples : indeed, we might bring 
forward the whole of science in illustration of 
our position, but we have sufficiently exem- 
plified it ; for, after showing that the greatest 
monument of which the inductive philosophy 
can boast was reared chiefly by synthesis — 
that much the largest induction of facts was 
made by this process, it is unnecessary to 
dwell longer on examples. Perhaps it may 
be objected to this last example that we are 
confounding, by citing it, the distinction 
which we have made between synthesis and 
analysis in the mathematics and the sciences 
of contingent truth. A little reflection will 

remove this objection. 
15* 



174 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

The application of mathematics to the sci- 
ences of contingent truth, does not take them 
out of the pale of induction ; because the 
whole object of such application is to explain 
the phenomena, by comparing the results of 
the demonstrations from the assumed data 
with observed facts, and thereby ascertaining 
from the agreement or disagreement of the 
results of the demonstrations with observed 
facts, whether the data or principle inferred 
by analysis, upon which the demonstrations 
are based, be true or false. An appeal must 
be made to experience, in every particular 
kstance of the application of mathematics to 
natural philosophy, to see whether the results 
of the demonstration correspond with observ- 
ed phenomena, no matter how well establish- 
ed the general principles of the particular 
science may be considered ; for it is in this 
way only that mathematics gives certainty to 
theories in natural philosophy, or in other 
words, strengthens our inductive conclusions ; 
because until we ascertain that such phenom- 
ena do exist as the demonstrations show to 
be necessary consequences of the assumed 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 175 

principle, we cannot be sure of the truth of 
the principle. For example ; when demon- 
stration showed that if the principle of grav- 
ity be true, there must exist certain inequali- 
ties and deviations in the motions of the 
planets, produced by their mutual action upon 
each other, drawing each other out of the 
orbits they would have ;moved in if acted 
upon only by the sun, we could not be cer- 
tain of the truth of the principle of gravity 
until we ascertained that these phenomena 
did really exist ; and then the principle would 
explain the phenomena, and the phenomena 
support the principle. Both the analytical 
and synthetical processes of induction then, 
are aided by the application of mathematics. 
Though, in testing the truth of the conclusion 
or principle arrived at by the analytical pro- 
cess of induction by applying mathematics to 
it, you must assume the truth of the conclu- 
sion or principle, and then deduce from it, 
the phenomena from which the conclusion 
has been inferred. And thus it is apparent, 
that the analytical process is aided by the ap- 
plicaton of mathematics, in the very same way 



176 THE BACOiYlA'N PHILOSOPHY, 

that the synthetical process is : for in apply- 
ing the mathematics to aid the synthetical 
process, you must assume the truth of the 
conclusion or principle arrived at by analysis, 
and deduce from it, the phenomena which 
you are seeking to explain by that conclusion 
or principle, and in this way prove the ana- 
lytical conclusion by these phenomena thus 
synthetically explained, and show that they 
belong to the same class with those from 
which the analytical conclusion was inferred. 
And both processes will thus result, in prov- 
ing the general principle inferred in the ana- 
lytical process. This application of mathe- 
matics in aid of the inductive process is spok- 
en of by Bacon in the ninety six aphorism of 
the second book of the Novum Organon, 
where he says "that mathematics ought rath- 
er to terminate natural philosophy than to 
generate or create it. " 

Let it not, then, be said that analysis is the 
inductive process, and synthesis the ancient. 
They are not processes of reasoning; for 
they both are conducted on the supposition 
or presumption merely of the existence of a 



THE EACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 177 

law or general principle, and are directed 
with a view to establish it, by the examina- 
tion of a sufficient number of facts : and not 
on the absolute certainty of the existence of 
the law or principle, which is the case in rea- 
soning. They are the processes by which we 
acquire all our knowledge of philosophy; and 
the two together constitute what is meant by 
induction in its largest sense. For example : 
something suggests a general principle or 
law ; we then try whether it is sustained by 
other facts, or, which is the same thing, whe- 
ther it will explain other phenomena of the 
same kind. The first step is analytical, the last 
synthetical ; and the whole is induction : and 
the whole series of inductions by which the 
sciences have been reared, were of this na- 
ture — conclusions from a few instances prov- 
ed by trial upon many ; and while we have 
been explaining the nature of analysis and 
synthesis, we have been explaining the na- 
ture of induction. This view of induction is 
taken by Bacon himself in the 103 aphorism 
of the first book of the Novum Organon. 
Speaking of the mere examination of partic- 



178 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

ulars, he says, "comparatively insignificant 
results are to be expected from thence, whilst 
the more important are to be derived from the 
new light of axioms, deduced by certain 
method and rule from the above particulars, 
and pointing out and defining new particulars 
in their turn. Our road is not along a plain, 
but rises and falls, ascending to axioms, and 
descending to effects. " It is obvious, that 
the terms ascending and descending describe 
what are now called the analytical and syn- 
thetical processes ; and it would perhaps be 
better, if the terms analysis and synthesis were 
banished from the sciences of contingent truth, 
and the terms ascending induction, and de- 
scending induction substituted for them, in 
accordance with the phraseology of Bacon ; 
because there is not the same difference be- 
tween the terms analysis and synthesis in the 
sciences of contingent truth, that there is be- 
tween them in the mathematics, and the re- 
tention of them is therefore calculated to mis- 
lead. As methods of instruction in what is 
already known, they are the reverse of each 
other; and so they would be as methods of 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 179 

Investigation in all the branches of natural 
philosophy to which mathematics can be ap- 
plied; if all the phenomena were known, and 
the mathematics were perfect, so as to render 
these branches of natural philosophy as much 
a matter of strict reasoning as geometry. 

As we have show T n that induction is carried 
on, by principles of evidence and not by 
principles of logic, we will offer some reflec- 
tions upon philosophical evidence; and de- 
velop induction further than Bacon did, and 
give it a more systematic form. 

We frequently see Analogy spoken of in 
the best writers as a fallacious sort of evi- 
dence, that ought not to be admitted into the 
inductive philosophy. This is very errone- 
ous ; for analogy is true inductive evidence. 
What we mean by inductive evidence, is evi- 
dence founded in the constitution of nature — 
real evidence, as opposed to mere hypothesis. 
And what we mean by evidence, is whatever 
is clothed by nature with the power of pro- 
ducing conviction in our minds, when it is 
fully apprehended, even in spite of ourselves. 
As to the first point, that analogy has a real 



180 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

foundation in nature, no one can object ; for 
we can trace it every where. And as to the 
other point, whether it is clothed by nature 
with power to produce conviction in our 
minds solid enough to be the foundation of 
sound inductive inferences, we think there 
will be as little objection, after diligent inqui- 
ry into the matter. The conviction produced 
by analogy between facts or phenomena, has 
the very same foundation that the conviction 
of the existence of the most familiar object 
has. They are both founded in our mental 
constitution, on what is called by metaphy- 
sicians, fundamental laws of belief. If we 
see an object we cannot but believe in its 
existence : so if we perceive an analogy be- 
tween phenomena, we cannot but believe 
that they are produced by a similar or com- 
mon cause. But why the conviction is pro- 
duced in either case, is not known to us, and 
never can be in this state of existence. It is 
beyond the boundaries of philosophy. Hav- 
ing laid this foundation, we will now proceed 
to show the importance of analogical evi- 
dence, and also to exhibit its nature, and 



THE EACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 181 

finally, to indicate the general principle by 
which our estimate of its force is to be regu- 
lated. 

There is no science whatever in which an- 
alogical evidence is not of great importance. 
In medicine, a remedy is frequently sugges- 
ted in one disease, from its having been effi- 
cacious in an analogous disease. In anatomy 
also, it is of much importance. One of the 
noblest monuments of human reason is the 
osteology of Baron Couvier; and this has 
been reared almost exclusively upon analogy. 
In moral science also, it has its monuments. 
The ablest defence of Christianity that has 
ever been submitted to the world, is founded 
altogether upon analogy. We mean the work 
of Bishop Butler — a work that has done more 
to make plain the ways of providence in the 
moral economy of the world, than almost any 
other human production. This work alone 
is sufficient to entitle analogy to the character 
of admissible evidence in philosophy ; for if 
it be admissible in one science, it must be ad- 
missible in all, as it must have the same rela- 
tive strength in all. But we will not confine 
16 



182 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

ourselves to general propositions : but will 
select instances in which analogical evidence 
has been the foundation of discoveries in na- 
tural philosophy as the best mode of enforc- 
ing our views. 

The conjecture of Newton that the dia- 
mond is a combustible body, which has been 
always thought to evince such marvellous sa- 
gacity, was founded upon the analogy of its 
effects upon light, to those of other combus- 
tible substances. Kepler having ascertained 
the orbit of Mars about the sun to be an el- 
lipse, having the sun in one of its foci, the 
same law was immediately extended by anal- 
ogy to all the planets ; and was found in time 
to hold good in the case of each : and when 
Jupiter's disc and satellites were afterwards 
discovered by Galileo, the same law was im- 
mediately extended by analogy, to this mini- 
ature system, and found to hold good : and the 
law was thus found to depend on the nature 
of planetary motion. AIL of which has since 
been mathematically demonstrated by New- 
ton. Here, then, are conclusions from anal- 
ogy in reference to the most difficult subjects, 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 183 

demonstrated to be correct by the most rigid 
application of mathematics ; and the conjec- 
ture of Newton about the nature of the dia- 
mond, has been proved to be correct by mod- 
ern chemistry. But perhaps the most beau- 
tiful instance of the use of analogical evi- 
dence, within the whole range of natural sci- 
ence, is to be found in the theory of dew by 
Dr. Wells. It is selected by Sir J. W. F. 
Herschel, " as one of the most beautiful spe- 
cimens of inductive experimental inquiry. " 
And as he has selected it as an example of 
inductive search without regard to the kind of 
evidence on which it rests, we will select it 
as an example of inductive search, conducted 
upon analogical evidence, and will give it in 
the words of Herschel : "Let us now exem- 
plify this inductive search for a cause, by one 
general example : suppose dew were the 
phenomenon proposed, whose cause we would 
know. In the first place, we must separate 
dew from rain and the moisture of fogs, and 
limit the application of the term to what is 
really meant, which is, the spontaneous ap- 
pearance of moisture on substances exposed 



184 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

in the open air, when no rain or visible wet 
is falling. Now here we have analogous 
phenomena in the moisture which bedews a 
cold metal or stone, when we breathe upon 
it; that which appears on a glass of water 
fresh from the well in warm weather; that 
which appears on the inside of windows, 
when sudden rain or hail chills the external 
air ; that which runs down our walls, when, 
after a long frost, a warm moist thaw comes 
on : all these instances agree in one point, the 
coldness of the object dewed, in comparison 
with the air in contact with it. But in the 
case of the night dew, is this a real cause ? 
is it a fact that the object dewed, is colder 
than the air ? Certainly not, one would at 
first be inclined to say ; for what is to make 
it so ? But the analogies are cogent and u- 
nanimous ; and therefore we are not to dis- 
card their indications ; and besides, the ex- 
periment is easy : we have only to lay a ther- 
mometer in contact with the dewed substance, 
and hang one a little distance above it, out of 
reach of its influence. The experiment has 
therefore been made ; the question has been 



THE BACONIAN THILOSOPH-Y. 1-65 

asked, and the answer has invariably been in 
the affirmative. Whenever an object contracts 
dew, it is colder than the air, &,c. " We 
here see inferences founded on analogy, prov- 
ed by actual experiment. If the example 
had been written with a view to the object for 
which we have selected it, the language could 
not have been more expressive of our doc- 
trine — could not point out the analogies more 
distinctly. This fact gives great force to it, 
as an illustration of the use of analogical evi- 
dence in philosophical inquiries. But why 
need we dwell on minor examples, when in 
fact, it was analogical evidence which led 
Newton to break through the fetters of the 
dogma, of the ancients, that the celestial phe- 
nomena are in their nature and laws different 
from the -terrestrial, and to connect the phy- 
sics of the earth with that of the heavens, 
and to identify their laws. He discovered an 
analogy between the motions of a bomb shot 
from a cannon and the motions of the moon, 
and was thus led to infer that their motions 
were produced by the same cause, and regu- 
lated by the same laws ; and from the anal- 
16* 



186 [ THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

ogy between the earth and the other planets, 
he concluded that the motions of their satel- 
lites were produced by the same cause that 
those of the moon were ; and, finally, the ana- 
logy between the motions of the earth and of 
the other planets around the sun, and the mo- 
tions of the moon around the earth, led him 
to infer that their motions were produced by 
the same cause; and the application of geom- 
etry, enabled him to verify these inferences. 
Thus we see, then, that it was by an induc- 
tion founded upon analogies, that the law of 
gravity was established. 

It is very important, then, as these exam- 
ples show, to have a number of analogous in- 
stances, which class themselves with the one 
under consideration : because the explanation 
of one of them will be apt to lead to that of 
all the others. We may also perceive analo- 
gies between different sciences, and trace 
them until they terminate in some common 
phenomenon, more general than that which 
is the subject of either of them, and thus ar- 
rive at their common cause. This has been 
the case with electricity, magnetism and gal- 



THE BACONIAN" FML05GPHV. 187 

vanism, for they have been discovered to be 
the same, or rather, the two last are particu- 
lar instances of the first, by examining their 
analogies ; and it is very probable from the 
strong analogies existing between the phe- 
nomena of ligfet and sound, that they will at 
last be discovered to originate in a common 
cause, vibratory motion. 

But we need not dwell longer on particu- 
lar examples; for the truth is, all the evidence 
on which the inductive process is conducted^ 
may be divided into analogy and identity, 
though of course, subordinate divisions may 
be made of these. For example : a child 
that has been burnt by the flame of a candle, 
will expect the same effect from the same 
cause — to be burnt by the same candle. This 
expectation is founded upon identity of evi- 
dence. But when the child expects the same 
effect, from a similar cause, as for instance, 
to be burnt by the flame of another candle 
(though this may almost be called the same 
cause,) or by the flame of wood, or gas, 
or by every flame, the expectation is founded 
upon analogy. Whenever the inference is 



188 THfi BACONIAx\ PHILOSOPHY. 

from same to same, it is founded upon identi- 
ty ; and whenever it is from like to like, how- 
ever great the likeness, it is founded upon ana- 
logy. We see then, that Induction beginning 
with the simplest classifications is founded up- 
on analogy. As long as the subject of inves- 
tigation is merely probable, no matter how 
great the probability, the process is founded 
upon analogy. For example : — in the case of 
the theory of dew, which we cited, the whole 
process was founded upon analogy, until it 
was ascertained by experiment with the ther- 
mometer, that cold was the cause. And so 
in every other science, we must proceed upon 
analogous instances, until we arrive at a com- 
mon causes and it has been done in every 
science from astronomy to chemistry. By 
analogy, the philosopher can push his enqui- 
ries to the utmost verge of reasonable sup- 
position. For example: we can with great 
probability infer that those stars, which have 
disappeared from the firmament, have been 
consumed by fire, from the analogy of the 
appearances exhibited by them to a great con- 
flagration. The stars at first appeared of a 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPIiF. 189 

dazzling white, then of a reddish yellow, and 
lastly of an ashy paleness until their light ex- 
pired. " As to those stars 5; says La Place 
" which suddenly shine forth with a vivid 
light, and then immediately disappear, it is 
extremely probable, that great conflagrations 
produced by extraordinary causes take place 
on their surface. This conjecture is con- 
firmed by their change of colour, which is 
analogous to that presented to us on the earth, 
by those bodies, which are set on fire, and 
then gradually extinguished. " The analo- 
gies, are the harmony of the universe — the 
real music of the spheres. 

Philosophical analogy is frequently con- 
founded by logicians as well as by the gener- 
al writer, with rhetorical analogy : but they 
are quite different. Philosophical analogy 
consists in any resemblance between phenom- 
ena, less than identity; as in all the examples 
which we have given. But analogy in rhe- 
toric is a mere fanciful resemblance discover- 
ed by the imagination ; and is used for mere 
illustration or ornament. For example : 
" the angry ocean, the howling winds. ?? 



190 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Here, the stormy state of the ocean is liken- 
ed to the anger of man ; and the noise of the 
winds, to the howling of a beast. Now man 
is naturally angry ; but the ocean is only met- 
aphorically so ; and the beast naturally howls, 
but the winds, only metaphorically. The 
first is founded in nature, the latter, in fancy. 
So in Shakspeare's beautiful description of 
concealed love — 

" She never told her love. 
But let concealment, like a worm in the bud, 
Feed on her damask cheek?' 

That the worm feeds on the bud, is a fact 
in nature, that concealed love feeds on the 
cheek, is a fact in fancy. So in Bacon, — 
"But if it (the mind of man) work upon 
itself, as the spider worketh his web, then it 
is endless, and brings forth indeed cobwebs 
of learning admirable for the fineness of 
thread and work, but of no substance or 
profit." That the spider makes a web is a 
fact founded in nature ; that the mind of 
man makes one is a fact in fancy. In these 
examples, it is easy to discern, that the analo- 
gy is purely rhetorical, and is used merely for 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 391 

illustration and ornament. But there are in- 
numerable instances in the best writers where 
rhetorical analogy is used as the foundation 
of inductive inference, thus confounding it 
with philosophical analogy,. For example 
Dr. Johnson in one of his reported conver- 
sations, talking of the want of memory, said, 
" No sir, it is not true : in general every per- 
son has an equal capacity for reminiscence, 
and for one thing as well as another; other- 
wise it would be like a person complain- 
ing that he could hold silver in his hand, but 
could not hold copper.' 5 It is very obvious 
that this is not an argument, as was supposed 
by the great talker. There is no philosophi- 
cal: analogy between the capacities of the 
mind and those of the hand — between the 
power of reminiscence, and the power to 
hold silver. The two instances cannot be 
brought under the same general principle or 
major proposition; there being no analogy 
between them on which an inductive infer- 
ence, can be founded — and consequently,, no 
argumentative conclusion can be drawn from 
the one to the other. The mind and the phy- 



192 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

sical powers belong to two different classes of 
being. Could the inductive philosopher ever 
draw the inference that he could remember 
one thing as well as another, from the fact 
that he could hold in his hand, copper as 
well as silver ? What analogy is there be- 
tween the two powers ? Certainly, none, but 
such as rhetoric may employ by way of illus- 
tration and ornament. On another occasion, 
the same individual used the following re- 
mark, " No, Sir, people are not born with 
genius for particular employments or studies ; 
for it would be like saying, that a man could 
see a great way east, but could not west." 
This example is just like the other, and its 
fallacy may be more clearly seen, by putting 
the last part of the sentence, first. Thus : 
" A man can see just as well east as he can 
west, therefore he has as much genius for one 
study as another." Here the conclusion does 
not follow from the premises ; because there 
is no analogy between the capacity of the 
mind and the power of the eyes, upon which 
the inductive inference can be founded, which 
constitutes the major premiss viz : " every 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 193* 

being that can see as well east, as it can west, 
has as much capacity for one study as anoth- 
er." Then, the minor premiss would be, 
u A man can see as well east as he can west ; " 
and then the conclusion would follow, "There- 
fore, he has as much capacity for one study 
as another." It really appears like trifling, 
to expose such gross fallacies. But from the 
fact that the greatest minds are deluded by 
them, it is necessary to analyze them, and ex- 
hibit the nature of the error on which they 
are founded. But the most extraordinary 
instance of the confounding rhetorical ana- 
logy with philosophical analogy occurs in 
Bacon's Advancement of Learning and in the 
De Augmentis ; and it shows how very de- 
lusive are such fanciful analogies. Bacon 
has absolutely based a department of philoso- 
phy upon them : or at least every instance 
which he has cited as an example of the sub- 
ject matter of this department of philosophy^ 
is tainted with the error which we are expos- 
ing. He tells us there are some principles 
which are not peculiar to one science, but are 

common to several ; and the department of 
17 



194 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

philosophy which embraces these principles 7 
he calls Philosophia Prima, primitive or sum- 
mary philosophy. We will cite only one ex- 
ample : An infectious disease is more likely 
to be communicated while it is in progress^ 
than when it has reached its height. This 
he says is a principle in medicine; and that 
it is also a principle in morals; for that the 
example of very abandoned men injures pub- 
lic morality less than the example of men 
whose good qualities have not all been extin- 
guished by vice. The resemblance here is 
purely fanciful, too obviously so,, to need 
illustration after what has been said about the 
examples above. The most remarkable fact 
about this error of Bacon, is, that at the very 
time he cited these examples of his Prima 
Philosophia, he had in his mind the distinction 
which we are exhibiting, though he certain- 
ly could not have had a very distinct appre- 
hension of it. For he makes this remark in 
regard to the examples : " Neither are these 
only similitudes, as men of narrow observa- 
tion may conceive them to be, but the same 
footsteps of nature treading or printing upon 



THE EACGNIAN PHILOSOPHY. 195 

several subjects or matters," They most un- 
doubtedly are " only similitudes" and not 
analogies upon which inductive inferences 
€an be based. And what is still more re- 
markable, in the fifty -fifth aphorism of the 
first book of the Novum Organon, he has 
mentioned as a source of error, the tendency 
in some mindsyto " compare even the most 
delicate and general resemblances ; " and that 
such minds, " readily fall into excess, by 
catching at shadows of resemblance." These 
facts in relation to Bacon show the delusive 
nature of these fanciful analogies, and that 
though we may have a general notion of them 
still we may be deceived in particular instan- 
ces of even the most marked character. 

One of the most beautiful illustrations of 
the difference between philosophical and rhe- 
torical analogy is given by Mr. Burke in his 
letters on a regicide peace : "lam not of 
the mind of those speculators, who seem as- 
sured that all Sates have the same periods of 
infancy, manhood and decrepitude that are 
found in individuals. Parallels of this sort 
rather furnish similitudes to illustrate or 



196 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 



adorn, than to supply analogies from which 
to reason. Individuals are physical beings — 
commonwealths are not physical but moral 
essences." And the same distinction is well 
expressed by Darwin in the preface to his 
Zoonomia : " The great creator of all things 
has infinitely diversified the works of his 
hands, but has at the same time stamped a 
certain similitude on the features of nature, 
that demonstrates to us, that they are one 
family of one parent. On this similitude is 
founded all rational analogy; which so long 
as it is concerned in comparing the essential 
properties of bodies, leads us to many and 
important discoveries : but when with licen- 
tious activity it links together objects other- 
wise discordant, by some fanciful similitude, 
it may indeed collect ornaments for wit and 
poetry, but philosophy and truth recoil from 
its combinations." On rhetorical analogy, is 
founded most of the beautiful flowers of 
speech, which under the magic influence of 
genius, spring up on the most sterile subjects 
to beautify and adorn them : but it never can 
be made the foundation of inductive inference. 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 197 

It is from the nature of rhetorical analogy, 
that men have, in a great measure, formed 
their opinions of the force of analogical evi- 
dence in philosophy. It is highly important 
therefore, to distinguish between them. 

Some have confined analogy to the resem- 
blance of relations, both in philosophy and 
rhetoric. But this is unphilosophical and 
exceedingly inconvenient in practice ; multi- 
plying distinctions which cannot be kept up, 
by even the greatest degree of caution. In 
philosophy, every rational resemblance less 
than identity, is analogy ; and so in rhetor- 
ic, every fanciful resemblance is analogy. In 
rhetoric, however, the analogy is always be- 
tween individuals of different species, and 
never between individuals of the same class. 
And it may here be remarked, that it is with 
rhetorical analogies, and not with philosophi- 
cal, that wit is conversant: wit belongs to 
rhetoric, and not to logic. 

From the analysis which we have made 
of the evidence on which induction is found- 
ed, the great fundamental principle of philo- 
sophical evidence is easily evolved. It is 
17* 



198 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY". 

this : that in proportion as the analogy between 
instances is stronger, our inferences from 
one to the other are made with more and more 
confidence ; and in proportion as it is iveaker, 
they are made with less and less confidence. 
For example : an inference from one indi- 
vidual to another of the same class, is made 
with more confidence, than an inference from 
one species to another. The inferences of 
the anatomy of the human frame, for instance, 
are made with far more certainty from the 
analogies furnished in the dissection of a 
man, than from those furnished in the dissec- 
tion of any other animal. This principle 
bears the same relation to induction, that the 
Dictum de amni et nullo of Aristotle does to 
the Syllogism. The dictum of Aristotle 
points out the connection between the prem- 
ises and the conclusion of the syllogism, and 
this points out the connection between the 
particular instances and the inductive infer- 
ence. And this principle is commensurate 
with the whole range of philosophical evi- 
dence, and embraces all the classes of pre- 
rogative instances set forth by Bacon in the 



THE BAC0MA7S THl'LO'SOPBY. 199 

second book of the Novum Organon, and 
connects them with the inductive inferences 
to be drawn from them. In its affirmative 
application it embraces the comparison of in- 
stances and in its negative application, the re- 
jection of natures. It is also of a very prac- 
tical character; as it is applicable to the most 
general as well as to the most particular 
cases. And in its negative application, it 
checks the natural proneness of the human 
mind to make hasty inductions. We will call 
this principle, the Dictum secundum magis et 
minus. 

We have now presented to our readers a 
general view of logic and the method of in- 
vestigation, and defined the limits of their 
respective provinces. 

It has often been disputed whether Aristo- 
tle understood the inductive process. He 
certainly did know that there was such a pro- 
cess ; for he frequently mentions k in his 
writings. But it is no less certain, that he 
had no idea of its scope and its great import- 
ance in philosophical investigations: but 
thought it of little importance in comparison 



200 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

with the Syllogism, as he supposed that na- 
tural philosophy could be discovered by rea- 
soning from a few general principles, and that 
therefore, the reasoning process was every 
thing in philosophical inquiries, and induction 
confined to very narrow limits ; though, at the 
same time^ it must be admitted, that he had 
some notion of the necessity of resorting to 
nature for something like principles ; for as 
an observer and collector of facts and phe- 
nomena he greatly surpassed all the philoso- 
phers of his time. " For in common logic, 
(says Bacon) almost our whole labour is spent 
upon the syllogism. The logicians appear 
scarcely to have thought seriously of induc- 
tion, passing it over with some slight notice, 
and hurrying on to the formulae of dispute. 
But we reject the syllogistic demonstration, as 
being too confused, and letting nature escape 
from our hands. For, although nobody can 
doubt that those things which agree with the 
middle term agree with each other, (which is 
a sort of mathematical certainty) neverthe- 
less, there is this source of error, namely, 
that a syllogism consists of propositions, pro- 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



201 



positions of words, and words are but the 
tokens and signs of things. If, therefore, the 
notions of the mind, (which are as it were the 
soul of words, and the basis of this whole 
structure and fabric) are badly and hastily ab- 
stracted from things, and vague, or not suffi- 
ciently defined, and limited, or, in short, faul- 
ty (as they may be) in many other respects, 
the whole falls to the ground. We reject, 
therefore, the syllogism, and that not only as 
regards first principles, (to which even the 
logicians do not apply it,) but also in in- 
termediate propositions, which the syllogism 
certainly manages in some way or other to 
bring out and produce, but then they are bar- 
ren of effects, unfit for practice, and clearly 
unsuited to the active branch of the sciences. 
Although, we would leave therefore to the 
syllogism, and such celebrated and applauded 
demonstrations, their jurisdiction over popu- 
lar and speculative arts, (for here we make 
no alteration,) yet, in every thing relating to 
the nature of things, we make use of induc- 
tion, both for our major and minor proposi- 
tions. For we consider induction to be that 



202 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

form of demonstration which assists the sen- 
ses, closes in upon nature, and presses on, and, 
as it were, mixes itself with action. 

Hence also the order of demonstration is 
naturally reversed. For at present the mat- 
ter is so managed, that from the senses and 
particular objects they immediately fly to the 
greatest generalities as the axes round which 
their disputes may revolve : all the rest is de- 
duced from them intermediately, by a short 
way we allow, but an abrupt one, and impas- 
sable to nature, though easy and well suited 
to dispute. But, by our method, axioms are 
raised up in gradual succession, so that we 
only at last arrive at generalities. And that 
which is most generalized, is not merely no- 
tional, but well defined, and really acknowl- 
edged by nature as well known to her, and 
cleaving to the very pith of things. 

By far our greatest work, however, lies in 
the form of induction and the judgment aris- 
ing from it. For the form of which the logi- 
cians speak, which proceeds by bare enumer- 
ation, is puerile, and its conclusions precari- 
ous, is exposed to danger from one contrary 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 203 

example, only considers what is habitual, and 
leads not to any final result. 

The sciences, on the contrary, require a 
form of induction capable of explaining and 
separating experiments, and coming to a cer- 
tain conclusion by a proper series of rejections 
and exclusions. " Notwithstanding this ex- 
plicit avowal by Bacon,, that the logicians had 
some, though a very inadequate notion of in^- 
duction, many have contended that Bacon 
claimed to be, and that he really was the dis- 
coverer of the inductive process. But the 
iact that Bacon was not the first to remark 
upon the inductive process, does not de- 
tract in the slightest degree from his merit as 
a philosopher — no more than the fact, that 
Copernicus and Kepler had hinted that the 
planets were held in their orbits by attraction, 
detracts from the immortal discoveries of 
Newton. For though Bacon did not discov- 
er the inductive process,, yet he was the first 
to develop its nature as a method of investi- 
gation, to show its transcendant importance, 
and to lay down rules for conducting it aright. 
What other men saw through a glass darkly, 



204 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

he saw clearly and confidently. It was he 
who poured the tide of fire over the fields of 
knowledge, and withered and consumed the 
poisonous growth, with which they were 
overrun, and prepared them for the rich har- 
vests which have since been cultivated by the 
illustrious labourers who have followed his 
directions. When he was born, the temple 
of false philosophy still stood firm and the 
priests who ministered at its altars thought it 
eternal. He was brought up in the false 
creed, and soon learned all its mysteries : but 
his gigantic Anglo-saxon mind could not 
be dwarfed so as to wear the fetters of the 
schools. He saw the folly of the miserable 
pedantry which was mistaken for profound 
knowledge; and in the full strength of his 
convictions, he determined to overthrow the 
false systems amongst which men had been 
so long bewildered, and to free the human 
mind from the bondage of prejudice and can- 
onized authority. With this view he wrote 
the Novum Organon; and let the splendid 
discoveries of modern science attest his suc- 
cess ! 



PART THE SECOND, 

CHAPTER SECOND. 



THE THEORY OF MIND ASSUMED IN THE BA- 
CONIAN METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 



" We must guide our steps by a clue,, (says 
Bacon,) and the whole path, from the very first 
perceptions of our senses, must be secured 
by a determined method. ?? We will endea- 
vor to fulfil the doctrine set forth in this pro- 
position ;. and therefore, will continue in this 
chapter to develop the Baconian Method of 
Investigation, until we trace it up to the first 
impressions made upon the senses. In order 
to do this, it will be necessary to inquire into 
the psychology or theory of mind assumed in 
the Baconian Method of Investigation, and 
which the influence of that method upon Eng- 
lish philosophy has caused to be developed by 
Locke and Reid. 

As the best mode of effecting this object, we 

will first show the points of contact between 

18 



206 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

psychology and logic, and between psycholo- 
gy and the method of investigation ; and then 
exhibit an outline of the two great systems of 
psychology, which have divided the opinions 
of philosophers, and show their correlative 
methods of investigation, by developing the 
points of affiliation and doctrinal identity be- 
tween them. 

The Creator of all things has established 
an order, an antecedence and sequence, in the 
phenomena of the universe of both matter 
and mind. The object of philosophy is to 
discover this order, by observing the pheno- 
mena, tracing their relations, and ascertain- 
ing the laws which govern them, for the pur- 
pose of building upon such discoveries, cer- 
tain practical rules or arts for increasing the 
power of man. In the world of matter, we 
investigate the relations of material substan- 
ces, and their actions either of a mechanical 
or chemical nature upon each other ; and 
found upon these relations the mechanical and 
chemical arts, by which the physical powers 
of man are so much augmented in his know- 
ing how to bring bodies into such circum- 



THE BACONIAN THILOSOPHY. 207 

stances as will give rise to their peculiar ac- 
tions. So in the world of mind, we investi- 
gate the relations of its phenomena, their an- 
tecedence and sequence in the order of time, 
their relations to the world of matter, and 
their antecedence and sequence in the logical 
order, an order peculiar to the world of mind, 
and which has no existence in the world of 
matter. 

The phenomena of mind may, for the con- 
venience of this investigation, be divided into 
two classes,* namely, those which relate to 
the intelligence — to perception, consciousness, 
memory, induction and reasoning ; and those 
which relate to the sensibility — to love, joy 5 
hope, fear, anger, and all the other emotions:; 
and upon the relations of the phenomena of 
both of these classes are founded certain prac- 
tical rules or arts. On the first, are founded 
logic and the method of investigation; and 
on the latter, are founded, aesthetics and the 
fine arts. It is with the first class, those 

*Note.— We are well aware that the phenomena of the will constitute a 
distinct class, but the division which we have made is sufficiently accurate 
for our purpose. 



208 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

which relate to the intelligence, that we have 
to deal in the investigation which we are pur- 
suing ; as it is amidst them that the connex- 
ion between psychology and logic, and be- 
tween psychology and the method of inves- 
tigation is to be discovered. Psychology by 
analyzing the phenomena of reasoning, ex- 
hibits the fundamental laws of thought, which 
govern the mental acts in every demonstra- 
tion : and logic exhibits the illative rules by 
which the conclusion is evolved out of the 
premises. This then is the point of contact 
between psychology and logic, the boundary 
where the one ends, and the other begins. 
Psychology also exhibits, by analyzing the 
phenomena of induction, the fundamental law 
of thought which governs the mental deter- 
mination in every act of belief that the future 
will be like the past, or that like causes will 
produce like effects; and the method of in- 
vestigation exhibits the inductive rules or re- 
gulative principles by which the general con- 
clusion is inferred from the particular instan- 
ces. And this is the point of contact between 
psychology and the method of investigation. 



THE BACONIAN THILOSOPHY. 209 

It is at these points of contact, that psycholo- 
gy supplies the deficiencies of logic and of the 
method of investigation — gives light where 
they give none ; for logic and the method of 
investigation pre-suppose psychology, and de- 
pend upon it for their whole strength. 

But psychology penetrates still further into 
the mysteries of human thought, and as rea- 
soning and induction assume the truth of the 
facts attested by sensation, consciousness 
and memory, it also analyzes their phenome- 
na, and evolves the fundamental laws of be- 
lief which govern all our knowledge derived 
from these sources respectively, and thus as- 
certains the very elements of human knowl- 
edge, which admit of no explanation, which 
borrow no light from any thing antecedent, 
but are self-luminous; and in this way sup- 
plies every thing which is assumed as true in 
logic and the method of investigation. With 
these preliminary remarks, indicating in a 
general way the connexion between psychol- 
ogy and logic, and between psychology and 
the method of investigation, we will now pro- 
ceed to exhibit the two great opposite sys- 



210 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

terns of psychology and the correlative meth- 
ods of investigation. 

The great problem which lies at the thresh- 
old of every inquiry into the phenomena of 
the human mind, and gives to every system of 
psychology its distinctive feature, in the point 
of view in which we are considering the sub- 
ject (its connexion with logic and the meth- 
od of investigation,) is, what is the origin of 
our ideas, "those simple notions into which 
our thoughts may be analyzed, and which may 
be considered as the principles or elements of 
human knowledge ? ?? There never have been, 
and never can be, more than two theories in 
regard to the solution of this problem. One 
is the theory of innate ideas, or primitive 
cognitions which are not the product of the 
mind's own activity, but are its original fur- 
niture ; the other, the theory, that all our ideas 
are founded ultimately in experience, and 
are acquired through sensation and conscious- 
ness. These two opposite psychological the- 
ories are the correlatives of the two opposite 
methods of investigation, the a priori method, 
(which we have shown in the last chapter, to 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 211 

be nothing more than an application of the 
Aristotelian logic out of its proper sphere,) 
which makes all absolute verity to depend 
upon certain innate principles, or elements of 
knowledge, from which the mind starts and 
reasons out all science as legitimate deductions 
from them, in which the series of logical de- 
ductions will correspond with the series of 
facts subsisting in nature ; and the inductive 
or Baconian method, which bases all knowl- 
edge upon experience, and considers princi- 
ples as mere generalized facts obtained by 
the observation of particular phenomena. We 
will first treat of the theory of innate ideas 
and then show that it is the psychological 
correlative of the a priori method of investi- 
gation. 

The theory of innate ideas has appeared 
under different phases ; and more distinctly in 
the writings of Plato amongst the ancients, 
and Des Cartes amongst the moderns, than 
the writings of any other philosophers. Pla- 
to representing one phasis of this theory, and 
Des Cartes, the other. Plato held that there 
are in the soul certain innate ideas which 



212 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

form the basis of our conceptions and consti- 
tute the principles of our knowledge ; and that 
these innate ideas were in the soul in a prior 
state of existence, and are now suggested to 
the mind, by individual objects presented to 
the senses. That the process of acquiring 
knowledge is mere suggested reminiscence ; 
and the reminiscence is in proportion as the 
mind becomes acquainted with individual ob- 
jects. For example : in the dialogue entitled 
"Phaedon," he asks, "Is it upon seeing equal 
trees equal stones and several other things 
of that kind, that we form the idea of equality, 
which is neither the trees nor the stones, but 
something abstracted from all these objects ?" 
And he answers the question thus : " Before 
we begin to see, feel, or use any of our senses, 
we must have had the knowledge of this in- 
tellectual equality ; else we could not be ca- 
pable of comparing it with the sensible ob- 
jects, and perceive that they have all a ten- 
dency towards it, but fall short of its perfec- 
tion." 

" That is a necessary consequence from the 
premises." 






THE BACOXIAN PHILOSOPHY, 



213 



u But is it not certain that immediately after 
our birth, we. saw, we heard and made use 
of other senses?" 

« Very true." 

" Then it follows that before that time, we 
had the knowledge of that equality ?" 

" Without doubt." 

" And of course, we were possessed of it 
before we were born ?" 

" I think so." 

" If we possessed it before we were born, 
then we knew things before we were born, and 
immediately after birth ; knew not only what 
is great, what is small, what is equal, but all 
other things of that nature." 

" For what we now advance of equality, is 
equally applicable to goodness, justice, sanc- 
tity, and in a word to all other things that have 
a real existence ; so that we must of necessi- 
ty have known all these things before we came 
into this world." 

It is manifest from this extract ; that Plato 
maintained that all our abstract notions are in 
the mind when we come into this world and 
are of course, first in the order of acquisition ; 



4 



214 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

and that it is by the light of these notions, or 
ideas as he called them, that we comprehend 
what we observe in this world — that it is by 
the abstract innate idea of equality, that we 
judge of the instances of equality exhibited 
in experience; by the abstract innate idea 
of goodness, that we judge of the instances 
of goodness, and so of every other innate 
idea. Thus maintaining that man has in his 
mind, an innate standard of truth, with which 
he can compare every thing, and test its ver- 
ity. 

We will now exhibit the other phasis of 
this theory, as taught by Des Cartes, He 
held that the idea of the infinite, and all other 
ideas which are particularizations of it, are 
not acquired ideas, but are innate in the mind, 
having been communicated to it, or interwo- 
ven into its very being by the Creator, to be 
the foundation of all its acquired knowledge, 
and the guide of its future reasonings. Though 
he did not maintain that these ideas were 
always present in the mind : " When I say" 
(says he) " that an idea is born in us, or that 
it is naturally imprinted -on our souls, I do 






THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 215 

not mean that it is always present in thought, 
for this would be contrary to fact ; but only 
that we have in ourselves the faculty of pro- 
ducing it." 

It is evident that these doctrines of Plato 
and Des Cartes are substantially the same, 
and exhibit only different phases of the the- 
ory of innate ideas. 

We will now show that the theory of 
innate ideas is the psychological correlative 
of the a priori method of investigation, and 
is the psychology assumed in that method ; 
and that both Plato and Des Cartes actually 
adopted and used that method. Thus prov- 
ing the proposition, both by philosophical 
analysis and historical fact. 

The least reflection will discover that the 
a priori method of investigation is the psy- 
chological correlative of the theory of innate 
ideas. For if all the principles or elements 
of our knowledge are an original furniture of 
the mind, and the most comprehensive princi- 
ples stand first in the order of time in the mind,, 
are those first developed to the intelligence, 
(as the theory of innate ideas teaches) — - 



216 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

then the only method by which the mind can 
extend the sphere of its knowledge and build 
up this knowledge into science, is to combine 
these principles and deduce from them con- 
clusions corresponding to the real particulars 
subsisting in nature; and the chronological 
and logical order of our knowledge is the 
same. And it is also clear that the a priori 
method of investigation assumes the theory 
of innate ideas or principles ; because if there 
are no innate principles, or if, in other words. 
a reason could be given for every truth, no 
process of deduction (and the a priori method 
of investigation is the process of deduction 
or reasoning, as we have shown in the last 
chapter) could ever have a beginning; for to 
make reasoning the process of discovering 
first principles, would be to go on to infinity ; 
because, in every argument or process of rea- 
soning, something must be assumed as true, 
from which our reasonings set out, and on 
which they ultimately depend. Where then, 
is the first starting-point to be had, if it be 
not innate ? It must be innate, or else it is 
furnished by induction : and if it is furnished 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHF. 217 

>y induction, the a priori method of investi- 
gation can have no existence : but is in reali- 
ty, what it was in the hands of Aristotle, 
(who did not believe in innate principles, 
but, that they are ascertained by induction,*) 
nothing more than reasoning from principles 
formed from a hasty or imperfect induction. 
It is evident then that the a priori method of 
investigation assumes the theory of innate 
ideas or principles — requires them for its 
starting-points; and thus is developed the 
point of affiliation and doctrinal identity be- 
tween them. 

It is thus manifest from philosophical ana- 



*Note. — It may perhaps be enquired, why it is, that Aristotle, who main- 
tained the theory of mind enunciated in the principle nihil intellectu, quod non 
prius in scnsu, yet maintained the a priori method of investigation. It is clear, 
that Aristotle, is either inconsistent with himself, or that he meant by this doc- 
trine, merely that sensation must precede all knowledge. But there are doctrines 
setforth in his writings upon, the point under consideration, which it is diffi- 
cult to reconcile, and which show that his opinions were not very definite, 
it is certain however, that he did not, like Plato, maintain that there are cer- 
tain innate ideas in the mind, independent of the mind's activity, but seems to 
have maintained the doctrine ascribed to him on the 149 — 50 pages of this dis- 
course, which to a great extent is an a priori theory much like that of Kant, 
and consequently, so far as it is an a priori theory, is consistent with his method 
of investigation. But let it be borne in mind, that our object in this part of 
our discourse, is not to show, that all who maintain the a priori method of in- 
vestigation, also maintain the doctrine of innate ideas, but to show, that, that 
method necessarily assumes this false doctrine for its basis, and is therefore fal- 
lacious itself. 

19 



21S THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

lysis of the theory of innate ideas, and of the 
a priori method of investigation, that they 
are psychological correlatives. We will next 
show, that they are correlatives in the history 
of philosophy also — that they are historically, 
as well as philosophically related — that Plato 
and Des Cartes adopted and used the a priori 
method of investigation, as well as maintain- 
ed the doctrine of innate ideas. 

In the Phaedon, the same treatise from 
w^hich we extracted the remarks relative to in- 
nate ideas, and the one in which Plato gives, 
though in an incidental way, his peculiar psy- 
chology, we have also a delineation of Plato's 
method of investigation ; though this is given 
in an incidental way too ; for in investigating 
the subject of the treatise, the immortality of 
the soul, he had to use both his psychologi- 
cal theory and his method of investigation. 

" Have seeing and hearing, " says Plato, 
"any thing of truth in them, and is their tes- 
timony faithful ? Or are the poets in the 
right in saying that we neither see nor hear 
things truly ? For if these two senses of 
r eeing and hearing are not trustworthy, the 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



219 



others which are much weaker, will be far 
less such. Is it not by reasoning that the 
soul embraces truth ? And does it not reason 
better than before, when it is not encumber- 
ed by seeing and hearing, pain or pleasure ? 
When, shut up within itself, it bids adieu to 
the body, and entertains as little correspon- 
dence with it as possible ; and pursues the 
knowledge of things without touching them. 
Now the simplest and purest way of examin- 
ing things, is to pursue every particular 
thought alone, without offering to support 
our meditations by seeing or hearing, or 
backing our reason by any other corporeal 
sense ; by employing the naked thought with- 
out any mixture, and so endeavouring to trace 
the pure and general essence of things with- 
out the ministry of the eyes or ears : the 
soul being, if I may so speak, entirely disen- 
gaged from the whole mass of the body, 
w r hich only encumbers the soul, and cramps 
it in the quest of wisdom and truth, as often 
as it is admitted to the least correspondence 
with it. If the essence of things be ever 
known, must it not be known in the manner 



220 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

above mentioned ?" Plato exhibits his meth- 
od of investigation still more clearly in the 
following remarks extracted from the same 
treatise : — " After I had wearied myself in 
examining all things, I thought it my duty to 
be cautious of avoiding what happens to those 
who contemplate an eclipse of the sun ; for 
they lose the sight by it, unless they be care- 
ful to view its reflections in water or some 
other medium. A thought much like to that 
came into my head, and I feared I should lose 
the eyes of my mind, if I viewed objects 
with the eyes of my body, or employed any 
of my senses in endeavoring to know them. 
I thought I should have recourse to reason, 
and contemplate the truth of all things as re- 
flected from it. It is possible the simile I use 
in explaining myself is not very just : for I 
cannot affirm that he who beholds things in 
the glass of reason, sees them more by reflec- 
tion and similitude than he who beholds them 
in their operations. However, the way I fol- 
lowed, was this ; from that time forward I 
grounded all upon the reason that seemed 
the best, and took all for truth, that I found 



THE BACONIAN THILOSOPHY. 221 

conformable to it, whether in effects or causes ; 
and what was not conformable I rejected, as 
being false. " 

In these extracts we see that Plato held 
that " it is by reasoning that the soul em- 
braces truth, " and that the mind has the 
light of all truth within itself, and all the 
material within itself, upon which to exert 
the reasoning process ; and that it does not 
stand in need of the ministry of the senses 
to gain any information — in a word, that all 
philosophy is built up by reasoning from or 
upon innate ideas; for that all the phenomena 
in nature are but copies of these innate ideas, 
and are known to the mind, only by compar- 
ing them with these innate ideas and observ- 
ing their resemblance to them as their types 
and models. 

That the a priori method of investigation 
was that used by Des Cartes also, is clearly 
manifested in his writings. He founded all 
knowledge upon a logical basis — upon de- 
monstration ; and considered that the object 
of philosophy is to deduce by reasoning from 

first causes, rules for the conduct of life and 
19* 



222 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

for the various arts. cc It is clear/* says he, 
" that we shall follow the best method in phi- 
losophy if from our knowledge of the deity 
himself, we endeavour to deduce an explica- 
tion of all his works ; that so we may ac- 
quire the most perfect kind of science, which 
is that of effects from their causes." In ac- 
cordance with this view of the method of in- 
vestigation to be used in physical science, is 
his theory of the mind; for he maintains that 
the idea of God, which he makes the start- 
ing-point in natural philosophy, is innate in 
the mind. Thus basing natural philosophy 
in psychology, and making it necessary to es- 
tablish the foundation of psychological truths 
before certainty can be attained in physical 
truth. In order then to establish the founda- 
tion of psychological truth, he makes doubt 
the foundation of certainty and the starting- 
point in human knowledge. " It is not to- 
day," says he, " for the first time that I have 
perceived in myself that, from my earliest 
years, 1 have received a great many false 
opinions as true, and that what I have built 
upon principles so badly ascertained, can be 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 223 

only very doubtful and uncertain. And ac- 
cordingly, I have decidedly judged that I 
must sincerely undertake some time in my 
life to rid myself of all the opinions I had be- 
fore taken upon trust, and begin altogether 
anew from the foundation, if I would estab- 
lish any thing firm and constant in science." 
Rejecting then., the knowledge of every 
thing, and plunging into absolute skepticism, 
he sets about to prove his own existence, as 
the first problem in knowledge ; and does it 
by this argument: — "I think, therefore I 
exist." Satisfied, that by this argument and 
the application of the principle contained in 
it, he had proved the reality of every thing 
revealed in consciousness — the reality of his 
own existence, his own thoughts, passions, 
&c., his next difficulty was to pass out of the 
sphere of consciousness, and prove the reality 
of things external to himself. In order to do 
this, he must find some fact revealed in con- 
sciousness, (whose phenomena he had proved 
to be worthy of credit) as the starting-point 
of the argument. This fact is the idea of a 
supremely perfect being, which he finds in 



S24 THE BA€ONIAX PHILOSOPHY. 

his mind. He concluded, that as the mind 
of man is finite, it could not have produc- 
ed by its own activity, this idea of the infi- 
nite ; but that this idea must have some real 
object corresponding to it — which object is 
God— or in other words, that the idea of the 
absolute and infinite must have, from their 
very nature, a real object subsisting in time, 
corresponding to it. u If we carefully exam- 
ine," says he, " whether existence belongs to 
a being supremely powerful, and what sort of 
existence, we shall find ourselves able clearly 
and distinctly to know, first, at least, possible 
existence agrees with him, as well as with all 
other things of which we have in ourselves 
any distinct idea, even those which are com- 
posed of fictions of our own mind : and next, 
because, we cannot think existence is possi- 
ble, without knowing at the same time — 
keeping in mind his infinite power — that he 
can exist by his own force, we conclude that 
he really exists, and that he has been from all 
eternity ; for it is very evident from the light 
of nature, that that which exists by its own 
force, exists always ; and thus we shall know 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 227 

that necessary existence is contained ini : ia- 
idea of a supremely powerful being, not by 
fiction of the understanding, but because ii 
belongs to the true and immutable nature of 
such a being to exist ; and it will be easy for 
us to know that it is impossible for this su- 
premely powerful being not to have in him- 
self all other perfections that are contained 
in the idea of God, in such sort, that, of their 
own proper nature and without any fiction of 
the understanding, they are always joined 
together and exist in God." By this ar- 
gument Des Cartes satisfied himself, that the 
existence of a God is proved from the exis- 
tence of the idea of such a being in the mind, 
and that thus the existence of an external re- 
ality is proved — that the boundary of con- 
sciousness is passed, and two orders of ideas 
are established : viz : himself, and the extern- 
al reality ; the proof of himself, resting upon 
his methodical doubt, "I think, therefore I ex- 
ist," and the proof of the existence of the ex- 
ternal reality, resting upon an idea corres- 
ponding to it in his mind. Returning again 
into consciousness, he finds there, the idea of 



£24 THE BA C0N1AN PHILOSOPHY. 

hj.ou^ht, and the idea of extension, under 
one or the other of which, he maintained, 
are embraced all other ideas ; and as these 
ideas are radically distinct, he concluded that 
the substances of which they are respectively 
the attributes are distinct also. The world, 
then, is composed of two classes of beings, 
spirit and matter, they being the substances of 
which thought and extension are the essen- 
tial attributes. But the question occurs to 
him, how does he know the reality of matter ? 
And he solved it thus : Because he has a 
natural impulse to believe in the objects of 
his sensations, and God, whose existence he 
has proved, being perfect in his nature, has 
guarantied the truth ot their testimony. 
Here then, is the starting-point in natural 
philosophy — God and matter. And as mat- 
ter and motion are, to his apprehension, the 
only phenomena in the physical world, in ac- 
cordance with his doctrine just now proved, 
that the most perfect kind of science is that 
of effects deduced from their causes, he says, 
" give me matter and motion and I will ex- 
plain the universe :" and he accordingly ex- 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 227 

plains all material phenomena by the applica- 
tion of mechanics based upon geometry, ma- 
king God the prime mover of the universe,, 
and the cause of all material phenomena. 

In this analysis of the Cartesian philoso- 
phy, in which we have endeavored to present 
the fundamental conceptions of that philoso- 
phy in their true relations and logical order, 
without any reference to the order in which 
they stand in the writings of Des Cartes, it is 
evident that the method is a priori — that it 
begins with an argument at all its salient 
points — that psychology is made the founda- 
tion of every truth, and that the very .first 
truth in this is established by an argument. 

And what a miserable tissue of sophistry 
is the whole pretended argument; resting, 
as it and every other a priori argument must, 
upon mere assumptions mistaken for innate 
ideas or principles. The theory of innate 
ideas and the a priori method of investiga- 
tion are correlative systems of error. Each 
is necessary to support the other. And they 
have been the great fountains from which 
have flowed copious streams of error into 






228 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

every department of human knowledge. For 
psychology is the foundation of all human 
knowledge — is the centre around which every 
science revolves — is the light in which all 
other sciences are seen ; and in proportion as 
this light is true or false, is the correctness of 
all our opinions upon the great subjects of 
human thought. 

Having now established the point, both by 
philosophical analysis and historical fact, that 
the theory of innate ideas and the a priori 
method of investigation have a logical affinity 
and a doctrinal identity, and are consequent- 
ly psychological correlatives, we will next 
treat of the psychological theory, that all our 
ideas are founded in experience and are ac- 
quired through sensation and consciousness, 
and show that it is the psychological correla- 
tive of the Baconian method of investigation; 
and in doing this, we shall trace that method 
to the first impressions made upon the senses, 
and evolve the principles which govern every 
step of the process. 

The most profound and comprehensive re- 
mark ever uttered by man in the whole his- 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 229 

tor j of philosophy , is the first aphorism of 
the Novum Organon — " Man as the servant 
and interpreter of nature, does and under- 
stands as much as his observations on the or- 
der of nature, either with regard to things or 
the mind, permit him, and neither knows nor 
is capable of more. " This proposition 
throws more light over the mysteries of na- 
ture than every thing that had been written 
before. It proclaims the true system of both 
mental and natural philosophy, and defines 
the limits and the modes of both the knowl- 
edge and the power of man. All the rest of 
the Novum Organon does nothing more than 
develop the great truth contained in this pro- 
position. In order to exhibit its full import, 
we will divide it into the two propositions 
asserting two kindred but distinct truths, of 
which it is composed. It speaks of man as 
the interpreter of nature, and also as the ser- 
vant of nature. Let us keep these two truths 
separate ; and consider the proposition, first 
leaving out what is said of man, as the servant 
of nature ; and then leaving out what is said 

of him, as the interpreter of nature. Man, as 
20 






230 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



the interpreter of nature, understands as much 
as his observations on the order of nature, ei- 
ther with regard to things or the mind, per- 
mit him, and does not know more. Here, 
it is declared, that the philosopher is a mere 
interpreter of nature, and that his knowledge 
is acquired by the observation of the order of 
nature, of both things and the mind, and that 
he does not know more. This proposition 
then, while it proclaims that both natural and 
mental philosophy are confined to the obser- 
vation of the order of nature, the antece- 
dence and sequence of its phenomena, just 
as distinctly proclaims the theory of mind, 
that all our knowledge is founded on experi- 
ence — that we understand as much as our ob- 
servations on the order of nature, either with 
regard to things or the mind, permit, but do 
not know more. But this exposition does 
not exhaust the fullness of the proposition ; 
for it speaks of man as the servant as well as 
the interpreter of nature, and thus points out 
the mode and the limit of his power as well 
as the mode and limit of his knowledge. The 
mode of his power consists in acting as the 






THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 231 

servant and not as the master of nature, and 
the mode of his knowledge consists in his 
interpreting and not anticipating nature. 

And here is at once shown the connexion 
between science and art, and the nature of 
both of them. Science consists in finding 
out the laws of nature ; and art, or the pow- 
er of man, consists in obeying these laws — 
in serving nature. Here then is evolved, 
out of the first sentence of the Novum Or- 
ganon, the psychology or theory of mind as- 
sumed in the Baconian method of investiga- 
tion, and which the whole scope and drift of 
that method make manifest ; that all our 
knowledge is founded in experience. And 
thus is at once exhibited the point of affiliation 
and doctrinal identity between the Baconian 
method of investigation and its correlative 
system of psychology. 

But we are not left to infer the psychology 
of Bscon merely from what he has tacitly as- 
sumed; for though the chief object of his writ- 
ings was to give directions in physical inquir- 
ies, and to divert the minds of men from me- 
taphysical speculations about the essence, the 



232 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

eternal reasons and primary causes of things, 
and thus, to prevent them from admitting ob- 
jections against plain experience, founded 
upon metaphysical notions — as Aristotle and 
the ancient philosophers had done, according 
to whose opinions physical science is the ap- 
plication of metaphysical notions to the ex- 
planation of the general phenomena of the 
universe — yet in his Advancement of Learn- 
ing, he has given a clear view of his theory 
of mind, and shows that he had a distinct ap- 
prehension of the great outline of the psychol- 
ogy which has since been developed by Locke 
and Reid. "The knowledge of man," says 
he, "is as the waters, some descending from 
above, and some springing from beneath ; 
the one informed by the light of nature, the 
other inspired by divine revelation. The 
light of nature consisteth in the notions of 
the mind, and the reports of the senses. So 
then according to these two differing illu- 
minations or originals, knowledge is first of 
all divided into divinity and philosophy." Ba- 
con is here speaking of the origin of all hu- 
man knowledge. He says one kind is deriv- 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 1233 

ed from revelation, and the other from the 
light of nature ; and that the "light of nature 
consists of the notions of the mind and the 
reports of the senses." By the notions of the 
mind, the whole scope of his writings, their 
very drift and aim, shows that he means 
those notions or ideas which are developed 
in consciousness, and not innate ideas ; and 
it is plain, that by the reports of the senses, 
he means the ideas acquired through sensa- 
tion : though we do not assert that Bacon had 
apprehended with scientific accuracy these 
two different sources of knowledge, but 
merely that he had a general knowledge of 
them. It is manifest then, that though Bacon 
laid great stress upon the knowledge derived 
through the senses, he did not think that sen- 
sation is the only source of knowledge,as some 
of the philosophers of the continent of Eu- 
rope have ignorantly alleged, but that like 
Locke and Reid he admitted consciousness to 
be a distinct and equally important source of 
knowledge. 

We will now proceed to show that the 
system of psychology, maintained by Bacon, 



234 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

is identical with that of Locke and Reid, indi- 
cating as we proceed the points of affiliation 
and doctrinal identity between their system 
and the Baconian method of investigation, 
and thus demonstrate that their system is as- 
sumed in that method. 

In developing the doctrines of Locke and 
Reid, we shall not so much follow in .their 
tracks, as pursue the train of our own 

thoughts : neither shall we stop short at the 
limits to which they have developed tfieir 
doctrines, but will give to them more scien- 
tific completeness than they possess as devel- 
oped by themselves, by filling up, with logical 
concatenations, the chasms which lie between 
the doctrines and their correlative method of 
investigation, and by modifying any doctrine 
which they have expressed with too much 
latitude or expressed imperfectly, so as to 
make them harmonize in a system. 

It was the signal glory of Locke to estab- 
lish the true theory of the origin of our ideas ; 
and thus to solve the problem which lies at 
the very threshold of psychology. The the- 
ory of innate ideas which we have already ex- 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



235 



hibited, had prevailed generally throughout 
the whole history of philosophy. This theo- 
ry Locke overthrew, just as Bacon had done 
its correlative method of investigation and 
showed how all our ideas originate.* In com- 
mencing his strictures upon the theory of in- 
nate ideas he says : " It is an established o- 
pinion amongst some men, that there are in 
the understanding certain innate principles, 
some primary notions, Ko tVM Emm, characters, as 
it were stamped upon the mind of man, which 
the soul receives in its very first being, and 
brings into the world w r ith it. " He then se- 

*Note. — We do not mean that Locke has shown correctly in every instance. 
how our notions have originated ; but that he has shown., that they are all acquir- 
ed through experience and arc not an original furniture of the mind. Can any 
one doubt, for example, how tlie notions of colours and sounds are acquired, 
when they consider that persons.who have not the senses of sight and hearing 
cannot by any means whatever acquire these notions ? They must see at once 
that these notions are acquired through the senses of sight and hearing. Locke 
has shown that all other notions of the external world are acquired in a similar 
way ; though his explanation of some instances may be erroneous. Neither 
does it detract from the truth of Locke's indication of the sources of these 
notions, that he has not chos'Ai the most appropriate terms to express them, 
viz : sensation and reflection. The last is the term which has been mostly con- 
sidered erroneous. Consciousness has been, and we concur in the opinion, 
considered as indicating more exactly the source of one class of our ideas. 
But this precision, though important in scientira accuracy, does not detract 
from the truth of the solution which Locke haPgiven of the problem of the 
origin of our ideas. It is a pitiful criticism upon a - great philosophical discovery, 
to dwell upon a mere inaccuracy in definition ; though certainly, the inaccu- 
racy ought to be pointed out. 



236 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

lects the following propositions as "having 
the most allowed title to innate " principles, 
namely :— " Whatsoever is, is ;*and It is impos- 
sible for the same thing to be-, and not to be. " 
He then argues that these principles are not 
so much as known to the greater part of man- 
kind 7 and are therefore not innate. " Foi%, 
first, it is evident, that all children and idiots 
have not the least apprehension or thought 
of them ; and the want of that is enough to 
destroy that universal assent, which must 
needs be the necessary concomitant of all in- 
nate truths : it seeming to me dear, a contra- 
diction to say, that there are truths imprinted 
on the soul which, it perceives or under- 
stands not ; imprifltihg, if it signify anything, 
being nothing else, but the making certain 
truths to be perceived. Fck to imprint any- 
thing on the mind, without the mind's per- 
ceiving it, seems to me hardly intelligible. If, 
therefore, children and idiots have souls, 
have minds,with those impressions upon them, 
they must unavoidably perceive them, and 
necessarily know and assent to these ttfuths ; 
which, since they do not, it is evident that 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 237 

there are no such impressions. No proposi- 
tion can be said to be in the mind, which it 
never yet knew, which it was never yet con- 
scious of. " To the argument which had 
been frequently used by the advocates of the 
doctrine of innate ideas, that men know these 
innate principles, as soon as they come to the 
use of reason, he replies : "But how can 
those men think the use of reason necessary, 
to discover principles that are supposed in- 
nate, when reason, (if we may believe them,) 
is nothing else but the faculty of deducing 
unknown truths from principles or proposi- 
tions that are already known ! We may as 
well think the use of reason necessary to make 
our eyes discover visible objects, as that 
there should be need of reason, or the exer- 
cise thereof, to make the understanding see 
what is originally engraven on it, and cannot 
be in the understanding before it is perceived 
by it. " After showing that the fact that 
those propositions are assented to, as soon as 
proposed and understood, does not prove 
them innate, and after deducing a variety of 
other arguments against the doctrine of in- 



238 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

nate ideas or principles, he says : u I say next 
that these two general propositions are not 
the truths that first possess the minds of child- 
ren ; nor are antecedent to all acquired and 
adventitious notions; which if they were in- 
nate, they must needs be. The child certain- 
ly knows, that the nurse that feeds it, is nei- 
ther the cat it plays with, nor the blackamoor 
it is afraid of; that the wormseed or mustard 
it refuses, is not the apple or sugar it cries for ; 
this it is certainly and undoubtedly assur- 
ed of: but will any one say, it is by virtue of 
this principle, that it is impossible for the 
same thing to be, and not to be, that it so 
firmly assents to these and other parts of its 
knowledge ? Or that the child has any no- 
tion or apprehension of that proposition, at 
an age, wherein yet it is plain, it knows a 
great many other truths?" By this train of 
reasoning, Locke has utterly overthrown the 
theory of innate ideas. This he does in the 
first book of his work on the human under- 
standing. And in the second book, he shows 
the true theory of the origin of ideas or of 
human knowledge. 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 239 

"Let us," says he, "then suppose the mind 
to be as we say white paper, void of all char- 
acters, without any ideas ; how comes it to be 
furnished ? Whence comes it by that vast 
store which the busy and boundless fancy of 
man has painted on it with almost endless va- 
riety ? Whence has it all the materials of 
reason and knowledge ? To this I answer, in 
one word, from experience; in that all our 
knowledge is founded, and from that it ultima- 
tely derives itself. Our observation employed 
either about external sensible objects, or about 
the internal operations of our minds, perceiv- 
ed and reflected on by ourselves, is that which 
supplies our understandings with all the mate- 
rials of thinking. These two are the fountains 
of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we 
have or can naturally have, do spring." Such 
is Locke's theory of the origin of human 
knowledge — it is all founded on experience. 

It has often been urged as an objection to 
this theory of Locke, that there are certain 
fundamental ideas which are necessarily as- 
sumed in the very conception of other ideas, 
which if derived from experience, could not 



240 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

have come into the mind, before the ideas in 
the very conception of which they are assum- 
ed; and that consequently, these fundamen- 
tal ideas, are a priori conceptions of the rea- 
son. Nothing can be more erroneous than 
this objection. It is founded upon an entire 
misconception of the whole process, by which 
knowledge is acquired. It assumes, that the 
mind acquires one idea at a time ; whereas 
this is impossible. When an object is pre- 
sented to the senses, for example, we not 
only get an idea of the object, but we also 
get an idea of existence and unity and other 
ideas. u Existence and unity (says Locke,) 
are two ideas, that are suggested to the un- 
derstanding, by every object without and 
every idea within. 55 Now, according to the 
reasoning of the objection which we are con- 
sidering, the ideas of existence and unity, are 
a priori conceptions. But if it be asked, whe- 
ther the mind has the ideas of existence and 
unity before it has the idea of the object which 
suggests them, and which cannot be appre- 
hended without assuming them, it surely can- 
not be answered in the affirmative. If then, it 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 241 

cannot be answered in the affirmative these 
ideas are not innate, and it is sheer trifling, 
to call them a priori conceptions, by way 
of distinguishing them from ideas acquir- 
ed by experience. Because these ideas are 
after experience, and are ideas accompanying 
the idea of the object which has suggested 
them in experience. The ideas are tied to- 
gether. They are related to each other, and 
cannot be conceived except under their rela- 
tions. And moreover, the ideas are not all 
brought out in equal distinctness in the first 
spontaneous action of the mind : but are af- 
terwards evolved by reflection. The mind 
does not acquire one idea at a time, any- 
more than the eyes see one object at a time. 
Nothing is ever perceived by itself, but must 
be perceived in its relations to its concomi- 
tant ideas. It is only by abstraction, after 
ideas are acquired, that we can isolate them 
in conception. But in acquiring them, they 
are always acquired under relations — are al- 
ways conceived in connection with others. 
And when, we analyze the idea of an object, 

it is found that the idea is not formed at once, 
21 



242 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Impressions corresponding with every part 
of the object, are made upon the mind, and 
the whole are combined into an idea of the 
object. What is called perception, is a com- 
pound process — a sort of analytico-synthet- 
ical process; and the result is multiplicity in 
unity. Aristotle seems to have had some 
apprehension of this truth ; for as well as we 
recollect, he somewhere calls perception an 
obscure synthesis. And let any one reflect 
for a moment on the operation of his mind, 
and he will at once see, that in the process of 
perceiving an object, the ideas of existence 
and unity do not come first into the mind : 
and yet in analyzing the idea of the object, 
we see that these ideas are necessarily as- 
sumed in it. The reasoning relative to these 
ideas, will hold good against all those which 
are called a priori conceptions, because the a 
priori character is ascribed to all of them on 
account of the fact that they are necessarily 
assumed in other ideas, before which they 
could not have come into the mind, if they 
be acquired by experience. We will there- 
fore, proceed to show the real origin of the 
chief of those which are so called. 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY, 243 

The ideas of time, space and cause are the 
chief of those which have been said to have 
an a priori origin. Now-, we think it is clear 
that the first and the last are acquired through 
the impressions made in consciousness from 
the mind^s own states and acts, and that the 
other is acquired by external perception. By 
contemplating the operation of our own fac- 
ulties, and noting the succession of thoughts, 
the idea of time is suggested by the lapse in- 
tervening between the thoughts, as well as 
between our mental states at the beginning and 
the end of the process. The interval seen 
between objects certainly gives us the idea of 
space. And that things exist in space, is a 
matter of direct perception ; and space is 
perceived to be as much of a reality, as the 
things which exist in it. To deny that space 
is a reality, and to say, that " It is a thing 
which being nothing in itself, exists only that 
other things may exist in it, " is nonsense. 
So, by contemplating the operation of the at- 
tention and the will in controuling our men- 
tal operations, we acquire the idea of men- 
tal power. By considering the effort 



244 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

which we put our limbs in motion we acquire 
the idea of mechanical force ; and by reflect- 
ing on the changes which are produced by 
both the mental power in the current of 
thought, and by mechanical force in matter, 
the abstract conception of cause is suggested 
to us. By the idea ot cause thus acquired 
from the surest source of experience, our 
own consciousness, we invariably assign a 
cause for the changes which take place in the 
material world. And by the experience of 
our own intentions as capable of being carri- 
ed into execution, by mechanical contrivan- 
ces, we come at the conception of final cause 
or design as manifested in the machinery of 
every part of creation. Such then appears 
to be the origin of these fundamental ideas. 
They are all founded in experience. 

Another objection to Locke's theory is that 
necessary and universal truths cannot be foun- 
ded in experience. The most prominent of 
these truths, on account of its great import- 
ance in our philosophical reasonings, is the 
proposition : — " Every thing which begins to 
exist, must have a cause. 5 ' Now, this truth 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 245 

is certainly not innate knowledge. For all the 
ideas, Ci existence/' " beginning/' "cause/' 5 
&c, embraced in it, are derived from expe- 
rience ; and the proposition merely express- 
es a relation between them and affirms it to 
be a necessary one. To say then, that we 
have knowledge of the relations between 
things of which we have no ideas at all, as 
we must do, if we say that we have innate 
knowledge of the proposition in question, 
and yet that the ideas embraced in it are ac- 
quired by experience, is nonsense. The fact 
that the relation is a necessary one, does not 
prove that it is not derived from experience. 
The idea of necessity as well as the idea of 
contingency belongs to the province of expe- 
rience. The relations between physical things 
are contingent — there is no necessary relation 
between any particular cause and effect, any 
two physical facts, as far as we know ; and 
therefore experience does not justify us in 
saying that there is any such necessary rela- 
tion : and the philosophy of experience does 
not teach any such doctrine. Physical phi- 
losophy does not inquire into causation, but 
21* 



246 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

into constant succession — not into efficient 
causes, but into the laws which regulate the 
succession of phenomena. Here then every 
thing is contingent. But the proposition, 
which we are examining,belongs to a different 
department of thought. It belongs to meta- 
physics and not to physics. It is not, let it be 
observed, a general proposition embracing by 
way of generalization, all the particular in- 
stances of relation between physical causes 
and effects ; and affirming that each particu- 
lar effect is necessarily produced by the par- 
ticular fact which precedes it. It is higher 
up in the inquiry into the constitution of na- 
ture. It is at a point, where physics cease 
to answer our interrogatories. It is at a step, 
where other ideas besides those furnished by 
matter, must intervene to resolve the prob- 
lems. Ideas furnished from the psychologi- 
cal world, the idea of cause evolved in con- 
sciousness, must come to our aid in the inqui- 
ry ; for physical nature cannot be explained 
without the intervention of these ideas. And 
thus we are lifted up above physics, but still 
we are on the basis of experience within the 



THE E AC OMAN PHILOSOPHY. 247 

province of metaphysics. We have gotten 
from experience in the physical world, the 
idea that things begin to exist, and from ex- 
perience in the psychological world, the idea 
of cause ; and we merely affirm the relation 
which experience tells us must exist between 
them. The necessity of the relation is forced 
upon us, by the contradictions, absurdities 
and impossibilities to which the contrary doc- 
trine would lead. The relation is not neces- 
sary in the same manner, that the three 
angles of a triangle are equal to two right 
angles. This conclusion is necessitated by 
the very laws of thought, upon the percep- 
tion of the relations involved in the proposi- 
tion, the two sides of the equation being 
identical truths expressed in different forms, 
the same quantity being stated in the form 
of a triangle and also in the form of two 
right angles. We do not therefore, let it be 
observed, in sustaining our doctrine, fall into 
the error of Condillac that, u All propositions 
in other sciences are of the nature of equa- 
tions in mathematics;" for propositions in 
the physical and psychological sciences ex- 



248 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

press real relations, while in the mathematics, 
they express logical relations. Though, of 
course, propositions can be formed relative 
to physical and psychological subject mat- 
ters, which merely express logical rela- 
tions, but then like all other logical proposi- 
tions, the relations embraced in them being 
logical and not real, they are governed by the 
rules of logic, and not by the laws of nature ; 
and such propositions are of the nature of 
equations in mathematics. But the relation 
of the predicate and subject of the proposi- 
tion which we have been considering, is ne- 
cessary from the nature of the relation be- 
tween a beginning of existence and causation, 
as disclosed in experience ; and not from a 
logical necessity, as in mathematical equa- 
tions and other purely logical propositions. 
The view which we have here taken of 
necessary truths, is sometimes opposed by ad- 
ducing the proposition, a That the fact, that 
every effect within our experience has had a 
cause, is no adequate ground of assurance 
that every effect must have a cause. " Now, 
this is an incongruous proposition, the first 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 249 

branch of it lying in physics, and the other 
in metaphysics., according to the distinctions 
just now made. The causes and effects in 
the first branch are evidently physical causes 
and effects, while in the latter, efficient cau- 
ses and their effects are evidently intended, 
as the word must implies the idea of necessi- 
ty, which, as we have shown, is not applica- 
ble to the relation between physical causes 
and effects, but only to metaphysical causes 
and their effects. Physical causes are noth- 
ing, as far as we know, but antecedent phe- 
nomena without any efficiency ; and to say 
that from these we can not infer that every 
effect must have an efficient cause is a tru- 
ism : but nevertheless, it has no sort of bear- 
ing upon the doctrine which it is designed to 
refute viz : That our knowledge of necessary 
truths is founded upon experience. Because 
this doctrine does not teach, that from the 
mere observation of the antecedence and se- 
quence of phenomena in the physical world 
we can arrive at a general law of efficient 
causation : but merely, at a general law regu- 
lating the successions of phenomena. Effi- 



250 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

cient causation lies, as we have shown, within 
metaphysics, and the experience on which it 
is founded, is based in consciousness, whence 
we get the idea of power or cause. Within 
the sphere of efficient causation, we can say, 
that every effect must have a cause ; or in oth- 
er words, that every effect must originate in a 
cause ; or still further, must spring from an in- 
telligent creator, eternal in himself. For in 
tracing up our various trains of thought about 
causation suggested in experience, we are 
compelled to come to this conclusion. The 
relation is clearly seen to be a necessary one, 
and that the word must implying necessity 
can be predicated of it. So, we are back a- 
gain with a sure footing upon the doctrine, 
that the idea of necessity is one which be- 
longs to the province ol experience. 

The necessary character of mathematical 
truths has been urged as an objection to 
their being founded in experience Now, it 
is obvious, that all true propositions about a 
subject matter which is necessarily such as it 
is, must he necessarily true; because its qual- 
ities are necessarily such as they are, and the 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 251 

propositions merely predicate of the subject 
matter one or more of these qualities. This 
is clearly the case in mathematics. Quantity 
and number, for example, are necessarily 
such as they are ; and of course, any propo- 
sitions expressing their properties must be 
necessary truths. The mind by applying it- 
self to the consideration of their subject mat- 
ters, discovers these properties, — which is ex- 
perience — and then expresses the result of 
that experience in axioms. We have an in- 
tellectual experience of the necessary proper- 
ties and relations of quantity and number as 
realized in special cases. The axioms of ge- 
ometry all relate to space, time, force, num- 
ber and other magnitudes. Now, all the ax- 
ioms, which predicate equality of either of 
these subject matters, as for instance, the one 
which declares, that magnitudes are equal, 
which fill the same space, are obviously found- 
ed in experience. For what but experience 
can assure us of the sameness of these sub- 
ject matters, on which the truth of these ax- 
ioms depends. The axiom, which declares 
that " things equal to the same thing, are e- 



252 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

qual to one another " which is a general 
proposition of which all others expressing e- 
quality are but examples, is nothing more than 
the ordinary process of measurement gene- 
ralized, and embodied in words. And the 
propositions which relate particularly to space, 
such as " that two straight lines cannot en- 
close a space " and " that lines which cut one 
another cannot both be parallel to the same 
third line" are all founded on experience. 
It is impossible for us to exemplify either of 
them in thought, without recurring to cases 
in actual experience, which shows that in 
these they originate. They all involve induc- 
tion — a consideration of particular cases and 
an inductive generalization. The truth of 
the propositions is forced upon us by cases in 
daily experience. And the mind forms gen- 
eral conceptions out of these particular cases ; 
and these particular cases are realized in the 
general conceptions. So then, it is seen that 
the axioms of mathematics, though they are 
necessary truths, are all founded on expe- 
rience ; and so therefore must be all the 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 253 

most remote conclusions resulting from their 
combination. 

As to the objection resulting from the uni- 
versality of the propositions, this is founded 
upon an entire misapprehension of the doc- 
trine of experience ; and would go to show 
that induction itself, the great organon of ex- 
perience, is not founded upon experience ; 
for the great office of induction is to ascertain 
general or universal truths. The doctrine of 
experience, is not that we have actual expe- 
rience of every inference found in our knowl- 
edge, but merely that all knowledge is actual 
experience, or conclusions from actual expe- 
rience, the general or universal conclusions 
which reach beyond actual experience, being 
justified by the constitution of our nature, 
which constrains us to ascribe like effects to 
like causes, upon the basis of analogy, which 
we have shown, in treating of induction, is 
the process by which all philosophy is built 
up. We certainly in the inductive process 
are led to believe the cases in which we have 
no actual experience, from those in which we 

have. The inference of universality there- 

22 



254 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

fore is, in the strictest sense, founded on ex- 
perience. For it is the force of the cases in 
which we have experience, such as their num- 
ber and the strength of their analogies, which 
justifies us in drawing a universal conclusion 
embracing cases in which we can have no ac- 
tual experience without being omniscient — 
without the past, the present and the future 
being all alike within our immediate cognition. 
A priori knowledge belongs to God only. 

The truth is, there is not an idea within the 
whole range of philosophy, that is not found- 
ed ultimately on experience. In the third 
part of this discourse, it will be shown that 
even the idea of a God is founded upon it. 
That upon the doctrine of experience, natural 
theology is impregnable ; and that Hume in 
his celebrated atheistic argument entirely per- 
verted this doctrine, by confining experience 
within the sphere of sensation, to what we 
perceive by the senses, instead of extending 
it also, to its still more appropriate sphere of 
consciousness. Consciousness is its most in- 
disputable province; for no skeptic has yet 
appeared who. was fool enough to deny the 






THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 255 

testimony of consciousness. Consciousness 
is therefore emphatically the province of ex- 
perience. And it was because Hume in his 
argument^ covertly excluded consciousness 
from the province of experience; that he could 
not discover that the origin of the idea of cause 
which originates in consciousness; is with- 
in th|tt province ; and that he succeeded in 
throwmg a suspicion upon the great doctrine 
of experience; which Atlas-like sustains the 
whole superstructure of the Baconian philos- 
ophy; and which by its potent organon of in- 
duction; has explored so many of Nature's 
dominions; and is still advancing in its con- 
quests; with such rapid progress and such 
brilliant victories; as to make us almost antici- 
pate; that at some future day in the history 
of man; nature will have told her last secret 
under the torture of this mighty engine of 
investigation. 

Here we have arrived at the point of affil- 
iation and doctrinal identity; between the 
psychology of Locke; and the method of in- 
vestigation of Bacon; namely, that all our 
knowledge is founded on experience. This is 



256 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

the theory of mind with all its correlative doc- 
trines, that is assumed in the Baconian meth- 
od of investigation. This theory of mind 
teaches that we begin with the knowledge of 
particulars and proceed to the knowledge of 
generals, as is taught throughout Locke's 
writings; and that nothing but particulars 
producing particular effects has any real ex- 
istence ; and that generals are nothing more 
than the conceptions of the mind formed from 
the contemplation of particulars, and are not 
real archetypal existences as Plato thought, 
by which the natures of particulars are com- 
prehended. 

Though Locke had, as we have shown, 
solved the great fundamental problem of psy- 
chology, and thus laid the foundation of men- 
tal philosophy, yet he had assumed in that so- 
lution a most erroneous theory in regard to 
the manner in which the mind perceives both 
external objects and itself. He assumed the 
ideal theory, that ideas or images of things 
in the mind, and not things themselves are 
the only objects of thought, which had pre- 
vailed universally from the earliest history of 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY- 257 

philosophy. Bishop Berkeley, after the time 
of Locke, showed that this doctrine led ir- 
resistibly to the denial of the existence of the 
material world ; because if we perceive noth- 
ing but ideas, there is no ground for infer- 
ring that any material world exists ; as there 
is nothing in ideas to indicate such a fact. 
But Berkeley held that the mind does per- 
ceive itself immediately, and therefore con- 
cluded that the spiritual world has a real ex- 
istence. Hume, who was instigated by a 
passion to overthrow all belief, philosophical 
as well as religious, in order that he might 
engulph all knowledge in absolute skepticism, 
had the acumen to pierce through the incon- 
sistency of Berkeley's doctrines in regard to 
the spiritual world, and his doctrines in re- 
gard to the material world, and showed that 
Berkeley had no more right to hold that the 
mind perceived itself immediately, than he 
had to hold that it perceived the material 
world immediately ; and as Hume held the 
ideal theory to be true, he turned the argu- 
ments which Berkeley had used against the 

existence of the material world, against the 
22* 



253 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

existence of the spiritual, and showed that a 
denial of its existence is also a legitimate de- 
duction from the ideal theory. So that a 
Christian Bishop and an infidel philosopher 
had, by their joint labours, shown that a doc- 
trine in which they both believed, and which 
had prevailed universally in the philosophi- 
cal world for several thousand years, proved 
beyond a doubt that the universe of both 
matter and mind is all an illusion ; and that 
nothing exists but certain ideas governed by 
laws of constant succession. 

Thus had skepticsim, by attacking English 
philosophy on a point where it had inadvert- 
ently based itself upon error, utterly over- 
thrown it. But in the order of Providence, 
a champion for the truth appeared in Reid, 
who, imbued with the true spirit of English 
philosophy, had the sagacity to perceive that 
the conclusions of Berkeley and Hume, are a 
reductio ad absurdum of the ideal theory, and 
at once set about to examine it ; for up to this 
time, he had believed in its truth. He show- 
ed that when applied to the sense of sight, 
there is something plausible in the theory, 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY* 259 

that the mind perceives the images of things 
and not things themselves, but that when ap- 
plied to the other senses, it is perfectly ab- 
surd. " As to objects of sight. " says he, 
" 1 understand what is meant by an image of 
the figure in the brain : but how shall we 
conceive an image of their colour, where there 
is absolute darkness ? — And as to all other ob- 
jects of sense, except figure and colour, I am 
unable to conceive what is meant by an image 
of them. Let any man say what he means 
by an image of heat and cold, an image of 
hardness or softness, and an image of sound 
or smell, or taste. The word image, when 
applied to these objects of sense has absolute- 
ly no meaning. " By this and many other 
modes of reasoning. Reid showed beyond a 
doubt, that this theory is a mere hypothesis 
feigned in a vain endeavour to fathom the mys- 
tery of the union between body and soul, be- 
tween mind and matter. Yet he did not at- 
tempt to substitute for it any theory of his 
own, Of the manner in which the mind per- 
ceives external things ; as he considered this 
beyond the sphere of philosophy, " How a 



:260 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

sensation, " says he, " should instantly make 
us conceive and believe the existence of an 
external thing altogether unlike to it, I do not 
pretend to know; and when I say that the 
one suggests the other, I mean not to explain 
the manner of their connexion, but to express 
a fact, which every one may be conscious of; 
namely, that by a law of our nature, such a 
conception and belief constantly and immedi- 
ately follow the sensation. " Though Reid 
did not attempt to show the manner in which 
the mind perceives external objects, for this 
is impossible ; yet he has solved the second 
great problem in psychology as Locke has 
solved the first. This second problem is, upon 
wdiat does our knowledge of the existence of 
the material and spiritual worlds rest ? How 
do I know these are not illusions, as Hume and 
Berkeley have taught? We have shown how 
Des Cartes has answered these questions— that 
he based their solutions upon argument — upon 
demonstration : which is the basis upon which 
the theory of innate ideas must forever found 
it; as that theory knows no belief independ- 
ent of or anterior to demonstration. And 



THE BACONIAN THILOSOPHY. 261 

though Hume (for we will now take leave 
of Berkeley) adopted the theory of Locke, 
that all our knowledge is founded ultimately 
upon experience, yet he agreed with Des 
Cartes, that all belief is founded upon demon- 
stration, and thus formed an inconsistent mon- 
grel creed, which is the hallucination of the 
skeptic, who seeing in his own mind contra- 
dictory opinions, concludes that this is the 
character of truth. Reid, therefore, taking 
as the foundation of his inquiry, the truth of 
Locke's doctrine* (though it must be admit- 
ted that Reid does not always appear to com- 

*Note. In consequence of the skeptical conclusions which Hume deduced 
from the ideal theory, Reid v/as led to overlook in a great measure the impor- 
tance of the service rendered by Locke to mental philosophy, because Locke 
had assumed that theory in his explanation of mental phenomena. He over- 
looked the fact that the great aim of Locke was to solve the problem of the 
origin of human knowledge, and that in the solution of this problem, he had, 
more by inadvertence, than by deliberate consideration, assumed the ideal the- 
ory, and that his solution is correct whether the ideal theory be true or not. 
In fact all that Reid has himself done, proves that Locke's theory of the origin 
of human knowledge is true. For, while Reid is refuting the ideal theory, he 
incidentally establishes the fact that there are no innate ideas or notions, but 
that they are acquired by experience — suggested by sensation and conscious- 
ness. It is true that he says frequently in his writings that there are other 
ideas than those of sensation and reflection : but then, we must observe what 
he means by this. He does not lay it down as an abstract proposition, but con- 
fines its meaning to the ideal theory, and thus limits the meaning of the propo 
sition. He is refuting the idenl theory, and uses this proposition as a touch- 
stone to refute that theory. For example, he says, "The conception of a 
mind, is neither an idea of sensation nor of reflection ; for it is neither like any 



262 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

prehend fully his relation to Locke in the de- 
velopment of English psychology,) that all 
our knowledge is founded ultimately in ex- 
perience, by a most profound and accurate 
analysis of mental phenomena, proved that 
there is in the mind, an element of belief in- 
dependent of demonstration, and evolved the 

of our sensations, nor like anything we are conscious of." Now, in this sen- 
tence, when it is taken in connexion with Reid's argument, properly, the first 
proposition — "The conception of a mind is neither an idea of sensation nor of 
reflection," is the conclusion ; and tha last proposition — " For it is neither like 
any of our sensations nor like anything we are conscious of" is the proof of 
the premises from which the first is deduced. His object is to refute the theo- 
ry that ourideas are mere images of something in sensation or consciousness; 
and in order to do this, he shows that the idea of mind is not an image of any- 
thing either in sensation or consciousness : but that it is a notion which is sug- 
gested to us by our sensations, justas the idea of hardness is not like that quality 
in matter, yet it is suggested to us by feeling a body which possesses that quality. 
But still it is evident, that Iteid supposed that he himself had solved the 
great problem in psychology — that he supposed the problem, whether the mind 
perceives things or the images of things, is a greater problem than that of the or- 
igin of our ideas, and he has accordingly subordinated this last, to the other, 
and classed Locke and Des Cartes, as belonging to the same school of 
mental philosophy. And even Dugald Stewart, with all his systematic and 
critical cast of mind, did not discern the precise relation which Keid held to 
Locke in the development of mental philosophy: but thought that Reid had 
originated a new mental philosophy. And this view of the subject, has led 
Stewart to express in his writings, opinions of Locke somewhat contradictory .; 
thus showing that his mind was rather confused on the subject All these er- 
rors of Stewart rpsulted from his not viewing psychology from logic, as we 
ha\ r e done. By looking at it from logic, it is at once discovered, that ivhui is 
the origin of human knowledge, in the fundamental problem, and that the solu- 
tion of this problem is the first step in psychology, and that all philosophers 
must be classed under one or the other of the two solutions which have been 
given of it, and not under the solutions of a minor problem, such as ickether 
the in iiul perceives images or things themselves. 



THE BACONIAN PHiLOSOrHYo 263 

great fundamental laws of human belief; and 
thus laid open to the eye of philosophy what 
it had so long sighed after, and toiled for 
through so many thousand years — the solid 
foundations of absolute verity, and raised up 
English philosophy from the abyss into which 
Hume had so coldly and stealthily piloted her. 
As Locke had shown that the elements of 
knowledge are not innate, and that neither 
are they acquired by reasoning, but through 
sensation and consciousness, Reid, true to 
these principles of him whom God in bis 
providence had made his forerunner and mas- 
ter, though as we have already said, he did 
not seem to comprehend the fact, strove, and 
successfully, to discover the psychological 
laws which govern human belief in regard to 
the knowledge acquired through these origi- 
nal sources. The law of belief which gov- 
erns the knowledge acquired through sensa- 
tion, he showed to be, that such is the consti- 
tution of human nature, that man cannot but 
believe in the reality of whatever is clearly at- 
tested by the senses. And he showed that 
the law of belief relative to the phenomena 



264 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

of consciousness, is, that such is the constitu- 
tion of human nature, that man cannot but be- 
lieve in the reality of whatever is clearly at- 
tested by consciousness. He showed these to 
be ultimate facts in psychology, incapable of 
resolution into simpler elements. That hu- 
man intelligence cannot penetrate deeper into 
the mysteries of faith. That here man finds 
laws of imperative command to believe, and 
that man cannot but believe. These laws are 
constituent elements of the mind. The mind 
must be annihilated before these laws can 
cease to operate ; for the sane mind obeys by 
necessity. Disobedience is impossible except 
in insanity, and even then disobedience is only 
partial. Another fundamental law of belief 
Reid showed to be, that man is so constituted 
that he cannot but believe in whatever he dis- 
tinctly remembers. This law is auxiliary to the 
others ; for without this law, the other two 
would be nearly useless. But the great fun- 
damental law of belief, upon whose broad 
foundations, all science immediately rests, the 
law of inductive belief, which is the only 
guide to our knowledge in the darkness of 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 265 

the future ; the law by which the mind infers 
the future from the past — that like causes will 
produce like effects — still remained undiscov- 
ered ; and the dauntless skepticism of Hume 
stood in the very vestibule of the temple of 
philosophy, boldly declaring that man cannot 
know any thing but what he has actually seen 
or been conscious of; and that even this 
knowledge must be verified by reasoning, as 
all certainty rests upon demonstration. Reid 
therefore showed by a most rigid analysis of 
mental phenomena, that man is so constituted 
that he cannot but believe that like causes will 
produce like effects; and that the future will be 
like the past : and thus discovered the great 
fundamental law of belief which governs the 
mental determination in the inductive pro- 
cess ; and thereby connected the whole men- 
tal theory of Locke and himself with the 
Baconian method of investigation ; for this 
is the point of contact between psychology 
and the method of investigation, as we show- 
ed in the beginning of this chapter. Reid 
has therefore solved the second great problem 

in psychology ; and showed that, the Bacon- 
23 



266 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

ian method of investigation which maintains 
that induction, and not reasoning, is the par- 
amount process in the acquisition of knowl- 
edge, and that perception, and consciousness, 
and induction, and not reasoning, are the ul- 
timate foundations of verity, has assumed a 
correct theory of the human mind. 

According to English psychology then, the 
mind of man is developed from without in- 
wards — sensation being exerted before con- 
sciousness, consciousness before induction,and 
induction before reasoning. AsReid showed 
that in the various exertions of thought there 
is not in the mind, any object distinct from 
the mind itself, but that what philosophers 
had called ideas or images of things in the 
mind, are nothing but the thoughts or acts 
of the mind, the doctrine of English psychol- 
ogy that all our knowledge is founded ulti- 
mately upon experience, means that the pow- 
ers of the mind are dormant until awakened 
into consciousness by some impression made 
upon the senses, and that as soon as this 
is done, the knowledge of two facts is ac- 
quired at once, that of the existence of the 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 267 

object of sensation, and of the person's own 
existence as a sentient being ; and thus two 
orders of ideas or notions are established, 
the mind, and that which is not the mind ; and 
that the original elements of all our knowl- 
edge are suggested to the mind by some such 
occasions — that certain impressions on our or- 
gans of sense are necessary to suggest to the 
mind a knowledge of external things^ and to 
awaken it to a consciousness of its own exis- 
tence, and to give rise to the exercise of its 
various faculties ; and that after consciousness 
is thus awakened, it becomes a source of 
ideas or notions distinct from those of sensa- 
tion — that the ideas of colours, sounds, hard- 
ness, extension, and all the qualities and 
modes of matter are received through the 
senses ; and that the ideas of memory, voli- 
tion, imagination, anger, love and all the acts 
and affections of mind are suggested in con- 
sciousness ; and that it is from the materials 
thus furnished in the way of experience, that 
the mind by combining, abstracting, general- 
izing, and so forth, builds up all knowledge. 
This mere historical order of the develop- 



268 



THE BACOPflAN PHILOSOPHY. 



ment of the mind shows that particulars are 
known before generals ; and that consequent- 
ly, perception is exercised before induction, 
and induction, before reasoning ; because per- 
ception informs us of particulars, induction 
of generals, and reasoning sets out from gen- 
erals, and is therefore dependent on induc- 
tion for the truth of its premises ; and con- 
sequently there cannot be an a priori method 
of investigation. 

English psychology, then, has discovered 
the origin of human knowledge, and the fun- 
damental laws of belief, which govern the 
two original sources of this knowledge, sen- 
sation and consciousness, and also the funda- 
mental law of belief which governs the in- 
ductive inference of a general conclusion 
from particular instances exhibited in sensa- 
tion and consciousness, and shown that these 
fundamental laws of belief are elements of 
the mind itself; and consequently ultimate 
facts in psychology ; and thus, by strict analy- 
sis of phenomena, laid open the whole men- 
tal process of acquiring knowledge, and es- 
tablished the basis of absolute verity. 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY* 269 

We have then in accordance with the propo- 
sition of Bacon quoted at the beginning of this 
chapter, a sure foundation to tread on through 
the whole path of investigation, from the very 
first perceptions of the senses, to the highest 
generalizations of induction — having the fun- 
damental laws of belief developed by Reid, 
to stand on safely and confidently in admit- 
ting the information of the senses, the infor- 
mation of consciousness, the information of 
memory and the conclusions of inductive in- 
ference. 

But let us return for a moment to the 
ground over which we have passed, and see 
whether we cannot throw more light on the 
theory of mind that all our knowledge is 
founded on experience ; or rather, let us look 
at that theory in another light. 

Lord Bacon, as we have already shown, 
teaches that the knowledge of man is deriv- 
ed from two sources, the light of nature, and 
divine revelation : u The knowledge of man 
is as the waters, some descending from above, 
and some springing from beneath ; the one 

informed by the light of nature, the other 
23* 



270 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

inspired by divine revelation." As we have 
examined psychology in the light of nature, 
we will now inquire whether any further 
light is thrown upon it by divine revelation. 

It is distinctly taught in the book of Gene- 
sis, that man originally received the truth by 
immediate revelation from God; and that he 
conversed with superior intelligencies, mes- 
sengers from Heaven ; and thus, by a super- 
natural tuition, was instructed in knowledge 
which he could not have acquired by his un- 
aided intellect. Now, if such communica- 
tions of knowledge were necessary to the ed- 
ucation of man, in the earliest period of his 
history, when he had just drawn his intellectu- 
al life from its first source, and possessed all 
the mental activity, which it may be conjec- 
tured he received when his intellectual en- 
dowments were first bestowed upon him by 
the hands of the Creator, is it not manifest, 
that the knowledge of man is not innate in its 
elements in the mind, and is not a mere de- 
velopment of human reason? For, at the 
creation of man his physical necessities, as 
well as his mental enjoyments, required more 



THE BACOMAN PHILOSOPHY 271 

than at any time since, that knowledge should 
be innate in his mind. But we find that man 
was treated as an ignorant being, as in his in- 
fancy^ and was instructed by superior intelli- 
gences. And this same supernatural instruc- 
tion in some form was continued by prophets 
and inspired men, until it was completed in 
the gospel of Jesus. 

Has not God, then, treated man on the as- 
sumption that knowledge is not a mere de- 
velopment of human reason exercised upon 
elements or primordial ideas innate in the 
mind ? It may, perhaps, be argued that it 
requires time to develop knowledge from 
these primordial notions, and that therefore 
man was necessarily instructed in the earliest 
period of his history. But we judge that 
this has no force. Because the faculties of 
the first man were created mature, and his 
mental eye, undimmed by sin, we may con- 
jecture, possessed an extraordinary degree of 
intuition, seeing with the greatest clearness 
whatever can be the object of intellectual per- 
ception ; and therefore he could have develop- 
ed his innate ideas into sufficient knowledge, 



272 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 



if this had been the mode of acquiring knowl- 
edge, which the Creator had established for 
him. But even if the first man had received 
his knowledge by an instantaneous endow- 
ment, it would not have impugned our theory ; 
because his intellectual faculties and his physi- 
cal nature were created mature, and not left 
to the slow process of natural growth, and 
therefore such an endowment would have 
been merely in keeping with the extraordina- 
ry dealings of the Creator, above the course 
of nature. But it is certain that the first man 
and all his posterity were treated as beings 
incapable of acquiring sufficient knowledge 
without supernatural instruction ; and the fact 
that their faculties w T ere mature and yet their 
knowledge deficient, forcibly corroborates our 
position. 

But the gospel makes our conclusion still 
more clear. The apostle Paul says : u I had 
not known sin, but by the law ; for I had not 
known lust, except the law had said thou 
shalt not covet." What is this but asserting 
that there is nothing in the reason of man 
which could have taught him sin? The law 



THE BACOXIAN PHILOSOPHY. 273 

was a schoolmaster, to bring man to the gos- 
pel ; and the gospel has revealed still more 
clearly the truth to man. 

So far from the most essential knowledge 
being innate in man, it has been necessary in 
all periods of the world down to the present 
time, that man should be instructed by others 
of superior knowledge: and thus in modern 
times, a general providence is performing for 
man what God did in the earlier periods of 
the world by direct instrumentality. No na- 
tion has ever risen from barbarism in the scale 
of civilization by its unaided efforts. All have 
borrowed learning from those which have 
preceded them. Every development of hu- 
manity has given its light to those which have 
succeeded it. The Greeks did all which phi- 
losophy, or the unaided reason of man, can 
do towards the solution of the mysteries of 
humanity. But after all their intellectual 
achievements, it has been declared by divine 
revelation, " that man by wisdom knew not 
God ; " and that their philosophy was wisdom 
falsely so called. But who can tell how much 
of Greek philosophy was a traditionary re- 



274 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

flection of divine revelations ? To deny, that 
much of it was, would be to run counter to 
the whole current of history, and to falsify 
the best established inductions of philosophy. 
All the philosophy of every period of the 
world has been enlightened by divine revela- 
tions ; and by a strange reflex action, the 
light thrown back from philosophy upon rev- 
elation, often enables man to see the truths of 
revelation the more clearly. Philosophy be- 
comes a mirror, in which we can see the im- 
age of revelation, reflected by its own light, 
in brighter lustre often, than when we look 
at it immediately: but still it is the light of 
revelation all the while revealing the truth to 
us. In order to apply to individual man, 
what is here said of nations, it is merely ne- 
cessary to reflect, that what is developed in 
nations, is also developed in the individual 
man : as a nation is but an aggregate of indi- 
viduals. 

We think, that our theory is further con- 
firmed by the fact that the same sort of er- 
rors are manifest in the theology of nations 
which adopt the theory of innate ideas, as in 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 275 

their philosophy. Those nations which adopt 
this theory, and that all philosophy is nothing 
more than a development of human reason, 
have fallen into error by making revelation 
subordinate to philosophy — having modified 
the doctrines of revelation by the teachings 
of reason. Whereas, those nations which 
have adopted the opposite doctrine, that all 
knowledge is acquired by experience, either 
from the light of nature, or the light of reve- 
lation, have submitted to the teachings of 
both these lights — have become the mere in- 
terpreters of both nature and revelation — 
have admitted that the mind has no innate 
intellectual conceptions, or innate moral prin- 
ciples, by which to try the truth of the doc- 
trines of revelation : but have admitted as the 
truth whatever a fair interpretation shows to 
be the doctrines revealed. The English, who 
adopt the doctrine, that all knowledge is 
founded in experience, have the largest mass 
of orthodox theology — theology conforming 
to a strict interpretation of the scriptures — of 
any nation in Christendom, while the Ger- 
mans and French, who maintain, to a great 



276 TUB BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

extent, under some modification or other, the 
theory of innate ideas, and exalt the ability 
of human reason, have reasoned away the ob- 
vious and philological meaning of the scrip- 
tures, in explaining their doctrines by certain 
abstract intellectual conceptions; and thus sub- 
stituted a philosophical theology in the place 
of divine revelation, thereby declaring them- 
selves wise above what is written ; as will be 
shown in the fourth part of this discourse. 

We have purposely deferred until now, the 
examination of a system of philosophy, which 
is doing more directly and indirectly, than any 
other system, to prevent the spread of the 
doctrines of Locke and Reid. We allude to 
the philosophy of Kant. The empirical skep- 
ticism of Hume, which had been so entirely 
refuted by Reid, is reproduced under a dog- 
matic form, in this philosophy. The writings 
of Reid are directed against the skepticism 
which attacks the very primary laws of 
thought, in the empirical form in which 
Hume presented it. When therefore, it is 
presented by Kant in the dogmatic form of 
the transcendental philosophy, it is no easy 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 277 

matter to detect the fallacy. Hume by an in- 
genious sophistry, and a perversion of the 
doctrine of Locke, that all our knowledge is 
founded on experience, attempted to make it 
appear in his essay on a special providence 
and a future state, that this doctrine leads to 
atheism, by endeavoring to show, that many 
truths which are necessary to sustain the doc- 
trines of natural theology, and a future state, 
have no valid existence, at all ; as they can 
not be found in experience, the only source 
of knowledge. Amongst the most important 
of these truths, is that of causation. He 
maintained that we have no real idea of cause, 
that it is a mere figment of the mind ; as it 
has no prototype in experience — nothing real 
to communicate such an idea to the mind. 

With this potent doctrine of skepticism, 
Hume entered upon the field of human 
knowledge, and maintained that all reasoning- 
concerning matters of fact is founded upon 
the relation of cause and effect, and as there 
is in reality no such relation, there is there- 
fore, no evidence to assure us of any matters 

of fact lying beyond our senses. Kant capti- 

24 ' 



278 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

vated by the ingenious sophistry of Hume, 
was awakened^ as he himself says, from the 
dogmatic slumber in which he had been re- 
posing. Unable to pierce through the fallacy 
of Hume, and discover that the idea of cause, 
as we have already shown, and will again 
more fully show in the third part of this dis- 
course, where Hume's doctrine is particular- 
ly examined, is founded in experience, is de- 
rived from the consciousness of power in our- 
selves ; and not from the external world at 
all, from the succession of events in the phy- 
sical world, as Hume supposed it must be, if 
founded in experience: for he covertly as- 
sumes in his essay, that the doctrine of ex- 
perience confines the origin of our knowledge 
to the senses. Kant regarded this argument 
of Hume as a reductio ad absurdum of the 
doctrine, that all our knowledge is founded 
on experience. He therefore concluded, as 
he could not get rid of the idea of cause, that 
it must be a necessary truth — a truth not de- 
rived from experience, but arising with it — a 
truth written as it were on the mind, but re- 
quiring contact with the external world to 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 279 

make it legible. And agreeing with the 
skeptical conclusion of Hume, that there is 
nothing in the external world corresponding 
with it, he maintained that it is a purely sub- 
jective idea. 

Here then, is the starting-point of Kant :— 
There are truths which we do not derive from 
experience, which come neither from sensa- 
tion, nor from consciousness, which can be 
neither proved nor disbelieved. "1 first en- 
quired (says he) whether the objection of 
Hume might not be universal, and soon found, 
that the idea of the connection between cause 
and effect is far from being the only one by 
which the understanding, a priori, thinks of 
the union of things ; but rather, that meta- 
phyics are entirely made up of such concep- 
tions. I endeavoured to ascertain their num- 
ber, and when guided by a single principle, I 
had succeeded in the attempt, I proceeded to 
inquire into the objective validity of these 
ideas ; for I was now more than ever convin- 
ced that they were not drawn from experi- 
ence, as Hume had supposed, but that they 
came from the pure understanding. " Though 



280 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Kant did not maintain, as this quotation shows, 
the theory of innate ideas, which was refuted 
by Locke, yet he maintained one of like im- 
port, and of the same logical consequences. 
He maintained that there is an a priori as well 
as an a posteriori element in our knowledge; 
and that in fact the a posteriori element can 
not become knowledge strictly so called, until 
it is combined with the a priori element — that 
it cannot be cognized before this combination. 

In order to bring out this doctrine of Kant, 
more distinctly, we will endeavour to present 
his view of the processes by which the mind 
builds up knowledge. 

When we look at an object, there are cer- 
tain impressions made upon the mind corres- 
ponding with all the various parts of the ob- 
ject, and these impressions produce intui- 
tions; and the idea of the object is not form- 
ed until these intuitions are combined by the 
mind into unity in consciousness. In this 
way ideas are formed out of intuitions. Ideas 
are then formed into judgments, by the un- 
derstanding, recalling the notion of unity, and 
thereby combining them. Intuitions are thus, 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 281 

the matter of ideas, and ideas are the matter of 
judgements. The next and the highest step 
in knowledge, is to bring judgements to unity, 
which is done by reasoning — by combining 
the judgements under the forms of the reason, 
or according to the laws of thought. 

But there are certain a priori conceptions 
of the reason, which belong to the same class 
with the idea of cause, that constitute the con- 
ditions on which all these operations depend, 
and without which, these operations are im- 
possible. All intuitions are^ for example, re- 
duced to unity under the a priori conceptions 
of time and space. All ideas are reduced 
to unity under the a priori conceptions of 
quantity, quality, relation or modality, call- 
ed after the manner of Aristotle, the cate- 
gories. And lastly, the unity of judgements 
is produced under the a priori conception, 
either of substance, the absolute totality 
of phenomena, or of a supreme being which 
contains all others. All these fundamental 
notions are called the forms of reason, and 
reason with respect to them, is called pure 

reason. They are a priori conceptions of the 
24* 



282 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

reason itself, produced by its own spontanie- 
ty, or existing in its spontaniety, and are not 
furnished by experience. 

Every act of knowledge therefore, is de- 
pendent on the a priori conceptions of the 
reason. Without them, there can be neither 
ideas, judgements nor reasoning. These a 
priori conceptions are inherent in the mind ; 
and without them, the mind could have no 
knowledge. They are the conditions, as well 
as the measure by Avhich knowledge is tested. 
It is manifest then, that the logical relations of 
these a priori conceptions of the reason , are 
precisely the same with those of innate ideas, 
and have exactly the same function in the 
method of investigation. And accordingly, 
Kant maintained an a priori method of inves- 
tigation, just as Plato and Des Cartes with 
their innate ideas, and Aristotle with his em- 
pirical general conceptions, did. He main- 
tained that the great work in building up 
philosophy, consists in establishing the great- 
est possible unity of judgements ; and that 
this is done by reasoning. He maintained, 
that there are three general forms of reason- 
ing, the categorical, the hypothetical, and the 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 283 

disjunctive ; and that each of these forms of 
reasoning are dependent for its validity upon 
a priori conceptions of the reason, which give 
unity to the judgements embraced in the pro- 
cesses. What he means by categorical reas- 
oning is when the conclusion is embraced in 
the very conception of the premises ; and is 
what we have exhibited as the reasoning pro- 
cess. But what he calls hypothetical reason- 
ing, is what we have exhibited as induction^ 
and is not reasoning at all ; as we have shown. 
We will pass over disjunctive reasoning, as of 
no use in our inquiry ; as we have shown al- 
ready, that there is but one process of reason- 
ing, and consequently our doctrine excludes 
this form of reasoning, as distinct from cata- 
gorical reasoning which we have shown to be 
the process of reasoning. 

Let us then, dwell upon what Kant calls 
hypothetical reasoning ; as this is the one, of 
his three forms of reasoning, to which we 
wish to direct especial attention 1 This form 
of reasoning is what we mean by induction, 
as has been said before. Now Kant main- 
tained that experience cannot furnish the fun- 



^84 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

damental notion upon which the validity of 
hypothetical reasoning or induction, depends, 
viz : the notion of the absolute totality of phe- 
nomena. That the all of the conclusion is 
not embraced in the some of the premises ; 
for however large the number of facts observ- 
ed, the number is limited and represents noth- 
ing absolute ; and that consequently, the rea- 
son must furnish, the a priori conception of 
the absolute totality of phenomena, which 
gives validity to the process. As we have 
already examined at large the nature of the 
inductive process, and shown that it is not a 
reasoning process at all as this theory of Kant 
assumes, but that it is radically distinct from 
the reasoning process, what is there said 
shows the futility of this doctrine. And we 
have shown that it is by a fundamental law of 
thought, that we draw the inductive inference 
of the all in the conclusion, from the some in 
the premises, or more properly, instances; 
and that it is upon the quantum of evidence 
(the number of particulars and the strength 
of their analogies,) that the validity of the in- 
ductive inference depends ; and that from the 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 285 

constitution of our nature, we confide in the 
truth of the universal inference, just as we 
do in the validity of what we see or are con- 
scious of. The validity therefore, of the in- 
ductive conclusion, does not depend upon any 
a priori conception of the absolute totality 
of phenomena. And if it did, it w r ould be 
equally valid, whether many or few par- 
ticulars are examined ; and thus the nature 
of induction as a process founded upon evi- 
dence — upon the number of particulars ob- 
served, — would be denied, and it be made a 
logical process deriving its validity from a lo- 
gical basis, contrary to the intrinsic nature of 
the whole process.* 

This theory of Kant also leads to skepti- 
cism, as we have before said. He maintains, 
as the quotation made above shows, that these 
a priori conceptions of the reason have no 
objective reality, nothing corresponding to 
them, in nature ; and that consequently, what 
are called laws of nature, are nothing but the 

*Note. ?.~olwitl:stnnding the utter incompatibility of the Kantian doctrine 
of a priori conceptions, with the inductive method of investigation, repudia- 
ting as it does the theory of mind upon which this method rests, Professor 
Whewcll of Cambridge, England, in his philosophical writings has attempted 
to combine them into a system. 



280 THE -BACONIAN" PHILOSOPHY. 

laws of our minds, imposed as it were upon 
nature : the phenomena of nature necessarily 
passing before the mind's comprehension in 
the order which these regulative principles of 
the thoughts called a priori conceptions, give 
to them. His philosophy therefore, as set 
forth in his chief work, a The Critique of 
Pure Reason" leads to Atheism just as inevi- 
tably as Hume's, from the negative pole of 
which it sprung. And so sensible was Kant 
of this consequence, that in his u Critique of 
Practical Reason" he endeavored to base nat- 
ural theology in the moral part of our nature, 
overlooking the fact, that as all the ideas must 
still be furnished by the reason, he was still en- 
tangled in the toils of his peculiar logical theory. 
This a priori element of the Kantian phi- 
losophy pervades in some shape or other, the 
whole of the German philosophy, filling it 
with all the error which we have shown must 
result from the doctrine of innate ideas; and 
in the philosophy of Schelling and Hegel con- 
summating its fullest developement, by going 
the extravagant length of making the absolute 
which is perceived by a sort of intuition, em- 
brace the whole of existence and knowledge 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 287 

And as this a priori elements in its connection 
with logic ; the same as the doctrine of innate 
ideas, we have sometimes in this discourse 
used language relative to the German philos- 
ophy which perhaps requires this explanation ; 
for otherwise it might perhaps be thought, 
that we intended to teach, that the doctrine 
of innate ideas in the form taught by Plato 
and Des Cartes pervaded the German philos- 
ophy. All that we mean by such expressions, 
and we use them for convenience, in our ex- 
tensive generalizations, is that the doctrine of 
innate ideas and that of a priori conceptions 
of the reason, are logically the same. They 
both equally put knowledge upon an a priori 
basis, and are both therefore psychological 
correlatives of the a priori method of investi- 
gation, though, the doctrine of innate ideas 
is more strictly so : logically they are the 
same doctrine, differing only in form and de- 
gree. And in accordance with this view of 
their logical identity, we sometimes speak of 
all a priori systems as transcendental ; because 
they all equally maintain that there are in the 
mind, a priori conceptions which transcend 
the sphere of phenomena; and are neither 



288 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

circumscribed by experience, nor derived 
from it, by the activity of the mind exercised 
upon its phenomena. 

We have now, in the two chapters of the 
second part of this discourse, exhibited an 
outline of the method of investigation, the 
processes, the starting-points and the founda- 
tions, of the English or inductive philosophy, 
and contrasted them with those of the a priori 
system of philosophy, in order that men may 
see, from the contrast, how solid are the foun- 
dations of the philosophy which has formed 
the opinions and mental habits of the Anglo- 
Saxon race ; and also that men may have 
a touchstone of philosophical criticism, by 
which to test the reigning speculations of the 
clay. For such is the increasing taste, in both 
this country and England, for the transcen- 
dental speculations of the German and French 
philosophers, that unless something is done, 
to check its progress, our old English philos- 
phy will be cut loose from its strong anchor 
of common sense ; and be driven off from its 
ancient moorings, to be dashed and tossed by 
every wind of speculation, upon the bound- 
less ocean of skepticism. 



PART THE THIRD. 



NATURAL THEOLOGY. 

ITS PLACE AMONGST THE SCIENCES; AND ITS EVIDENCES. 



The second part of this discourse, not only 
teaches the true method of investigation, but 
it also may be employed as a touchstone of 
philosophical criticism, to direct and enlight- 
en the judgement in philosophy, just as rhet- 
oric is a touchstone of literary criticism, to 
direct and refine the taste in literature. We 
will therefore, in this third part of the dis- 
course apply the logical and psychological 
principles developed in the second part, 
by way of philosophical criticism, to Lord 
Brougham's Discourse of Natural Theology, 
and Hume's Essay on a Special Providence 
and a Future State, in order to show how the 
errors of both these productions may be de- 
tected by the application of these principles ; 
and also make it manifest, that Natural The- 
ology is a branch of the Baconian or inductive 
25 



290 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

philosophy, and is supported by every prin- 
ciple of that philosophy, both logical and 
psychological : and thus, while we show the 
importance of the second part of this dis- 
course as a touchstone of philosophical criti- 
cism, at the same time put to rest the ig- 
norant assertion which we noticed in the 
first part of this discourse, that the Baconian 
philosophy leads to atheism. 

With a view then to these objects, let us 
enquire what is the proper place of Natural 
Theology amongst the sciences, and what is 
the nature of the evidence upon which it 
rests ! 

Natural theology is a branch of the induc- 
tive philosophy, and is founded upon the 
same sort of evidence, as that upon which 
natural philosophy and metaphysics are bas- 
ed. Lord Brougham in his " Discourse of 
Natural Theology/' enunciates this proposi- 
tion; and the whole design of his work is 
to establish it ; but he has in the very out-set, 
most strangely assumed a false notion in re- 
gard to the nature of the evidences on which 
natural theology rests ; and then endeavors 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 291 

by a laboured analysis, to show, that the evi- 
dences on which natural philosophy and met- 
aphysics are based, are of the same character. 
He assumes that all the evidences upon which 
natural theology rests are deductive ; and then 
endeavors to show, that all the evidences 
are deductive also, on which natural philos- 
ophy and metaphysics repose. Nothing can 
be more erroneous than these notions ; and 
more flimsy sophistry was never employed 
to sustain error, than the noble author has 
pressed into his service. A false notion in 
logic which runs through the whole discourse, 
led him into these errors. This false notion 
in logic, is the confounding the fundamen- 
tal laws of belief with reasoning ; and con- 
founding reasoning with simple compari- 
son. Indeed, the author's logical doctrines 
go the full length of rejecting altogether per- 
ception and consciousness,and substituting the 
process of reasoning in their stead. On pa- 
ges 18 — 21, he remarks : " The careless 
inquirer into physical truth would certainly 
think he had seized on a sound principle of 
classification, if he should divide the objects 



292 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

with which philosophy, natural and mental, 
is conversant, into two classes — those objects 
of which we know the existence by our sen- 
ses, or our consciousness ; that is external ob- 
jects which we see, touch, taste, and smell, 
internal ideas which we conceive or remem- 
ber, or emotions which we feel — and those 
objects of which we only know the existence 
by a process of reasoning, founded upon 
something originally presented by the senses or 
by consciousness.^ The author then goes on, 
with a tissue of the most egregious sophistry, 
to refute the truth of this classification ; and 
after citing a great many instances of truths, 
which are generally supposed to be ascertain- 
ed by perception and consciousness, and not 
by reasoning, he asks : " But can we say 
that there is no process of reasoning even in 
the simplest case which we have supposed 
our reasoner to put — the existence of the 
three kingdoms, of nature, of the heavenly 
bodies, of the mind ? It is certain that there 
is in every one of these cases a process of 
reasoning," Now, is it not making wild 
work with mental philosophy, to assert that 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY* 293 

the existence of external objects, and even 
the existence of the mind is ascertained by 
processes of reasoning ? Why ! what can 
the author mean by reasoning? Let him an- 
swer for himself ! On page 20, in arguing 
this very point, he says : " The very idea of 
diversity implies reasoning, for it is the re- 
sult of a comparison. " Here, he evidently 
confounds reasoning with simple comparison ; 
as will appear by throwing the argument into 
a syllogism ; because the major premiss will 
be — "Whatever is the result of a comparison, 
implies reasoning ;" which is virtually as- 
serting that comparing is reasoning. Where- 
as, reasoning is a comparing of two terms 
with a third term, and drawing a conclusion 
from the comparison, that the two terms agree 
with each other, from the fact that they agree 
with the same third term, or that they disa- 
gree with each other, from the fact that one of 
them agrees, and the other disagrees with the 
same third term.* So then, in every act of 

*Note. As it would einbarras3 us by the number of notes, to notice every 
application of the logical and psychological principles in this criticism, we will 
merely direct attention to this instance,, and leave the other instances to the 
reader's own observation. See Dages 143-4. 

25* 



294 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

reasoning there are three acts ol comparison, 
two simple and one inferential ; and therefore 
to say that simple comparison is reasoning, 
is grossly erroneous. Now, what is the pro- 
cess of reasoning, by which the existence of 
such an object of sense as a tree, is ascertain- 
ed ? We should like to see the argument in 
the form of a syllogism. But the notion that 
the existence of the mind is ascertained by 
reasoning and not by consciousness, is the 
grossest absurdity in the whole discourse. 
Reasoning is the deducing something un- 
known, from something known. Now, what 
is it, from which the existence of the mind is 
deduced, which was known before the exis- 
tence of the mind was known ? What is the 
major premiss of such a conclusion ? And if 
every object of sense and of consciousness is 
ascertained by reasoning, is deduced from 
something previously known — how did we 
acquire the knowledge from which it is de- 
duced ? Let this question be put in infini- 
tum; and what answer can be given to it, on 
Lord Brougham's theory ? There must be a 
beginning some where ; and this rebuts the 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY, 295 

presumption that all our knowledge is ascer- 
tained by reasoning. The truth is Lord 
Brougham's discourse is replete with logical 
blunders ; and he contradicts himself over and 
over again, and evinces the greatest looseness 
and confusion of opinion in regard to the gen- 
eral doctrines of logic. For example : — on 
page 39, he says ; "The consciousness of exis- 
tence, the perpetual sense that we are think- 
ing, and that we are performing the operation 
quite independently of all material objects, 
proves to us the existence of a being dif- 
ferent from our bodies, with a degree of ev- 
idence higher than any we can have for the 
existence of those bodies themselves, or of 
any other part of the material world. " 
How can this sentence be reconciled with the 
doctrine before advanced, that the existence 
of our mind is ascertained by reasoning ? Is 
it not emphatically asserted here, that its ex- 
istence is ascertained by consciousness, " The 
perpetual sense that we are thinking ? " And 
on page 41, in discoursing of the faculties of 
the mind, he says — " Among the most re- 
markable of these, is the power of reasoning, 



2j f < THE 13ACCNIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

or first comparing ideas and drawing conclu- 
sions from the comparison, and then compar- 
ing together these conclusions or judge- 
ments." Is not this definition of reasoning, 
altogether inconsistent with the hypothesis 
that all comparison is reasoning? which is 
assumed as the basis of all the logical doc- 
trines advanced in the first section of the dis- 
course ; though we are sure it was assumed 
inadvertently: yet without this assumption, 
the doctrines have not even the semblance of 
plausibility, and even with it they are alto- 
gether untenable ; because it would then be 
necessary to assume, that in every act of per- 
ception and consciousness, there is compari- 
son ; which is preposterous. There are many 
other logical errors in the discourse, such as 
confounding induction with reasoning : but 
our limits will not permit us to make quota- 
tions in proof of this point. 

We think that it is now apparent, that 
Lord Brougham was in error when he assum- 
ed that all the evidences of natural theology 
are deductive ; for they are evidently of both 
kinds — some intuitive and some deductive, 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 297 

just as in all other inductive sciences. In 
other words, some of its evidences rest upon 
perception and consciousness and some upon 
reasoning. It is impossible to distinguish 
what items of evidence or knowledge are as- 
certained by perception and consciousness, 
and what by reasoning, in every instance ; 
yet it is easy to draw a line of difference be- 
tween them by general definition ; for every 
one knows that they differ widely from each 
other. It is therefore impossible, and we do 
not think that it is desirable, (for it is the 
case of every other inductive science) to 
show what amount of the evidence of natu- 
ral theology, is founded upon perception and 
consciousness, and what amount upon reason- 
ing. All that is requisite (if it be requisite 
at all to consider its evidences in this divis- 
ion) is to show in a general way that some 
of its evidences are founded upon the one, 
and some upon the other ; and this is so easily 
done, and we conceive it to be of so little 
importance, that we will not make a particu- 
lar topic of it ; but will merely ask the rea- 
der to bear the matter in mind as he passes 
over the sequel of this part of our discourse. 



298 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

Let us return to the proposition with which 
we set out, that natural theology is a branch 
of the inductive philosophy; and is founded 
upon the same sort of evidence, as that upon 
which natural philosophy and metaphysics are 
based ; which it is the object of this part of 
our discourse to establish, and which it was 
also the object of Lord Brougham's discourse 
to establish. The same error which per- 
vades the first section, which is the portion 
of the discourse that we have been consider- 
ing, runs through all the other sections ; and 
superadded to this, there is in the second and 
third sections a continual dodging of the 
chief difficulty w T hich the discourse was de- 
signed to remove — the difficulty of "explain- 
ing" as the author says on page 10, " the na- 
ture of the evidence upon which it (natural 
theology) rests — of showing that it is a sci- 
ence the truths of which are discovered by 
induction, like the truths of natural and moral 
philosophy — that it is a branch of science par- 
taking of the nature of each of those great 
divisions of human knowledge, and not merely 
closely allied to them both." All this will appear 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 29$ 

as we proceed. We will therefore endeavor 
to establish the proposition with which we set 
out, by meeting the difficulties, which our 
author shunned ; and will at the same time, 
show how he has shunned them, and thus 
point out the defects in his discourse, while 
we supply them; or by pointing out in what 
they consist, show how they may be supplied. 
Natural theology branches off into two 
paths of inquiry concurrently, or rather iden- 
tically with natural philosophy and metaphys- 
ics; for in inquiring into the structure and 
relations of the physical and spiritual worlds, 
which are respectively, the objects of natural 
philosophy and metaphysics, the evidences of 
their origin and destiny which are the ob- 
jects of natural theology, are necessarily, re- 
vealed to us, and forced upon our attention. 
In our inquiries into the physical and spirit- 
ual worlds, we cannot but observe the eviden- 
ces of design displayed in them : in other 
words, when we are studying natural philos- 
ophy and metaphysics, the evidences of nat- 
ural theology lie in our path at every step — 
we behold the footsteps of God imprinted 



300 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

on every part of these domains of inquiry. 
a The same induction of facts, " says Lord 
Brougham, u which leads to a knowledge of 
the structure of the eye and its functions in 
the animal economy, leads us to the knowl- 
edge of its adaptation to the properties of 
light. It is a truth in physics, in the strictest 
sense of the word, that vision is performed 
by the eye refracting light, and making it 
converge to a focus on the retina ; and that 
the peculiar combination of its lenses, and the 
different materials they are composed of, cor- 
rect the indistinctness which would otherwise 
arise from the different refrangibility of light : 
in other words, make the eye an achromatic 
instrument. But if this is not also a truth in 
natural theology, it is a position from which, 
by the shortest possible process of reasoning, 
we arrive at a theological truth — namely, that 
the instrument so successfully performing a 
given service by means of this curious struc- 
ture, must have been formed with a knowl- 
edge of the properties of light. " We have 
made this quotation both for the purpose of 
illustrating our position, and at the same time 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 301 

pointing out the defect, which runs through 
the whole discourse, of dodging the real dif- 
ficulty, as is done in this quotation ; for this 
may be taken as a favourable sample of the 
instances in which the author explains the 
mental transition from the apprehension of a 
truth in natural philosophy, to the apprehen- 
sion of a truth in natural theology. In no 
instance, has he explained it more accurately ; 
for in many instances, he leaps the chasm 
which separates the truths of the two scien- 
ces, or bridges it over with a mere asser- 
tion ; and thus passes by the very point to be 
proved. For example: he concludes the 
very paragraph, which we are now consider- 
ing, thus : — " These things are truths in both 
physics and theology ; they are truths taught 
by the self-same process of investigation, and 
resting upon the self-same kind of evidence . " 
This conclusion is preceded by no analysis 
indicating its truth : but merely by statement s 
of facts in natural philosophy relative to th e 
laws of light and their adaptation to the struc- 
ture of the eye. So again, on page 51, after 

citing many examples of design in the psycho- 

26 



302 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

logical world, when he comes to prove that 
the theological doctrine inferrible from the 
examples, rests upon the same sort of ev- 
idence, as that upon which intellectual and 
natural science rests, he passes over the very 
point to be proved by this assertion : — " The 
kind of evidence is not like, but identical with, 
that by which we conduct all the investiga- 
tions of intellectual and natural science." But 
to return from this exposition, to the quota- 
tion above. The proposition^ " that the eye 
is an achromatic instrument," is certainly not 
a truth in natural theology ; though it is evi- 
dence which proves a truth in natural theol- 
gy — that it was made by an intelligent agent. 
For it is one thing to inquire into the uses of 
an object, and another to inquire into its ori- 
gin — whether it was manufactured or not? 
One thing, to enquire into the structure of a 
watch, and another to inquire whether it was 
manufactured or produced spontaneously — 
to inquire into the use of a thing, and wheth- 
er it was designed and fabricated for that use. 
But is the proposition " that the eye is an 
achromatic instrument, a position from which 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY, 303 

by the shortest possible process of reasoning, 
we arrive at a theological truth ?" May we 
not arrive at the doctrine, that the eye was 
made by an intelligent agent, simultaneously 
with the discovery that the eye is an achro- 
matic instrument ? Is not evidence of both 
truths revealed at the same time ? Or are 
not both truths, different convictions produc- 
ed by the same evidence, owing to different 
views of it? For example: — in inquiring 
into the functions of the eye on mechanical 
principles, with a view to ascertain what 
mechanical design it evinces, the only evi- 
dence of design, would be its round form, 
which makes it move more easily in the sock- 
et, so as to enable us to look about more read- 
ily ; and the eye lids, which serve as a pro- 
tection, and for the purpose of shutting up the 
eye, to prevent us from seeing when we de- 
sire to sleep. And these would be all the 
evidences of design, which optics would afford 
one acquainted with mechanics and anatomy, 
but ignorant of the laws of light. And thus 
stood the evidences of natural theology af- 
forded by optics, until Sir Isaac Newton dis- 



3 04 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

covered the different refrangibility of the dif- 
ferent rajs of light. This discovery in natu- 
ral science, now enabled us to discover the 
design of the other peculiar conformation of 
the eye — that its lenses refract light and make 
it converge to a .focus, and paint an image 
on the retina. Here, then, as optics progress 
other evidences of design are revealed ; and 
natural theology keeps pace with optics. Still 
our knowledge of optics is imperfect. • Mr. 
Dolland discovers another law of nature — 
the dispersive powers of different substances ; 
and this enables us to ascertain that the pecu- 
liar materials which the lenses of the eye are 
composed of, correct the indistinctness of vi- 
sion, that would otherwise be produced by the 
different refrangibility of the different rays 
of light: and thus another adaptation of 
means to an end, is discovered ; and Jthe ev- 
idences of natural theology evinced by the 
human eye are complete. The science of 
optics is now investigated in reference to 
compartative anatomy ; and it is here discov- 
ered, that the conformation of the eye is va- 
ried to suit, the different necessities of each 



THE EACOXIAiN" PHILOSOPHY. 305 

animal. If the animal prowl by nighty the 
conformation of the eye is such as to enable 
him to see in the dark : if he be amphibious, 
his eye is formed so as to suit the vision to 
the mediums of both air and water , if he 
be acquatic, his eye is constructed wholly 
with reference to the adaptation of light to 
water ; and this change of conformation to 
diversity of circumstances, is seen through- 
out the whole science of comparative anato- 
my. In this investigation, it is perfectly ob- 
vious, that the truths of natural theology were 
revealed to us simultaneously with the truths 
in optics ; for the truths of optics are the ev- 
idences of the truths of natural theology. 
In fact, the very idea of contrivance involves 
the idea of a contriver ; and it may be doubt- 
ed, whether in the acquisition of knowledge, 
the idea of a contriver or agent, is not first in 
chronological order ; it certainly is, if either 
be prior. It is also obvious, that the pro- 
cess of investigation is the same in optics and 
natural theology ; for truths in both sciences 
were discovered in the same investigation ; 

just as anatomical truths, and the truth of the 

26* 



306 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

different refrangibility of the rays of lights 
and the truth of the refractive powers of dif- 
ferent substances, and of the dispersive pow- 
ers of substances, also, might have been dis- 
covered in the same process of investigation. 
All these various truths belonging to differ- 
ent sciences, may be discovered by the self- 
same inductive process; just as in an analysis 
of any complex phenomenon, truths belong- 
ing to different sciences are always discover- 
ed, in the resolution of such a phenomenon 
into its several causes. The process of in- 
vestigation in natural theology, is just as ob- 
viously inductive, as that in physical science. 
For example — one instance of adaptation of 
means to ends, is discovered, and another, 
and another, until the observer is forced by 
the laws of his mind, to believe, that so many 
contrivances adjusted so nicely for bringing 
about certain ends, must have been fabricated 
for the purpose, by some agent of knowledge 
competent to the task. 

It is manifest, then, that the evidence of 
natural theology is of precisely the same 
character, as that on which natural philoso- 



THE BACOxNIAN PHILOSOPHY 30? 

phy rests ; and like all other evidence, pro- 
duces conviction whencontemplated,indepen- 
dently of our volition. Its evidences cannot 
be comprehended, without our being persua- 
ded of its truths. That some have not been 
persuaded of its truths, though they have un- 
derstood the evidences, or perceived the de- 
signs, does not result from the fact that the 
evidences had no tendency to convince them ; 
but because preconceived opinions overruled 
or counteracted the force of these evidences : 
so that their opinions do not result from any 
inherent defect in the testimony any more 
than the inefficiency of medicines in some 
cases, does not result from the defect of the 
medicines but from the condition of the pa- 
tients. The instant we discover contrivance, 
adaptation of means to ends, in any part of 
creation, whether in the physical or spiritual 
worlds, we are irresistibly led to infer an in- 
telligent artificer. Who, for instance, can 
read the Bridgewater Treatises, and contem- 
plate the innumerable instances of contriv- 
ance, adaptations of means to ends, order, 
and harmony, there collected, and not be con- 



308 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

vinced that such innumerable arrangements 
so conducive to purposes, and so certainly ac- 
complishing them, and in many instances ac- 
complishing them by such a number and vari- 
ety of means changed to suit a change of cir- 
cumstances, all working to accomplish partic- 
ular purposes which are important in them- 
selves, and yet, by the harmony of their ac- 
tion accomplishing with unerring certainty, 
and in some instances, at such long and regu- 
lar intervals of time, the main purpose of 
all the arrangements combined, must have 
been made by design ; and that an agent ex- 
ists capable of contriving the whole — of con- 
ceiving the purposes, and adapting the means, 
and adjusting them so nicely, for execut- 
ing these purposes? A much more limited 
induction of instances of any other class, 
would convince any one, of any truth in phys- 
ical science. The most cautious philosophers 
are continually inferring physical causes from 
a much more limited induction of facts. We 
have, then, the same kind, if not the same 
degree of evidence, and we will say the same 
degree, for believing in the existence of an 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY, 309 

intelligent first cause or agent, as we have for 
believing in the existence of gravity or any 
other physical cause. The evidence of the 
one is just as obvious as that of the other — 
shines with as bright a light from every part 
of creation. Why, then, should it not strike 
home upon the mind, as strong a conviction 
of: the peculiar doctrines which it teaches? 
Is it because we infer an invisible agent, from 
sensible phenomena ? But may not this ques- 
tion return upon him, who asks it, to know 
whether we do not continually infer invisi- 
ble physical causes from sensible phenom- 
ena? Will it be said that the existence of 
an intelligent artificer, cannot be proved by 
contrivances, adaptations of means to ends, 
order, and harmony, just as the existence 
of a physical cause, can be proved by the 
motions and changes around us ? It certainly 
can • and the grounds, upon which the proofs 
in both instances rest, will be pointed out in 
the sequel, in treating of causation in connec- 
tion with Hume's Essay. 

We will not consider the branch of natural 
theology, which runs identically with meta- 



310 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

physics, as the remarks upon the branch, 
which we have considered, can be easily ap- 
plied to that branch ; and the defects in Lord 
Brougham's Discourse, are precisely the same 
in both branches, and therefore need not be 
pointed out in both. 

As we have now examined the nature of 
the evidence on which natural theology rests, 
we will next endeavour to point out its exact 
place among the sciences, and its precise rela- 
tions to them. And this, we think, cannot 
be done better, than by showing what Lord 
Bacon has said on the subject; especially too, 
as we shall thereby vindicate the opinion of 
this great man on this subject, from the idle 
censures of blundering ignorance, or the wil- 
ful perversions of envious detraction, endea- 
vouring to cover over Lord Bacon's opinions, 
in order that they may gain the credit of having 
first discovered the proper place of natural 
theology among the sciences ; when, in fact,all 
that they have said truly on the subject, was 
said in a general way by Bacon, and whenever 
they have refused to follow this illustrious 
guide, they have gone astray from the truth. 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 31 1 

Lord Bacon, in his Advancement of Learn- 
ing, after speaking of history and poetry, 
says : — " The knowledge of man is as the wa- 
ters, some descending from above, and some 
springing from beneath ; the one informed by 
the light of nature, the other inspired by di- 
vine revelation. So then according to these 
two differing illuminations or originals, knowl- 
edge is first of all t divided into divinity and 
philosophy. " 

" In philosophy, the contemplations of man 
do either penetrate unto God, — or are cir- 
cumferred to nature, — or are reflected or re- 
verted upon himself. Out of which several 
inquiries, there do arise three knowledges, di- 
vine philosophy, natural philosophy, and hu- 
man philosophy or humanity. " — page 131, 
Basil Montagu's edition. 

u And as concerning divine philosophy or 
natural theology, it is that knowledge or ru- 
diment of knowledge concerning God, which 
may be obtained by the contemplation of his 
creatures; which knowledge may be truly 
termed divine, in respect of the object, and na- 
tural, in respect of the light. — For as all works 



312 THE BACOxN'IAN PHILOSOPHY. 

do show forth the power and skill of the work- 
man; so it is of the works of God, which do 
show the omnipotency and wisdom of the 
maker. Wherefore by the contemplation pf 
nature, to induce and enforce the acknowl- 
edgement of God, and to demonstrate his 
power providence and goodness, is an excel 
lent argument, and hath been excellently han 
died by divers." — Pages 135-6. 

"Natural science or theory (natural phi 
losophy,) is divided into physique and meta- 
physique : wherein I desire, it may be conceiv- 
ed that I use the word metaphysique in a dif- 
fering sense from that, that is received: and 
in like manner, I doubt not it will easily ap- 
pear to men of judgment, that in this and 
other particulars wheresoever my conception 
and notion may differ from the ancient, yet I 
am studious to keep ancient terms. To re- 
turn, therefore, to the, use and acceptation of 
the term metaphysique as I now understand 
the word. It appeareth likewise, that natural 
theology, which heretofore hath been handled 
confusedly with metaphysique, I have enclos- 
ed and bounded by itself. It is, therefore, 






THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 313 

now a question, what is left remaining for 
metaphysique ; wherein I may without pre- 
judice preserve thus much of the ancient of 
antiquity, that physique should contemplate 
that which is inherent in matter, and there- 
fore transitory; and metaphysique should 
handle that which supposes further in nature 
a reason, understanding and platform — the 
one part which is physique, inquireth and 
handleth the material and efficient causes ; 
and the other which is metaphysique handleth 
the formal and final causes." Pages 141-2. 

" For metaphysique, we have assigned unto 
it, the inquiry of formal and final causes. " 
page 144. Lord Bacon then proceeds to in- 
quire into formal causes, by which he means 
causes of a higher degree than metaphysical 
causes,in fo's meaning of this latter term, and 
then proceeds to the second part of metaphy- 
sique. 

"The second part of metaphysique, is the 

inquiry of final causes, which I am moved to 

report not as omitted, but as misplaced ; and 

yet it it were but a fault in order, I would not 

speak of it ; for order is matter of illustra- 
27 



314 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

lion, but pertaineth not to the substance of 
sciences. But this misplacing hath caused a 
deficience or at least a great improficience in 
the sciences themselves. For the handling of 
final causes, mixed with the rest in physical 
enquiries, hath intercepted the severe and 
diligent inquiry of all real and physical 
causes, and given men occasion to stay upon 
these satisfactory and specious causes, to the 
great arrest and prejudice of further discov- 
ery. Not because those final causes are not 
true, and worthy to be inquired, being kept 
within their own province ; but because 
their excursions into the limits of physical 
causes, has bred a vastness and solitude in 
that track. For otherwise keeping their pre- 
cincts and borders, men are extremely de- 
ceived, if they think there is an enmity or re- 
pugnancy at all between them. For the 
cause rendered that the hairs about the eye- 
lids are for a safeguard of the sight, doth not 
impugn the cause rendered, that pilosity is 
incident to orifices of moisture; and so of 
the rest : both causes being true and compat- 
ible, the one declaring an intention, the other 
a consequence only." Pages 148-150. 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 315 

It will be seen by these extracts, that Ba- 
con first divides knowledge into divinity, 
(revelation) and philosophy. He then pro- 
ceeds to consider philosophy ; and divides it 
into three parts, divine philosophy or natural 
theology,natural philosophy, and human philo- 
sophy. As the first in order, he then treats of 
natural theology, and says with great sagaci- 
ty, that it " may be truly termed divine in 
respect of the object, and natural in respect 
of the light ;" that is, the subject of which 
it treats, is divine, but the evidence on which 
it rests is natural, or founded on the constitu- 
tion of nature ; the very doctrine which Lord 
Brougham's whole treatise was designed to 
establish. He next proceeds to the consider- 
ation of natural philosophy, and divides it 
into physique and metaphysique ; and de- 
fines the province of physique to be the in- 
quiry into physical causes ; and after treating 
of this branch of natural philosophy at some 
length, he proceeds to the other branch, 
which he calls metaphysique; and we be- 
speak the particular attention of our readers 
to this branch of Bacon's division of natural 



316 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

philosophy, asking them to bear constantly in 
mind, the sense in which he uses the term, 
as a part of natural philosophy, and not ac- 
cording to its present acceptation, the science 
which treats of mind. 

Bacon defines metaphysique, to be that part 
of natural philosophy which inquires into for- 
mal and final causes. After treating of formal 
causes, by which he means causes of a higher 
degree than physical causes, in his sense of 
this latter term, he proceeds to consider final 
causes. The term final causes, he uses in its 
common acceptation, the designs manifested 
in creation, " that the hairs about the eye-lids 
are for a safe-guard of the sight; that the 
firmness of hides is for the armor of the body 
against the extremities of heat or cold, de- 
claring an intention and not a consequence 
only." He then, in order to do away the 
evils which had resulted to philosophy, from 
considering final causes confusedly with phy- 
sical causes, a for the handling of final caus- 
es mixed with the rest in physical inqui- 
ries, had intercepted the severe and diligent 
inquiry of all real and physical causes," has 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 31-7 

divided natural philosophy into two parts., 
physique and metaphysique, in order to sep- 
arate the two kinds of causes, and to prevent 
final causes from being considered to the ex- 
clusion of physical causes. However useless 
such a division may be at this advanced stage 
of science, it was necessary at the time Bacon 
wrote ; for the consideration of final causes, 
had led men from the consideration of physical 
causes — "had given them occasion to stay 
upon these satisfactory and specious causes, 
to the great arrest and prejudice of further 
discovery. " u To say" says Bacon, " that the 
hairs of the eye-lids are for a quick-set and 
a fence about the sight ; or that the firmness 
of the skins and hides of living creatures is 
to defend them from the extremities of heat 
or cold, is well inquired and collected in met- 
aphysique : but in physique they are imperti- 
nent. Not because those final causes are not 
true and worthy to be inquired, being kept 
within their own province (metaphysique); 
but because their excursions into the limits of 
physical causes hath bred a vastness and sol- 
itude in that track." Bacon therefore, con- 

27* 



318 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

sidered final causes as a part of the evidence 
on which natural philosophy rests ; and very 
wisely too ; for some great discoveries in nat- 
ural philosophy have been made by the light 
of final causes. For example : — the discov- 
ery of the circulation of the blood was acer- 
tained by the consideration of final causes ; 
as also were the two setts of nerves. And in- 
deed without the evidence of final causes, little 
progress would have been made in anatomy, 
for it is by considering the supposed functions 
of the different parts of the human system,that 
its exact anatomy is ascertained ; as is evinc- 
ed by the minute and useful anatomical re- 
searches, the supposed functions of the liver, 
the colon and other intestines are leading to, 
in the structure of these organs ; while at the 
same time, the structure of these organs is 
aiding in ascertaining their functions ; and all 
these again, conducting to a knowledge of 
correct pathology. And we find that Locke 
has used an argument founded upon fin- 
al causes (the uses of the faculties) against 
the doctrine of innate ideas, thus making 
final causes evidence in intellectual philoso- 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 319 

phy. " For any one will easily grant/' says 
he, " that it would be impertinent to suppose 
the ideas of colours innate in a creature, to 
whom God has given sight and a power to re- 
ceive them by the eyes from external objects : 
and no less unreasonable would it be to attribute 
several truths to the impressions of nature 
and innate characters, when we may observe 
in ourselves faculties fit to attain as easy and 
certain knowledge of them, as if they were 
originally imprinted on the mind." 

We see then, that Bacon makes final causes 
evidence in natural philosophy, that part of it 
embraced in the division which he calls meta- 
physique. Now natural theology also, rests 
entirely upon the evidence of final causes, the 
contrivances and adaptations of means to ends 
manifested in creation; and therefore Lord 
Bacon has with great sagacity, distinguished 
the use of final causes as evidence in natural 
philosophy, by bounding natural theology to 
itself. " Natural theology," says Bacon, 
" which heretofore hath been handled con- 
fusedly with metaphysique (his sense of the 
term) I have bounded by itself. " Before Ba- 



320 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

con's time, men had, in handling final causes 
considered them as evidence in both natural 
philosophy and natural theology in one and 
the same treatise; thus confounding the two 
sciences together, and retarding the progress 
of both. At one moment they would in the 
same inquiry,consider the theological doctrine 
based upon final causes, and at the next mo- 
ment, consider the philosophical doctrine 
based upon them ; to the utter confusion of 
all connected thought and definite inquiry. 
Bacon then, considers final causes in two 
points of view — first as evidence in natural 
theology ; and secondly, asevidence in natural 
philosophy. We believe that every writer 
on natural theology, has overlooked the fact 
that Bacon, has made this twofold division of 
the enquiry into final causes. This oversight 
has arisen from the fact, that Bacon does not 
use the term final causes, when he speaks of 
natural theology ; and also from the fact, that 
he uses the term metaphysique in a different 
sense from its present acceptation. And all 
writers who have quoted the concluding re- 
marks on metaphysique, " not because those 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 321 

final causes are not true and worthy to be in- 
quirecl,being kept within their own province," 
have supposed that Bacon meant, natural 
theology, by " their own province ;" where- 
as the whole tenor of the argument shows, 
that he means, that part of natural philoso- 
phy, which he calls metaphysique. He is 
showing that final causes have not been kept 
within the province of metaphysique ; but 
have been considered confusedly with physi- 
cal causes — " that their excursions into the 
limits of physical causes^ hath bred a vastness 
and solitude in that track. For otherwise, 
keeping their precincts and borders (meta- 
physique) men are extremely deceived, if 
they think, there is an enmity or repugnancy 
at all between them ; ?? that is between phys- 
ical causes and final causes, both as evidence 
in natural philosophy : and this is the more 
obvious, as Bacon never applies the term final 
causes to the contrivances of nature, when 
considered as evidence in natural theology, 
but only when considered as evidence in na- 
tural philosophy ; thus affording evidence of 
the maturity and precision of his reflections 



322 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

upon this point. Let any one read Bacon's 
writings with this view of his doctrines in re- 
gard to final causes, and the occasional re- 
marks which appear to disparage the inquiry 
into final causes, can be easily reconciled with 
the doctrines so deliberately expressed in the 
Advancement of Learning. 

It is manifest that Lord Bacon considered 
natural theology a branch of the inductive 
philosophy, based upon the same sort of evi- 
dence, as that upon which natural philosophy 
and metaphysics rest, " it being natural in 
respect of the light, though divine in respect 
of the object." He makes it a branch of phi- 
losophy because its evidence is founded in na- 
ture: not a branch of divinity, its evidence 
being derived from revelation. " The knowl- 
edge of man" says he, a is as the waters, 
some descending from above, and some spring- 
ing from beneath ; the one is informed by the 
light of nature, the other inspired by divine 
revelation. So according to these two differ- 
ent illuminations or originals (different sorts 
of evidence) knowledge is first of all, divid- 
ed into divinity and philosophy." Now, has 



THE BACONIAN* PHILOSOPHY. 323' 

not Bacon defined the place of natural theol- 
ogy among the sciences, and pointed out its 
relations to them, with at least as much pre- 
cision as Lord Brougham ? Why, then, does 
Lord Brougham write his whole discourse, as 
though he claimed the merit of assigning to 
natural theology, its true place among the 
sciences. It is true, that one section of the 
discourse, is taken up with the consideration 
of what Bacon had said upon the subject ; 
but after quoting detached remarks of Bacon 
upon final causes, which were not spoken in 
reference to natural theology at all ; and ex- 
pressing many misapprehensions of Bacon's 
meaning, he concludes, that on the whole, 
u when rightly examined, then, the authority 
of Lord Bacon appears not to oppose the 
doctrine which we are seeking to illustrate. 55 
" Appears not to oppose ! 55 So then all that 
the noble author could see, in the elaborate 
care and extreme precision, with which Ba- 
con has defined the boundaries of natural the- 
ology, and indicated the nature of the evi- 
dence on which it rests (for he has been 
as careful about natural theology, in this 



324 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

respect, as about any other science), is that 
he appears not to oppose the science of 
natural theology. Is this ignorance? oris 
it wilful perversion, desiring to establish 
his own claim to the merit of discovering the 
place which natural theology holds among 
the sciences? This Olympic Jupiter of British 
criticism, has no right to complain of the se- 
verity of our strictures ; for he has been for 
the last twenty years continually hurling his 
bolts, without the least mercy, upon authors 
in every department of literature, and while 
we have pointed out the errors which more 
than disfigure his discourse, we here gladly 
acknowledge, that it throws the light of much 
learning, upon the subject of natural theolo- 
gy, and contains some specimens of fine writ- 
ing, that entitle its author to stand in the 
very first rank of the great masters of diction. 
As we have shown, that natural theology is 
a branch of the inductive philosophy, and is 
based upon the same sort of evidence, as that 
upon which natural philosophy and metaphy- 
sics repose, we will next proceed to combat 
the objections which have been urged against 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY, 325 

it, and to point out the chief source of the er- 
ror of the objections ; and in doing this, to 
extend our inquiry still further into the evi- 
dences of natural theology, until we trace 
them up to the very origin of the main idea 
on which the whole science rests. 

Many philosophers, and amongst them, 
Des Cartes and Leibnitz, men of immense ge- 
nius, and of vast attainments in every de- 
partment of knowledge, have decried final 
causes, as unworthy to be admitted within the 
circle of legitimate philosophical evidence. 
La Place, too, one of the most illustrious 
names of modern times, has rejected final 
causes from philosophy. " Let us run over," 
says he, u the history of the progress of the 
human mind and its errors : we shall perpet- 
ually see final causes pushed away to the 
bounds of knowledge. The causes which 
Newton removed to the limits of the solar 
system, were long ago employed in explain- 
ing meteors. They are therefore, in the 
eyes of the philosopher, nothing more than 
the expression of the ignorance in which 
we are, of most real causes." But so far as 

28 



326 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 






authority goes, it is decidedly favourable to 
the evidences of final causes. To say noth- 
ing of the many distinguished writers of the 
present day, we can point to the father of in- 
ductive philosophy, to Copernicus, to Kep- 
ler, and to the great genius of the human 
race, the man who had drunk as deep into 
the fountains of true philosophy, as any one 
who ever lived; as having borne their testimo- 
ny in their favour. After Newton had pas- 
sed on, in his sublime career, from planet to 
planet, and from system to system, until he 
had stepped from the golden ladder of geom- 
etry, upon the remotest star ; when he looked 
down and saw how far he was above the high- 
est point to which any other philosopher had 
ever climbed, if he had excluded final causes 
from his philosophy, he would have supposed 
himself upon the very summit of science, 
and would have exclaimed, a there is no God ; 
for if there were, here would be his dwelling 
place ! J? and this atheistic declaration would 
have been the conclusion of the immortal Prin- 
cipia. But in the spirit of true philosophy, 
Newton directed his eye still upwards, and 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 327 

by the light of final causes, saw the heights 
of inductive science towering still far above 
him, and stretching on to the throne of an 
intelligent Creator : and then, with the same 
confidence in which he had written the 
other great truths of nature, he penned his 
" General Scholium, " declaring there is a 
God, and made it, the sublime conclusion of 
his immortal labours. 

We think, that much, if not all the error 
relative to natural theology, has originated in 
the use of the term, " final causes. " The 
use of this term has led to great confusion of 
ideas in regard to causation, and has also led 
men to confound an intelligent Creator, with 
a mere physical cause — to thrust a mere 
mechanical cause into the place of God. 
Hume in his " Essay on a particular Provi- 
dence and a Future State, " from the begin- 
ning to the end of his argument, confounds 
an intelligent Creator, with a mere physical 
cause : as soon as this is perceived, the fal- 
lacy of his whole argument becomes mani- 
fest. This argument of Hume, is the great 
bulwark of atheism ; " and we may the rather 



328 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

conclude/ 5 says Lord Brougham, " tbat it is 
not very easily answered, because, in fact, it 
has rarely, if ever, been encountered by wri- 
ters on theological subjects. 5 ' We will, there- 
fore expose what appears to be the chief er- 
ror of this argument ; as we believe that the 
same error lies at the bottom of all objections 
to natural theology. 

The Collocutor (who speaks Hume's sen- 
timents ) says — u you then, who are my ac- 
cusers have acknowledged, that the chief, or 
sole argument for a divine existence (which I 
never questioned,) is derived from the order 
of nature ; where there appear such marks 
of intelligence and design, that you think it 
extravagant to assign for its cause, either 
chance, or the blind and unguided force of 
matter. You allow that this is an argu- 
ment drawn from effects to cause. When 
we infer any particular cause from an effect, 
we must proportion the one to the other, and 
can never be allowed to ascribe to the cause 
any qualities but what are sufficient to produce 
the effect. The same rule holds, whether 
the cause assigned,be brute unconscious mat- 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 329 

ter or rational intelligent being. If the cause 
be known only by the effect, we ought not 
to ascribe to it any qualities beyond what are 
precisely requisite to produce the effect — 
nor can we by any rules of just reasoning re- 
turn back from the cause, and infer other ef- 
fects from it, beyond those, by which alone, 
it is know to us. No one merely from the 
sight of one of Zeuxis 5 pictures could know, 
that he was also a statuary or an architect, 
was an artist no less skilful in stone and mar- 
ble than in colours. Allowing, therefore, the 
Gods to be the authors of the existence or 
order of the universe ; it follows that they 
possess that precise degree of power, intelli- 
gence, and benevolence, which appears in 
their workmanship ; but nothing farther can 
be proved, except we call in the assistance 
of exaggeration and flattery, to supply the de- 
fects of argument and reasoning. 5 ' 

We perceive that in this argument, God is 
expressly and designedly likened to, and con- 
founded with any physical cause, and that 
the one is reasoned from to the other ; and 

the whole argument throughout all its parts 

28* 



330 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

is conducted upon the supposition that there 
is no difference, " whether the cause assign- 
ed 3 be brute unsconscious matter or rational 
intelligent being ;" and all the doctrine ad- 
vanced by Hume, can be sustained upon this 
supposition only. But is it not obvious to the 
plainest understanding, that there is a wide 
difference between a mere physical cause, 
and an intelligent Creator ? What is a physi- 
cal cause ? It is an event or fact, which con- 
stantly precedes another in nature. For ex- 
ample : heat always precedes ignition in a 
body ; and when we meet with a burnt stick, 
we therefore assign heat as the cause of the ig- 
nition. What we mean then, by causation in 
the physical world, is nothing more, so far as 
our knowledge extends, than the constant 
conjunction or succession of two events or facts. 
We do not know, whether the cause, or ante- 
cedent fact, does contain an operative princi- 
ple which produces the effect or sequent fact, 
or not ; for we can readily conceive that this 
conjunction or succession might have been oth- 
erwise—that fire might freeze,instead of burn: 
at least such a supposition involves no contra- 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 331 

diction in thought, and therefore appears to be 
within the limits of possibility. And in in- 
ferring a cause from an effect, we must not in- 
fer one more than adequate to produce the ef-* 
feet. And in the progress of science, caus- 
es are continually being resolved into other 
causes, and these again, into causes still 
more remote ; and causes thus become effects, 
or in truth, their real character is thus as- 
certained to be nothing more than facts 
standing in constant conjunction or succession 
with other facts in the order of nature, as A 
stands before B, in the alphabet, and that it 
might have been otherwise. Such, then, is 
a physical cause ; and that it is such, Hume 
is one of the most strenuous advocates ; 
and then of course, it must be to such an idea 
of a physical cause, that he likens the Crea- 
tor throughout his argument. 

Now, to clothe the Creator with the attri- 
butes of a physical cause ; and to limit his 
operations to the mere works which he has 
already made, as we limit a cause, to its 
known effects, is most preposterous. There 
is no analogical or deductive relation be- 



332 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

tween them, upon which either an inference 
or an argument from the one to the other, 
can be based. Hume has entirely miscon- 
ceived the argument for the existence of a 
Divine being. It is not based upon the doc- 
trine of cause and effect as exhibited in the 
physical world, at all, (which will be more 
clearly shown in the sequel, w T hen we treat 
of the origin of the idea of causation,) but 
is based upon the contrivances indicative of 
design, which appear in every part of the 
universe, to which the term, " final causes, " 
has been very improperly applied, thus ex- 
tending the idea of causation, to a case in 
which it does not apply in its ordinary signif- 
ication. We can never infer the existence of 
an intelligent being or agent, from the mere 
antecedence and sequence of facts or phe- 
nomena, however constant it may be ; for 
there is nothing in this, that evinces intelli- 
gence. The mere fact that fire burns, or that 
cold freezes, can not give us the least ground 
for inferring the existence of an intelligent 
agent. But it is by observing the contrivan- 
ces, the adaptations of means to ends, by 
which certain results are brought about, dis- 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 333 

played in the universe, that leads us to infer 
the existence of an intelligent agent, who 
designed and fabricated them. And why do 
we draw this inference? Because contri- 
vances, and adaptations of means to ends are 
marks of intelligence. But how do we know 
that they are marks of intelligence ? By ob- 
serving the works of men. But how do we 
know that the works of men evince intelli- 
gence ? By a knowledge derived from con- 
sciousness of the exercise of intelligence by 
ourselves in conceiving designs, and executing 
them by contrivances and adaptations of 
means to ends. We therefore, arrive at the 
knowledge of the Creator, (his existence be- 
ing implied in such knowledge,) in the same 
manner, that we arrive at the knowledge of 
men — by comparing his works with our own. 
If we see a watch for the first time, we know 
that it was made by an intelligent being, 
though we never saw one fabricated. So if 
we see an animal with all its admirable con- 
trivances, we know that it must be the work 
of an intelligent being also ; because both e- 
qually evince design and intelligence; and 



334 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

experience, as well as an original principle of 
our minds compel us to ascribe both to a sim- 
ilar cause or agent, as they both have the ap- 
pearance of a manufactured article. This is 
an act of ordinary induction of two facts un- 
der one class or principle. We look at the 
facts or phenomena in one point of view 
only — that of design ; and this is the point 
we generalize. The difference in the facts, 
whether in the excellence of workmanship, 
in the material, or in the particular objects of 
the contrivances, cannot affect the justness 
of the classification ; for this difference has 
nothing to do logically, with the point gener- 
alized. This is a well established inductive 
principle, upon which we are continually act- 
ing in the ordinary affairs of life, as well as 
in philosophical pursuits. We have thus by 
the strictest induction brought God and man 
under one class — that of intelligent beings or 
agents ; and of course we can reason from the 
one to the other, to the full extent of that 
classification : and we will show in the sequel, 
that on this ground the evidences of natural 
theology are impregnable. 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 33£ 

" We can never return back," says Hume, 
" from a cause and infer other effects from 
it, than those by which it is already known 
to us." This, we apprehend, cannot be 
said of man as an intelligent agent. Could 
we not justly argue or infer that the artificer 
could make another watch, or that Zeuxis 
could paint another picture ? It is impossi- 
ble for us to think otherwise. The very same 
reasons will compel us to infer that God or 
the intelligent agent, who made the animal, 
could make another. If it be denied that 
Hume's argument goes to this extent, (though 
we assert that it does,) yet, it cannot be 
denied, that it goes to the extent of deny- 
ing, that God can make any thing the least 
variant from what he has already made. 
Which, according to the induction we have 
made of God and man, under one class — that 
of intelligent agents — is virtually asserting, 
that because a man has made an axe, we have 
no right to infer, that he could make a hat- 
chet ; or that because he has made a boot, 
we have no right to infer that he could 
make a shoe; or that because he has made 



336 



PHILOSOPHY. 



a watch or a steam engine, that he could make 
a syringe or the very most simple utensil ; 
for if an intelligent agent be like a physi- 
cal cause, he must be confined to his known 
works ; and we have no more right to infer 
smaller effects from a cause, than those which 
it is known to produce, than we have to infer 
larger. It is true, we would not be justified in 
inferring, that Zeuxis was a statuary, from the 
fact that he was a painter ; neither would we 
be justified in inferring that he was not a statua- 
ry ; for, from the nature of mind, we know that 
he might be, and a poet and a mathematician 
also ; for it is the nature of mind to perform 
various operations, as the various works of 
of man attest. We have proved God to be 
mind, or an intelligent being, and of course 
he must possess various powers ; for a mind 
or intelligent being with capacity to do one 
work only is incomprehensible ; or at least 
contrary to experience and the analogies of 
nature. And does not the universe indi- 
cate the most various powers in its artifi- 
cer ? A perfect acquaintance with all science 
is evinced in its adaptations of means to ends, 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 337 

its laws, and its order. It is evident there- 
fore, that it is unphilosophical, and indeed 
absurd, to limit the powers of God to what 
he has done, as we limit a cause to its known 
effect. Such a notion is contrary to all the anal- 
ogies of mind as exhibited by men ; and it is 
from observing the minds of men as manifest- 
ed in their acts, and ultimately our own minds, 
(as we have shown,) that we infer the nature 
of God ; and not from the consideration of 
physical causes ; to which God bears no anal- 
ogy whatever, and from the contemplation of 
which alone, it would be impossible ever to 
infer the existence of such a being. 

But if we push out Hume's argument 
a little further than he has done, (and we 
have a right to do it,) its erroneousness can 
be more clearly exhibited. If we must infer 
that God can do no more than he has already 
done, we have no right to infer, that the sun 
will rise to-morrow, or that the world will 
continue another moment, or that the seasons 
will follow each other as they have done, or 
that the existence of any thing can be con- 
tinued another instant; because we must 
29 



338 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

limit the cause to those effects, " by which 
alone it is known to us. " In reference to 
this point, Hume says : — " In works of hu- 
man art and contrivance, it is allowable to 
advance from the effect to the cause, and re- 
turning back from the cause, to form new in- 
ferences concerning the effect, and examine 
the alterations, which it has probably under- 
gone, or may undergo. But what is the foun- 
dation of this method of reasoning ? Plainly 
this ; that man is a being whom we know by 
experience, whose notions and designs we 
are acquainted with, and whose projects and 
inclinations have a certain connection and co- 
herence, according to the laws, which nature 
has established for the government of such a 
creature." Well ! cannot the same be said of 
God ? Hume answers, no ! " The Deity is 
known to us, only by his productions, and is 
a single being in the universe not compre- 
hended under any species or genus from 
whose known attributes, we can by analogy 
infer any attribute or quality in him." We 
have shown, that we have a right to draw the 
very same inferences in regard to the power 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 339 

of God, to repeat and vary his operations, 
that we draw in regard to man ; because we 
brought them under the same classification— 
the same " species or genus, " and can there- 
fore infer by analogy the attributes and qual- 
ities of God from the experienced attributes 
or qualities of man. We have as much right 
to infer, that God can create other worlds, as 
we have to infer that man can make another 
watch or other machine. The very constitu- 
tion of our minds, upon the comprehension of 
the evidence, necessitates such an inference in 
both instances. We cannot believe otherwise 
if we wished to do so ; for the very notion 
that God is an intelligent being forces such 
a conviction upon us. But does not Hume, 
when he admits that man can repeat and vary 
his operations, virtually admit that God can 
do so ? For it must be through the power 
of God upholding him, that man is enabled 
to do it ; and this proposition Hume does not 
deny. Hume's argument goes the full length 
of destroying everything like inductive in- 
ference ; and confines our knowledge to 
what is now present to our senses and con- 



340 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

sciousness and memory. If this narrow cir- 
cle embraced all legitimate knowledge, all our 
hopes would be blasted, by the most wither- 
ing skepticism. 

From this train of reasoning, Hume, though 
he admits that there is a God, concludes, that 
we have no"right to attribute, either omni- 
science or omnipotence to him ; or suppose 
that he has either the power or inclination to 
continue our existence in a future state ; ior 
we must limit his powers to what he has 
done. This we think is sufficiently answer- 
ed by the single reflection, and the trains of 
thought to which it necessarily conducts: 
that when we look out upon the universe, 
and see the wonderful adaptation of every 
thing to the place which it occupies, and of 
all to each other, and observe such a chain of 
connexion binding all together as one whole, 
we cannot but believe, that the whole is the 
product of one mind ; and in the chain of 
causation we cannot stop short of one ulti- 
mate cause, and this the direct agency of an 
intelligent being, no matter how boundless be 
the range of our thoughts: and therefore we 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY, 341 

are necessitated to ascribe creation to one 
creator with wisdom and power commensurate 
with the universe — and this is omniscience 
and omnipotence. 

It is obvious, that the great error of Hume's 
argument consists in confounding the Crea- 
tor with a mere physical cause ; and apply- 
ing the doctrines of mere causation, to the 
creative operations of an intelligent agent. 
The same error is apparent in the quotation 
from La Place, where he says final causes are 
perpetually " pushed away to the boundaries 
of science." And the same error is the 
source of most if not all, of the false doc- 
trine relative to natural theology. 

As Hume's argument relative to a particu- 
lar providence and a future state, is intimately 
connected with his doctrine of cause and ef- 
fect; and as the portion of his doctrine of 
cause and effect, which relates to the origin 
of the idea of causation or power, is radical- 
ly erroneous, we will examine this portion of 
his doctrine and expose its errors. 

" All reasoning concerning matters of fact/ 5 

says Hume, e( seems to be founded on the re- 
29* 






342 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



lation of cause and effect. By reason of this 
relation alone, we can go beyond the evidence 
of our memory and senses. If we would 
satisfy ourselves, therefore, concerning the 
nature of that evidence, which assures us of 
matters of fact, we must inquire how we ar- 
rive at the knowledge of cause and effect,, 
The knowledge of this relation is attained by 
experience, and not by reasoning a priori. — 
The principle which determines us to form a 
conclusion from the past to the future, is cus- 
tom or habit. And it is certain, that we here 
advance a very intelligent proposition at least, 
if not a true one, when we assert, that after 
the constant conjunction of two objects, heat 
and flame, for instance, weight and solidity, 
we are determined by custom alone, to ex- 
pect the one from the appearance of the other. 
All inferences, therefore, from experience, 
are effects of custom, not of reasoning. " 

We will commence with Hume's last pro- 
position; and deny, that it is custom or 
habit, which determines us to draw conclu- 
sions from the past to the future, or to infer 
cause from effect. On the contrary, we main- 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 343 

tain, that it is an original principle of the mind., 
which is exercised from earliest infancy; 
though the exercise of it, like that of every 
other principle of the mind, is directed by 
experience. This principle is a fundamental 
law of the mind, like the principles by which 
we believe in our own existence, and in the 
existence of external objects. It determines 
us to believe that the future will be like the 
past, and that similar causes will produce 
similar effects. The inference is not intuitive, 
neither is it demonstrative, but we are com- 
pelled to draw it, by an original principle of 
the mind, called the fundamental law of in- 
ductive belief. This principle has been de- 
veloped, since the essay of Hume, by Dr. 
Reid ; as we have shown in the second part 
of this discourse. We will here quote Hume 
against himself ; and show that he has ad- 
mitted this very principle in some of his rea- 
sonings. In a preceding chapter, where he 
argues that the inference from effect to cause, 
is not an argument, he says : " When a child 
has felt the sensation of pain from touching the 
flame of a candle, he will be careful not to 



344 THE BACONIAN : PHILOSOPHY. 

touch any candle ; but will expect a similar 
effect, from a cause which is similar in its sen- 
sible qualities and appearances. If I be right, 
I pretend not to have made any great discov- 
ery. And if I be wrong, I must acknowledge 
myself to be indeed, a very backward scholar ; 
since I cannot now discover an argument, 
which it seems was perfectly familiar to me, 
long before I was out of my cradle." Hume, 
here says, that a child will infer that any can- 
dle will burn, because the one which it touch- 
ed, did so. Now this inference surely can- 
not be from custom or habit ; for it would be a 
strange sort of custom or habit, that is acquired 
by a child in a moment. As we do not know- 
how old Hume was before he left his cradle, 
we cannot determine, whether there is any 
contradiction in his saying, that he was per- 
fectly familiar with what he calls custom or 
habit, long before he was out of his cradle, 
and shall leave this point to be determined by 
his nurse. We do not care whether Hume 
calls the thing custom or habit or by any other 
name, so that he admits that the child brings 
it into the world with it, and exercises it from 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



345 



earliest infancy, as he does admit, if he means 
anything in this last quotation. In illustration 
of his doctrine of custom or habit, he makes 
a supposition of a person of the strongest 
faculties of reason and reflection, brought sud- 
denly into the world ; and says that such a 
person, " would immediately observe a con- 
tinual succession of objects, and one event 
follow another; but would not be able to 
discover any thing further. Such person 
without more experience could never employ 
his conjecture or reasoning concerning any 
matter of fact, or be assured of any thing 
beyond his senses or memory. " Here Hume 
says, that a person of the strongest faculties 
of reason and reflection, could only from ex- 
perience do what a child, he admits, does at 
once, and what he was perfectly familiar with 
Jong before he was out of his cradle. In 
another place, speaking of the operation, by 
which we infer like causes from like effects, 
he says, it is not " trusted to the fallacious 
deductions of our reason. It is more con- 
formable to the ordinary wisdom of nature, 
to secure so necessary an act of the mind by 



346 THE BACOXIAN PHILOSOPHY 

some instinct or mechanical contrivance, which 
may be infallible in its operations, may dis- 
cover itself at the first appearance of life and 
thought^ &,c. ?? What he here calls " natu- 
ral instinct^ which discovers itself at the first 
appearance of life and thought, " he before 
calls custom or habit. In the first of the two 
last quotations, he obviously makes his per- 
son to suit his argument, and then tries to 
prove his argument by his person ; which is 
reasoning in a circle. The fact is, he contra- 
dicts himself, so often, on this point, that his 
writings remind us of a wheat field, with a 
good deal of rye in it. At first, we cannot 
distinguish whether it is a field of wheat or 
a field of rye ; but on a nearer view and a 
closer examination, we discover, that there is 
more wheat than rye, and therefore conclude, 
that it was intended for a field of wheat. 

The manner in which Hume has fallen into 
these contradictions, is this : he first argues 
that the inference from the past to the future, 
or from effect to cause is founded on experi- 
ence, and adduces such arguments to prove 
it, as will make this point strongest when 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 347 

taken alone. And in the second place, he 
contends, that it is not reasoning a priori, or 
a reasoning process at all; and adduces such 
arguments, as will make this point strongest 
when taken alone, losing sight of the argu- 
ments on the other point; and thus when the 
arguments on both points are brought into 
juxta-position, as we have brought them, they 
are found in conflict and destroy each other, 
and leave the truth in undisturbed security. 

In the recapitulation at the end of the essay, . 
on necessary connection between cause and 
effect. Hume says, " Every idea is copied 
from some preceding impression or sentiment ; 
and when we cannot find any impression, we 
may be certain that there is no idea. In all 
single instances of the operation of bodies, or 
minds, there is nothing that produces any im- 
pression, nor consequently can suggest any 
idea of power or necessary connection. But 
when uniform instances appear, and the same 
object is always followed by the same event, 
we then begin to entertain the notion of cause 
and connection. We then feel a new senti- 
ment or impression, to wit, a customary con- 



348 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

nection in the thought or imagination, be- 
tween one object and its usual attendant ; and 
this sentiment is the original of that idea, 
which we seek for. For as this idea arises 
from a number of similar instances and not 
from any single instance ; it must arise from 
that circumstance, in which the number of in- 
stances differ from every individual instance. 
But this customary connection, or transition 
of the imagination, is the only circumstance, 
in which they differ. In every other particu- 
lar they are alike." 

The sentiment of customary connection, is 
certainly not very intelligible ; and surely the 
idea of power is not a copy of it, according 
to Hume's own theory ; because according to 
his theory, the idea differs from its impres- 
sion or sentiment in vivacity only. They are, 
says he, in his essay on the origin of ideas, 
u distinguished by their different degrees of 
force and vivacity. " Now the impression or 
sentiment of connection is different in kind 
from the idea of power; does not come un- 
der the same class. The idea of power 
must according to Hume's own theory, be a 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY- 349 

copy of the impression or sentiment of power, 
just as the idea of heat is a copy of the im- 
pression of heat, or the idea of a tree is a 
copy of the impression of a tree, or the idea 
of any act of the mind is a copy of the sen- 
timent of that act. They must be of the 
same kind, and " distinguished by their dif- 
ferent degrees of force and vivacity." Hume 
means by impression or sentiment the effect 
produced on the mind when the object is 
present to the senses, or an emotion or other 
mere mental act, as love or hatred, is actually 
taking place; and by idea, the notion of this 
impression or sentiment of the object or emo- 
tion when recalled by the memory. In 
another place, he says " that the idea of 
power can never be derived from the con- 
templation of bodies in single instances of 
their operation ; because no bodies ever 
discover any power, which can be the ori- 
ginal of this idea ; ?? and he might have ad- 
ded, that a number of instances do not dis- 
cover any power either, which can be the 
original of this idea. The only difference in 

the effect upon the mind, produced by a sin- 
30 



350 THE BACOxMAN PHILOSOPHY. 

gle instance and a number of them, is in de- 
gree of certainty. For example : the appli- 
cation of heat to metal would give the im- 
pression that heat can fuse metal, and a num- 
ber of instances of its application could only 
add certainty to our conviction : but could 
never suggest the idea, that heat can trans- 
mute metal into wood, or change the original 
impression into an idea entirely different from 
it. It is evident, then, that the idea of pow- 
er or cause is not derived from the contem- 
plation of a number of instances of conjunc- 
tion between the same facts or events, as 
Hume contends. But here the question sug- 
gests itself: how can this doctrine of custom- 
ary connection, be reconciled with the decla- 
ration that the child will get the idea that any 
candle will burn, from the fact that one did 
so ? The child must certainly from the one 
instance, have derived the idea that the can- 
dle had the power to burn, or which is the 
same thing, was the cause of the pain, and 
that any other candle would produce the same 
effect. Here, then, let us pause and look 
back, with a feeling of melancholy pity, at 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 351 

the laborious and toilsome efforts, of a great 
genius striving to overturn the foundations of 
all our religious- hopes, ending at last in such 
gross contradictions and absurdities as would 
almost disgrace a child ! 

It is evident from the foregoing considera- 
tions, that the idea of power or cause, is not 
derived originally from custom or habit in 
contemplating many instances of the conjunc- 
tion or succession of the same phenomena in 
the physical world. On the contrary, we 
maintain that it is not derived from the con- 
templation of the phenomena of the physical 
world at all — the conjunction or succession of 
the same events^ either in many or single in- 
stances ; for it seems very clear that we could 
never derive the idea of power from merely 
contemplating the constant succession of two 
events or phenomena : but that it is derived 
from mental phenomena — from the conscious- 
ness of power in ourselves, to act or produce 
effects, or even make exertion ; and that we 
transfer this idea of power or causation to 
what we call causes in the physical world. 
Suppose we had been from infancy shut up 



352 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

in a dark cave, with our body and limbs 
encrusted in plaster so that we could nei- 
ther see motion in external bodies, nor be 
capable of producing it in ourselves, and 
therefore could have no idea of it whatever : 
still we would have a complete idea of power 
or force derived from consciousness in our- 
selves of a will, an endeavor, an exertion, 
and a consequent fatigue and exhaustion. If, 
then, we were put into a state of insensibility 
by an opiate, and then removed into the light, 
where we could see inanimate things in mo- 
tion, such as a stone rolling, we would have 
no idea that power or force was the cause of 
the motion ; but if we were now freed from 
the plaster, and discovered that by the will, 
the endeavor, the exertion of which we 
were before conscious, we could move our 
limbs, and by their instrumentality, other bo- 
dies, we would begin to ascribe all the mo- 
tions in the physical world, which were be- 
fore inexplicable, to some hidden force ; and 
thus transfer an idea derived exclusively from 
consciousness, to phenomena in the physical 
world. This is the history of the chronolo- 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 353 

gical order, in which every mind acquires 
its knowledge of causation in the physical 
world. And this is not a single instance, an 
anomaly, in mental phenomena ; for the poet 
is continually transferring ideas derived from 
consciousness to material things, in his per- 
sonifications. No one will pretend, that there 
is, in the physical world, any thing but motion, 
that can suggest the idea of force to us ; and 
it is very certain, that this can do it, only by 
association in the manner which we have 
developed ; for there is nothing in motion 
that can suggest the idea of force to us a 
priori. There is no analogy or perceptible 
relation between them ; and force produces 
equilibrium as well as motion. It may per- 
haps be asked, how does a child get the idea 
that a candle has the power to burn, just from 
a single instance ? By association in the man- 
ner we have shown ; for power is, if not the 
very first, certainly among the first things we 
are conscious of, in the acquisition of knowl- 
edge ; for, on no other hypothesis, can any 
rational explication of psychological phenom- 
ena be given. Hume thus argues against 
30* 



354 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

this doctrine : " The influence of the will 
over the bodily organs, is a fact, which like 
all natural events, can be known only by ex- 
perience, and can never be foreseen from any 
apparent energy or power in the cause which 
connects it with the effect, and renders the 
one an infallible consequence of the other. 
The motion of our bodily organs follows upon 
the command of the will. Of this we are 
every moment conscious. But the means by 
which this is effected ; the energy by which 
the will performs so extraordinary an opera- 
tion, of this we are so far from being im- 
mediately conscious, that it must forever es- 
cape our most diligent inquiry." We cer- 
tainly agree with Hume, that " the influence 
of the will cannot be foreseen from any appa- 
rent energy or power in the cause ; " because, 
this would be to look at the operations of the 
mind with the eyes. Here Hume confounds 
consciousness with perception ; and applies 
language to the former, which has been form- 
ed to express the operations of the latter, 
and has no meaning, when applied to the 
former. But is he not all the while proving 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 355 

by his own argument, that we are conscious of 
power over our bodily organs ? And does not 
this give us the idea of power ? No, says he, 
because u we are not conscious of the means 
by which it is effected." But, no one pre- 
tends to such knowledge; for it involves the 
nature of the union between soul and body, 
between spirit and matter; and if this is 
an objection to one instance of knowledge 
derived through consciousness, it is an objec- 
tion to all our knowledge derived through 
that source; for in no instance are we con- 
scious of the modus operandi of mind. We 
are conscious of thinking, and of controlling 
the current of our thoughts; but of the 
means by which the operation is effected, or 
of the manner in which the brain is the or- 
gan of the mind, we are utterly ignorant : 
but will any man in his senses, pretend that we 
have no idea of thought, or of mind ? Such 
a notion would not be skepticism but consum- 
mate nonsense. We might just as well deny 
that we have any idea of perception, because 
we do not know the means of its operation ; 
and thus shut up all sources of knowledge at 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



once ; for we have no more knowledge of the 
manner in which the mind communicates with 
the external world, than we have how it 
exercises power over our bodily organs. 
Throughout the whole of these objections, 
Hume seems to think that we cannot have 
an idea of any thing but what we can see and 
handle — that the only real ideas are those de- 
rived through the senses; for the language he 
applies to consciousness, has no meaning ex- 
cept upon this supposition. 

It will now appear how the doctrine of 
cause and effect is connected with the eviden- 
ces of natural theology. If the idea of pow- 
er or cause is not derived from consciousness 
of power in ourselves, then the idea of the 
final cause or power is not derived ultimately 
from reflecting upon our own minds, and God 
cannot therefore, be classed under the same 
genus or species with man, so that we can 
reason from the one to the other ; and then 
all the evidences of natural theology must 
rest ultimately upon the doctrine of customa- 
ry conjunction. Upon this foundation the 
evidences of natural theology must fail ; be- 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 357 

cause we know of but one instance of con- 
junction between such a cause and effect, — 
the present creation ; and the doctrine of cus- 
tomary conjunction, is that no one instance 
can suggest the idea of power, but that it re- 
quires many instances to do it. Hume, 
throughout his argument on a particular prov- 
idence and a future state, covertly assumes 
this position, though he does not push it out 
to its ultimate conclusions, for it would go the 
full length of denying the existence of any 
God at all, which he seems to have avoided 
merely for the purpose of thereby better sus- 
taining the skeptic character of never assert- 
ing any thing positively ; for it is evident 
from his writings, that he foresaw this con- 
clusion as resulting from his principles of ev- 
idence in regard to cause and effect. His 
doctrine is, that cause and effect are nothing 
more than the constant conjunction or succes- 
sion of two facts or phenomena; and that 
the antecedent fact does not produce or ex- 
ercise any power over the sequent fact, and 
that in reality, there is no causation in such 
cases, but that it is the mere association of 



I 

358 THE BAOOxVIAN PHILOSOPHY 

ideas arising from the constant conjunction of 
the facts that leads us to imagine that there is 
an operating principle or power in the ante- 
cedent fact. We see by this mere statement, 
that if God be like a physical cause, he must 
according to Hume's doctrine be merely ima- 
ginary, even if there were as many instances 
of conjunction between such a cause and its 
effect, as between any other cause and effect. 
This doctrine then leads to atheism ; and does 
not stop short at a God of limited powers, as 
Hume has done in his essay on a Particular 
Providence and a Future State. But will it 
make any material change in the theological 
doctrine, if we consider the cause or antece- 
dent fact as containing an operative principle 
which produces the effect or sequent fact ? If 
we liken God to a blind agency in matter, such 
as this doctrine of cause and effect teaches, 
we cannot upon any principle of sound indue- 
tion, consider him any thing else than a mere 
vis formativa, operative through the universe, 
which is the doctrine of pantheism. " God, " 
says Michelet, a pantheist, "is the eternal 
movement of the universal principle constant- 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 359 

ly manifesting itself in individual existences, 
and which has no true objective existence, but 
in these individuals which pass away again 
into the infinite. " To this notion of God, 
must the doctrine, that a physical cause con- 
tains an operative principle, lead, if we make 
causes the foundation of our inferences in re- 
gard to God. We see, then, that upon nei- 
ther doctrine of cause and effeet, can God be 
likened to a physical cause ; for the first leads 
to atheism, and the other to pantheism, which 
is in fact atheism too. But if we lay causa- 
tion in consciousness, the evidences of natu- 
ral theology are impregnable ; because then, 
instead of being driven to the necessity of 
confounding God with a mere physical cause, 
(bringing them under the same class,) and 
reasoning from one to the other, we bring 
God under the same class, (that of intelligent 
agents,) with man, and reason from an intelli- 
gent agent to an intelligent agent. Because 
in this view of causation, we resolve every 
mechanical cause ultimately into the direct 
agency of an intelligent being ; for the only 
instance of direct causation of which we have 



360 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

any knowledge, is that of the exercise of 
force by ourselves and by other men, over 
matter. And this would perhaps be account- 
ing for every instance of causation in the uni- 
verse ; for so very large a portion of the phe- 
nomena of the universe have already been 
traced up to the exertion of mechanical force, 
as to lead philosophers to believe, that me- 
chanical force is the only cause capable of 
acting on material beings, and that, of course, 
all other causes, when better understood, 
will be ascertained to be nothing more than 
the exercise of mechanical force. With 
this view then, of causation, and basing the 
evidences of natural theology on the contriv- 
ances, adaptations of means to ends, the or- 
der and harmony of the universe, we have 
throughout the whole inquiry, — never losing 
sight of it for a moment — the idea that God 
is a personal intelligent being, distinct from 
his creatures, both animate and inanimate, in 
his essence, and acts, and consciousness ; and 
not a mere cause, of which the universe is 
the phenomena. On this foundation, natu- 
ral theology teaches the notion of such a 



THE EACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 361 

God as we can address as u Our father who 
art in heaven. " 

The argument of Hume, which we have 
been considering, is certainly subtle and in- 
genious in the extreme, but he views things too 
much through the little pin-hole of his skep- 
tical creed ; to let in upon his mind, light from 
all parts of his subject; and in presenting his 
partial views to others, he gives them such 
bold relief, by the bright coloring of his ad- 
mirable rhetoric, as to cast the other parts of 
his subject, completely into the shade. In 
his philosophical writings, therefore, we never 
see a complete picture ; yet what we do see^ 
exhibits the touches of a master ; for howev- 
er imperfect the picture may be as a likeness, 
it has nothing of the daubing of the preten- 
der. 

If what we have gleaned, from this field of 
evidence which has been harvested home by 
the masterminds of the past and present cen- 
tury, shall contribute anything to the truths of 
natural theology, we will rejoice ; for it were 
better that the sun were smitten from the 

firmament, and all creation covered in dark- 
31 



362 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. • 

ness, so that we could not read one word in 
the great book of nature, than that a false 
and impious philosophy should tear out the 
sacred chapter of final causes. What ! God 
write a book in defence of atheism. It must 
be so, if nature tells nothing of him. Must 
creation cease to declare the glory of him who 
spread out the heavens, and will roll them up 
as a scroll ? The desolate soul of the misan- 
thrope atheist, may answer "yes;" but New- 
ton has given the response of the Baconian 
philosopher. 



PART THE FOURTH. 



THE CONNECTION BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY 
AND REVELATION. 



In the third part of this discourse, we have 
shown, that Natural Theology is a branch of 
Philosophy. We propose now to inquire, 
what connection there is between Philosophy 
and Revelation, 

In order to attain a precise understanding 
of this question, it is important, to inquire 
first into the connection between reason and 
revelation. First then, what is the connec- 
tion between reason and revelation ? 

The first problem which presents itself in 
the investigation of the connection between 
reason and revelation, is what is meant by 
reason? We shall endeavour to show, that 
whatever idea men may intend to convey by 
it in such a connection, they do in reality 
mean by it philosophy. If this be so, then 



364 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

this inquiry will resolve itself into the inves- 
tigation of the connection between Philoso- 
phy and Revelation, which is the subject that 
this part of our discourse is intended to un- 
fold. 

In the second chapter of the second part 
of this discourse, we have endeavoured to 
show with Locke, that there are no innate 
ideas, nor a priori conceptions, by which the 
mind judges of truth, but that all our knowl- 
edge is acquired by experience ; and that what 
we call principles are nothing but generalized 
facts ; and that whether these facts or princi- 
ples have been generalized by ourselves or 
by others, they are equally acquired by ex- 
perience in our meaning of the term. 

If then the mind has no innate, or a priori 
knowledge, but acquires all through experi- 
ence, we must mean by reason, either the 
bare faculty of reason, or else the knowl- 
edge acquired by that faculty : for upon this 
theory of mental philosophy, it can have no 
other meaning. If then we mean by it, the 
bare faculty of reason, the inquiry resolves it- 
self into this: What is the use of reason in inter- 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 365 

preting revelation ? and if we mean by it, the 
knowledge acquired by that faculty, the in- 
quiry resolves itself into this: What is the 
connection between our knowledge of nature 
and revelation. And whether we use the 
word in the one meaning or the other, it 
amounts to the same thing, in the connection 
in which we are considering it. For the real 
inquiry is, what light does our reason throw 
upon revelation ? If our reason has no light, 
but what it has acquired by experience, then 
this light is the light of nature, which is phi- 
losophy ; and it is by this light, that it must 
judge of the truths of revelation, if it judge 
of them by any other light, than that of 
revelation itself. There are then, accord- 
ing to this analysis, only two lights to guide 
the mind in the investigation of knowledge, 
the light of nature and the light of revelation. 
And our inquiry obviously resolves itself into 
the question, what assistance does the light 
of nature afford us in examining the truths 
of revelation ? Or, what is the connection be- 
tween philosophy and revelation? And this 

is the question which we propose to examine* 
31* 



366 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

u The knowledge of man (says Bacon) is 
as the waters, some descending from above, 
and some springing from beneath ; the one 
informed by the light of nature, the other in- 
spired by divine revelation. So then, accord- 
ing to these two differing illuminations or ori- 
ginals, knowledge is first of all divided into 
divinity, and philosophy. " As then, nature 
and revelation are the only sources of knowl- 
edge, what assistance does the light of nature 
or philosophy give us in interpreting divinity 
or revelation ? This question Bacon himself 
has properly answered. " But on the other 
side (says he) out of the contemplation of nat- 
ure or ground of human knowledge, to induce 
any verity or persuasion concerning the points 
of faith, is in my judgment not safe. Dafidei 
qua fidei sunt We ought not attempt to 
draw down or submit the mysteries of God, 
to our reason ; but contrariwise, to raise and 
advance our reason to the divine truth. 
Wherefore we conclude that theology, which 
in our idiom we call divinity, is grounded on- 
ly upon the word and oracle of God, and not 
upon the light of nature. " Such is the doc- 



THE BACOXIAN PHILOSOPHY. 367 

trine of the Baconian Philosophy, that theol- 
ogy is grounded only upon the word and ora- 
cle of God, and not upon the light of nature. 
We must look to the light of nature for phil- 
osophy, but to revelation, for theology. And 
as the mind has no innate knowledge, if we 
interpret revelation by any other light than 
its own, we interpret it by the light of philo- 
sophy, whether we call it interpretation ac- 
cording to reason, or not. For we have 
shown, that what we call reason, is philoso- 
phy ; and not a light put into the mind by the 
Creator, at or before our birth, and therefore 
a divine standard of truth, called by the a 
priori philosopher, the reason, by which, rev- 
elation as well as nature, is to be tested as to 
the truth of its doctrines. 

But let us not, in this inquiry, overlook the 
distinction between reason, as meaning phi- 
losophy, and as meaning the bare faculty of 
reason ; and thereby mistake what we say 
about it as meaning philosophy, as being said 
about it as meaning the bare faculty of rea- 
son. For it would be nonsense, to say that 
reason in this latter sense, is of no use in in- 



368 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

vestigating the doctrines of revelation. " The 
use of reason (faculty of reason) in religion, 
(says Bacon) is of two sorts : the former, in the 
conception and apprehension of the mysteries 
of God, to us revealed ; the other in inferring 
and deriving of doctrine and direction there- 
upon. The former extendeth to the myste- 
ries themselves ; but how ? by way of illus- 
tration, and not by way of argument; the 
latter consisteth indeed of probation and ar- 
gument. In the former we see God vouch- 
safed to descend to our capacity in the ex- 
pressing of his mysteries in sort as may be 
unto us ; and doth graft his revelations and 
holy doctrine upon the notions of our reason, 
and applieth his inspirations to open our under- 
standing, as the form of the key, to the ward 
of the lock; for the latter, there is allowed 
us a use of reason and argument, secondary 
and respective although, not original and ab- 
solute. For after the articles and principles 
of religion are placed and exempted from ex- 
amination of reason, it is then permitted unto 
us to make derivations and inferences from 
and according to analogy of them, for our bet- 



THE BACOjVIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



369 



ter direction. In nature this holdeth not; 
for both the principles are examined by induc- 
tion, though not by a medium or syllogism ; 
and besides, those principles or first positions 
have no discordance with that reason which 
draweth down and deduceth the inferior po- 
sitions. Such therefore is the secondary rea- 
son which hath place in divinity, which is 
grounded upon the placets of God." Bacon 
here shows that reason enables us to apprehend 
the mysteries of God., such as 'the doctrine of 
the atonement, or the resurrection, not by 
way of argument or proof, but by way of il- 
lustration ; for God doth graft these mysteries, 
as well as his holy doctrine, love your enemies, 
and other such doctrines, upon the notions of 
our reason, and applieth his inspirations to 
open our understanding as the form of the 
key to the ward of the lock, in order that we 
may fully understand them. But we will 
show in the sequel, that much of what we, 
in considering at this day the connection be- 
tween philosophy and revelation, are apt to 
call the notions of reason, and probably of 
what Bacon in the passage quoted, has called 



370 THE EACOx\ T IAtf PHILOSOPHY. 

the notions of reason, is not derived exclusive- 
ly from the light of nature, but also from rev- 
elation. Because our first parents were taught 
by revelation, at the very moment of their 
creation, or rather, as soon as their internal 
consciousness was awakened into knowledge. 
The light of nature had no sooner fallen on 
their minds, than God spoke to them and in- 
structed them in all knowledge proper for 
them. And the mode of instruction by reve- 
lation was continued through prophets and 
inspired men till the completion of that mode 
of instruction in Christianity. So that the 
light of nature and the light of revelation are so 
mixed up in our knowledge, that the teachings 
of each cannot be separated, and the latter 
had become so corrupted before Christianity 
was promulgated, that we are apt in the ardour 
of investigation, to call all our knowledge 
anterior to Christianity, the notions of our 
reason. So that, in strictness, the bare facul- 
ty of reason is not now, and never has been, 
employed in examining revelation, but is em- 
ployed with a knowledge already furnished 
from both nature and prior revelations. But 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 371 

this use of prior knowledge is not by way of 
proof of the doctrines of revelation at this 
day, but merely by way of comprehending 
them 5 because every portion of our prior 
knowledge has lost its authority as revelation, 
from the fact, that the revealed cannot be dis- 
tinguished from the natural, and therefore 
cannot be made a test in examining what is 
known to be revelation. Bacon also shows 
that reason is of use in inferring and deriving 
doctrine and direction from revelation, and 
that this consisteth indeed in probation and 
argument : but still, that this use of reason 
and argument is secondary, not original and 
absolute ; for, that all our inferences and deri- 
vations must be made according to the analogy 
of the articles and principles of religion, or 
as the Apostle expresseth it, by a comparing 
spiritual things with spiritual ;' ? and not as in 
nature, where principles themselves are ascer- 
tained by induction. 

We do not, therefore, in revelation ascer- 
tain first-principles, such as love your neigh- 
bour as yourself, or the ten commandments, 
by induction in the wide domain of reason or 



372 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

philosophy, and then try the scriptures by 
these principles ; nor do we look out into the 
domain of philosophy for still higher and 
more absolute truths, as the transcendental 
philosophers do, and deduce from them the 
great doctrines of revelation, according to 
eertain fancies about the unity of truth. But 
we get all our knowledge of the truths of re- 
velation from a sound interpretation of the 
scriptures. u For the obtaining the informa- 
tion (says Bacon) itresteth upon the true and 
sound interpretation of the scriptures, which 
are the fountains of the waters of iife." Be- 
cause the fundamental doctrines taught in re- 
velation are the generalizations, if we may so 
speak, of a wider experience than that which 
lies within the province of philosophy. They 
embrace eternity, with all the facts in that 
boundless field of experience. It is only 
then by a mind which has swept over that 
vast field of vision, that the truths which be- 
long to it can be generalized. A finite mind 
cannot do so ; and of course it must receive 
such truths from the mind that can ; or rather, 
must receive them from the mind whose man- 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 373 

ner of knowing is different from man's manner 
of knowing— who knows intuitively, what man 
knows inductively; and to whom all truths 
are objects of intellectual perception. And 
this is the reason that induction has a secon- 
dary office in ascertaining the truths of reve- 
lation : these truths^elong to a wider field of 
experience than that in which induction can 
be used by man. 

The proper mode, then, of interpreting the 
scriptures, is not by making its doctrines 
square with our reason, which is nothing 
more than our philosophy, but by a sound in- 
terpretation of their language by the rules of 
grammar and logic \ and by collecting all the 
passages on the same subject matter, and 
from the induction of the whole, draw the 
meaning of each ; and not from the meaning of 
one which we may fancy to be a leading one, 
to infer the meaning of all the rest, thus violat- 
ing the fundamental principles of induction, 
which in this secondary way holds good in in- 
vestigations of this kind, as well as in nature. 
In some cases, however, where the meaning 

of a text is so obvious that no two opinions 
32 



374 THE BACONIAN ^PHILOSOPHY. 

can be entertained about it, like what Bacon 
calls a glaring instances " in nature, where 
one single instance is so significant, that you 
can by it alone determine upon the nature of 
the whole class, you may use it as a key to the 
meaning of less obvious passages upon the 
same subject matter. In a word, we must 
make scripture the infallible rule of interpret- 
ing scripture ; just as we make nature the in- 
fallible rule of interpreting nature. Neither 
must we interpret the scriptures altogether as 
we would a mere human writing. For 
though in most things they are like human 
writings, yet they differ in some essential 
particulars ; as is well shown by the following 
remarks of Bacon. u But the two latter 
points known to God and unknown to men, 
touching the secrets of the heart and the suc- 
cessions of time, do make a just and sound 
difference between the manner of the exposi- 
tion of the scriptures and all other books. For 
it is an excellent observation which hath been 
made upon the answers of our Saviour Christ 
to many of the questions which were pro- 
pounded to him, how that they are impertinent 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 375 

to the state of the question demanded: the rea- 
son whereof is, because not being like man, 
which knows man's thoughts by his words, 
but knowing man's thoughts immediately, 
he never answered their words, but their 
thoughts : much in the like manner it is with 
the scriptures, which being written to the 
thoughts of men, and to the succession of 
ages, with a foresight of all heresies, contra- 
diction, differing estates of the church, yea 
and particularly of the elect, are not to be in- 
terpreted only according to the latitude of 
the proper sense of the place, and respec- 
tively towards that present occasion where- 
upon the words were uttered, or in precise 
congruity or contexture with the words, be- 
fore or after, or in contemplation of the prin- 
cipal scope of the place ; but have in them- 
selves not only totally or collectively, but dis- 
tributively in clauses and words, infinite 
springs and streams of doctrine to water the 
church in every part. And therefore the lit- 
eral sense is as it were the main stream or 
river ; so the moral sense chiefly, and some- 
times the allegorical or typical, are they 



376 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

whereof the church hath the most use : not 
that I wish men to be bold in allegories, or 
indulgent or light in allusions : but that I do 
so much condemn that interpretation of scrip- 
ture which is only after the manner as men 
use to interpret a profane book." These sa- 
gacious remarks of Bacon need no comment. 
They point out with great precision, the dif- 
ference to be observed in interpreting the 
scriptures and a mere human writing — a dif- 
ference founded upon the omniscience of the 
Author of the scriptures. 

It may perhaps be asked, whether philoso- 
phy is of no use at all, in the interpretation 
of the scriptures ? as our remarks thus far, 
may appear to lead to the conclusion that it is 
not. We answer, yes ! For it must be borne 
in mind, that the scriptures contain something 
besides revelation, that though they brought 
life and immortality to light, yet the greater 
part of them are rehersals of historical facts 
and citations of natural phenomena, and re- 
marks upon the nature of man, all of which 
lie within the province of philosophy. Of 
course then, all natural phenomena, whether 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 377 

physical or psych ological, are to be explain- 
ed by philosophy, with the limitation as to 
the psychological phenomena which will be 
explained hereafter ; and not to be judged 
according to the words of scripture, as these 
convey the notions current amongst men at 
the time the scriptures were written, and not 
absolute truth, as do their teachings of reve- 
lation proper. The Papal Church, for in- 
stance, followed the letter of scripture, when 
it condemned Galileo. But this was a matter 
in which it ought to have followed the light 
of nature or philosophy. For the scriptures 
do not teach philosophy, but theology. They 
were intended to light up that dark abyss 
which lies beyond the present state of exis- 
tence—to bring life and immortality to light. 
This is the province of revelation, and over 
it philosophy throws no light. For much of 
what we now call philosophy, as we have al- 
ready indicated, is in reality the light of rev- 
elation, which has become so mixed up with 
the light of nature in our knowledge, that 
we cannot separate them, and it has therefore 

lost all its authority as the light of revelation 
32* 



378 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

in interpreting the scriptures. Indeed, it is 
doubtful whether all the theological notions 
in the world are not fragments of revelations 
more or less corrupted, made in the early 
ages of human history. For it is certain that 
the theology of our first parents, was a direct 
revelation, and not inferences from the indica- 
tions of nature. And this was also the case 
with our second great progenitor, Noah. And 
therefore it may be, that all the theology in 
the world, in all the varying forms of mono- 
theism, polytheism, and pantheism, is derived 
more or less from these original divine reve- 
lations, but kept alive in these corrupt forms 
by the indications of nature, ever since they 
were revealed. And as the light of nature, 
with the assistance of all the fragments of 
divine revelations which had been handed 
down to them, was not sufficient to enable the 
wisest philosophers before the Christian dis- 
pensation, to form a correct idea of God ; 
and as the light of nature has not been suffi- 
cient to prevent the idea of God from being 
entirely obliterated from the minds of some 
tribes of men in the south of Africa, who 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 379 

have for centuries been entirely removed from 
the influence of the amount of revealed truth 
which is always acting through the gene- 
ral agencies of civilization, it may be doubt- 
ed whether the light of nature in itself 
is sufficient to originate in the human mind 
the idea of God ; though they are, as we have 
shown in the third part of this discourse, 
abundantly sufficient to prove the existence 
of a God, after the idea of God is once in the 
mind, --is once grafted upon the notions of cau- 
sation and contrivance developed in conscious- 
ness ; and the mind is thereby enabled to per- 
ceive and generalize the analogies pertaining 
to the subject which are presented in the 
psychological and physical worlds. And the 
Creator has certainly not left the human race 
to the teachings of the light of nature alone: 
but has made revelation even of his own ex- 
istence, a part of his educational economy. It 
is true that the Apostle to the gentiles has said: 
" For the invisible things of him from the 
creation of the world, are clearly seen, being 
understood by the things that are made, even 
his eternal power and Godhead : so that they 



380 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

are without excuse. " But this, we appre- 
hend, does not controvert our view. Because 
the Apostle says this of men, who had the 
idea of God, as he well knew, given them by 
divine revelation, either immediately, or by 
remote means. And what the Apostle says 
further seems to confirm our view : " Because 
that, when they knew God, they glorified 
him not as God, neither were thankful, but 
became vain in their imaginations, and their 
foolish hearts were darkened/ 5 &c. The 
words, " when they knew God," evidently re- 
fer to other knowledge than that derived from 
nature — from " the things that are made. " 
All then, the Apostle appears, to teach, was, 
that even the light of nature was sufficient 
to keep alive in the mind the idea of God, 
which had been communicated by divine rev- 
elation, if man had not apostatized, and there- 
by suffered his mind to be darkened. And 
a kindred thought is expressed in the elev- 
enth chapter of Hebrews, "Through faith we 
understand that the worlds were framed by 
the word of God, so that things which are 
seen, were not made of things which do ap~ 



THE EACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 381 

pear." The meaning here is, that it is by faith, 
by the teachings of revelation and not by the 
light nature ; that we know that all things are 
made by God, and not developed out of capa- 
bilities of nature by agencies which we can as- 
certain by the light of nature; as philosophy 
would seem to teach. So that there may be a 
doubt,whether all the evidences of natural the- 
ology are not seen by a light imparted at some 
stage of man's history, by direct revelation. 

And this does not detract from the proper 
force of the evidences of natural theology. 
For though we might not be able to read the 
planetary system in the indications of the 
heavens, as Newton did, still after he has 
taught us, we can then see its evidences in all 
their force, and they are just as incontroverti- 
ble as if we had discovered them ourselves. 
So in regard to the evidences of natural the- 
ology, we might not be able to see these evi- 
dences in nature, without an instructor, but 
when once instructed, we may be able to 
see them in all their fulness. And it is no 
objection to the parallel, that we require a su- 
pernatural instructor in the one case and only 



382 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

a human instructor in the other. For we ut- 
terly repudiate the shallow sophism, that 
" nothing can be made intrinsically evident to 
reason, whose intrinsic truth transcends rea- 
son ; or, what is the same thing, is not natur- 
ally knowable by reason. " The intrinsic 
truth or internal reasonableness of many of 
the doctrines of revelation which are not natu- 
rally knowable by reason, is now evident to the 
mind enlightened by revelation. For exam- 
ple, the precept "love your enemies," and 
the other sublime instructions of the sermon 
on the mount, were not naturally knowable by 
reason : but we apprehend, their internal rea- 
sonableness or intrinsic truth, is clearly discov- 
ered by the Christian. Else, the doctrine of 
spiritual discernment taught in the scriptures 
is a cunningly devised fable. We admit, there 
are some mysteries in revelation, as for in- 
stance, the trinity, whose internal reasonable- 
ness is inevident to the mind of man : but none 
of them contradict what is known. They are 
merely above our knowledge ; and therefore 
do not support the sophism which we repu- 
diate. There fore.,, though the evidences of 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 383 

natural theology may not be naturally discern- 
ible, yet they may be seen by the light of re- 
velation shed abroad on the mind, increasing 
its spiritual discernment. 

We see then how little the light of nature 
or philosophy has to do with theology or the 
teachings of revelation. Philosophy is noth- 
ing but the result of the observation and ana- 
lysis of phenomena, either in the physical or 
psychological world: and our knowledge of 
the infinite and the absolute, or in other words 
our general conceptions, are nothing but in- 
ductive inferences, and not the result, of di- 
rect cognition, as is our knowledge of partic- 
ulars, Every conclusion therefore, which 
transcends the sphere of phenomena, is mere 
conjecture. What light then, does philoso- 
phy throw upon the doctrine of the trinity, 
the incarnation, or of the origin of sin, or the 
atonement, or even upon the immortality of 
the soul ? Where are the phenomena or an- 
alogies in nature, from which these great doc- 
trines are to be inductively inferred ? They 
are without any but the very vaguest analo- 
gies in nature, and certainly without any pro- 



384 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

totype in existence. The little light which 
philosophy amongst the ancients seemed to 
throw even upon the immortality of the soul, 
was perhaps but the faded light of ancient 
revelation which had passed down comming- 
led with the light of nature in human teach- 
ings. This truth has often forced itself upon 
us when reading the Phaedon of Plato. The 
rambling speculations, the flimsy hypothetical 
reasonings that prove nothing, the vulgar al- 
lusions, which neither explain nor enforce 
anything, but need to be explained them- 
selves, all overwhelm us with the conviction, 
that the writer is striving after something be- 
yond the compass of the human faculties un- 
aided by revelation. And even the analogies 
of nature which are often employed in illus- 
trating the doctrines of revelation, and de- 
fending them from the cavils of infidelity, are 
but a secondary knowledge. They have 
been seen by the light of revelation, and not 
by the light of nature. They do not lead to 
the truths of revelation, but the light of reve- 
lation leads to them, and enables us to see 
them as the foot-prints of the God of revela- 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 385 

tion upon the domain of nature. It is by a 
spiritual discernment, which the truths of re- 
velation beget in the mind, that we perceive 
them ; just as we have already shown, is the 
case with the evidences of natural theology. 
We have said that all natural phenomena 
whether physical or psychological, are to be 
explained by philosophy, and not by the 
words of scripture. But it is important to 
observe, that there is a difference between 
physical and psychological truths in the cer- 
tainty with which they can be made to bear 
upon the interpretation of scripture. There 
is generally more certainty in our knowledge 
of physical than of psychological truths. For 
instance, we know with absolute certainty, 
that the earth moves round the sun, and that 
the bread and wine in the eucharist are bread 
and wine ; and of course, scripture must be 
interpreted accordingly ; for God never con- 
tradicts in revelation, what he has said in na- 
ture ; and it must be borne in mind that in 
physics all reasoning must end in submission 
to the senses. For the illusions of sense can 

only be corrected bv evidence of the same 
33 



386 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

sort, where one sense is brought to testify 
against another or the same sense against 
itself. And Revelation throws no light over 
physical truth, except as to the origin of the 
world, and the order of its creation, and per- 
haps also as to the time in which it was created, 
and also, that things were created mature, the 
vegetables bearing seed after their kinds, and 
the animals, including man, bearing young 
after their kinds : if these truths can proper- 
ly be said to lie within the range of physics. 
And therefore physical truth must be seen 
exclusively by its own light, or the light of 
philosophy. But this is not the case with psy- 
chology. For over the moral branch of this 
subject, though lying within the province of 
philosophy, revelation throws much light. 
For even though it should be maintained that 
we are not enabled by the light of revelation 
to discover any psychological truth, which is 
not to some extent made known to us by the 
light of nature, yet it must be admitted, that 
we are enabled by it, to see the great truths 
of the moral branch of psychology in much 
greater distinctness. For example; the great 



THE BACO.MAN PHILOSOPHY 387 

iundarnental truth of our moral nature, that 
which constitutes the basis of the moral branch 
of psychology, that the heart of man is de- 
ceitful above all things and desperately wick- 
ed> and that man is bom in sin, is much more 
manifest to our reason by the light of revela- 
tion, than it is by the light of nature. Our 
spiritual discernment is quickened and invig- 
orated by the doctrines of revelation, through 
the agency of the Spirit of God ; and we are 
thus enabled to discern much more clearly, 
the great truths which lie within the moral 
branch of psychology. The remark of the 
Apostle : " But the natural man receiveth not 
the things of the Spirit of God ; for they are 
foolishness unto him : neither can he know 
them, because they are spiritually discerned,'*' 
has much pertinence to the topics of which 
we are treating, but was spoken more partic- 
ularly of the great truths of the plan of sal- 
vation through Jesus Christ, over which the 
light of nature throws no light whatever. 
Notwithstanding though, that the light of 
revelation illumines the truths of the moral 
branch of psychology, still after we have 



388 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

searched the scriptures about any doctrine 
relative to man, it is legitimate, with the light 
thus obtained to look into the nature of man 
or psychology, and to the intellectual branch as 
well as to the moral, for though revelation 
throws no light over the purely intellectual 
branch,yet it assumes the truths of that branch, 
to see whether we can derive from thence any 
evidence confirmatory of our interpretation, in 
the adaptation of 'the doctrine to the nature 
so discerned, or in the conformity of the doc- 
trine to ascertained psychological laws. In- 
deed the adaptation of the doctrines of rev- 
elation to the nature of man in regenerating 
it, and satisfying its most earnest cravings, 
and its most perplexing doubts, is one of the 
strongest evidences of its divine character ; 
because it evinces a knowledge of man, on 
the part of the teacher of such doctrines, far 
more accurate than any man can by possibil- 
ity possess ; for one of the most important of 
these doctrines, is that man cannot possibly 
know, such doctrines. In order to discover 
this adaptation, we must understand, both 
revelation and man ; but in the enquiry, it 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY, 389 

ought constantly to be borne in mind, that 
revelation is the light, and man the subject to 
be illumined, and not the reason of man the 
light, and revelation the subject to be illumin- 
ed. a For God doth graft his revelations 
and holy doctrine upon the notions of our 
reason, and applieth his inspirations to open 
our understanding as the form of the key 10 
the ward of the lock." It is true however, 
that the truths of scripture do nevertheless 
appear more manifest after we have seen the 
excellence of their application to our natures, 
than before ; and thus more completely vsatis- 
fy our skepticism. 

With these views then, we should never 
make revelation subordinate to philosophy. 
For of any of the proper truths of revelation, 
philosophy knows but little, and of many of 
them nothing at all. And this truth cannot 
be too much urged upon our attention. The 
neglect of it, has been the great source of her- 
esy in every age of Christianity. And that 
it has lost none of its importance is made 
manifest by many publications of the present 

day, and by none more clearly than the recent 
33* 



390 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

work of Professor Bush on the resurrection. 
The Professor has signally violated this fun- 
damental principle of scriptural interpreta- 
tion. He has made his argument from rea- 
son^ or the light of nature, the first step in 
the investigation of the teachings of revela- 
tion on the subject of the resurrection ; in- 
stead of first examining revelation and ascer- 
taining its doctrines from its own teachings 
on a subject lying so emphatically within its 
province., and then examining nature, to see 
whether it said anything upon the subject. 
And as might be expected by any one ac- 
quainted with the fallacy of such a method 
of interpretation, we see in the whole inves- 
tigation, a constant effort to bring the truths 
of revelation within the laws of nature, which 
if successful, would at once destroy the super- 
natural character of revelation and cast the 
inquirer down upon the broad platform of 
infidelity. In his very preface he says, "the 
resurrection is effected by the operation of nat- 
ural Jaws.' 5 And he more than intimates, that 
the spiritual body is developed immediately 
after death by galvanic agencies ; and declares 



THE BACOXIAN PHILOSOPHY. 391 

that " the intimate connection between elec- 
trical phenomena and light goes undoubtedly 
to favor the idea that the spiritual body will 
be essentially luminous." And thus the 
great leviathan doctrine of the resurrection 
which had been swimming about in the bound- 
less ocean of metaphysical conjucture, for a 
period long before the Sadducees disputed 
about it, and had escaped the angling of the 
most skilful philosophers, has been caught by 
Professor Bush upon the cunning hook of 
reason, with almost as much ease as a boy 
catches a trout. But scriptural commentators 
should know that the line of philosophy can- 
not fathom the mysteries of revelation ; nor 
its light illumine their darkness. Philosophy 
stands by the dying man, feels his pulse ebb 
and flow, sees the pallid hues gather over the 
brow, sees the fire of the eye bedimmed, and 
hears the last gasp of life; and all then is 
lost in shadows, clouds and darkness. True ! 
philosophy may then cast a longing hope and 
a probable conjecture into a future state, 
which imagination can create. But is this 
the sure inference of sound philosophy ? Is 



392 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

this such a light as can gild the dark clouds 
which hang over the future, with a bow of 
promise sufficiently bright to animate the hopes 
of the dying man ? Let the dying infidel an- 
swer the question ! For philosophy then, to 
tell us in what body the soul is to rise, when it 
does not tell us that it will rise at all, is to 
our minds, something like a double petitio 
principii. 

This a priori method of interpreting scrip- 
ture — of forcing one's philosophy upon its 
teachings; — has been the great source of the- 
ological error in all ages of Christianity. At 
the present day, we need but look to New- 
England theology, where the attempt to 
bring down the mysteries of revelation, to 
the principles of reason, at first reduced 
Christianity to Unitarianism, and has now 
so completely frozen all life out of it, that as 
a retreat from open infidelity this theology 
has ascended the high walks of the transcen- 
dental philosophy, to see whether it cannot 
descry in its reveries something to bridge 
over the yawning chasm which separates the 
mysteries of revelation from the teachings of 



THE BACOXIA^ PHILOSOPHY" 393 

philosophy. And in all countries, where the 
a priori philosophy prevails, at the present 
day, especially in Germany, it is corrupting 
revelation by subordinating its teachings more 
or less to its a priori conceptions, upon the 
ground that Christianity is a system of accom- 
modation undergoing a gradual development, 
through the agency of philosophy, which from 
its higher position in the scale of knowledge, 
can hear more articulately the voice of God 
than it is expressed in the exoteric teachings 
of Christianity. This state of theology in 
Germany has been produced by the philo- 
sophical movement which begun in the a pri- 
ori philosophy of Kant. Kant in his " Reli- 
gion within the Limits of mere Reason," and 
his disciple Fichte in his " Critique of all 
Revelation," applied the principles of the pe- 
culiar form of a priori philosophy which Kant 
originated, to revelation, and subordinating it 
to these principles, concluded that revelation 
cannot possibly give us any information which 
our natural reason and conscience might not 
have obtained without it. And thus our rea- 
son is made the test and measure of the doc- 



394 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

trines of revelation. And it was the same lo- 
gical torch which Kant had lighted at the 
altar of the a priori philosophy, that Schel- 
ling and Hegel held in their hands as the 
light to their path, when they descended into 
those dark abysses of blasphemous nonsense, 
from whence they brought up, as truths far 
more profound than the teachings of revela- 
tion, their monstrous pantheistic doctrines 
which corrupting German theology, led it to 
the very brink of the hell of errors. And 
Cousin the Germanized French philosopher, 
was guided by the impious light from the 
same torch, when basing himself upon the 
doctrine that the reason of man is imperson- 
al, and therefore capable of seeing absolute 
truth, he maintained as he openly does in his 
Introduction to the History of Philosophy, 
that revelation is to be developed and per- 
fected by philosophy imparting to it some of 
its own superior light. That, u philosophy is 
patient; she knows what was the course of 
events in former generations, and she is full 
of confidence in the future ; happy in see- 
ing the great bulk of mankind in the arms of 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 395 

Christianity, she offers, with modest kindness, 
to assist her in ascending to a yet loftier eleva- 
tion." We do not so much wonder that pro- 
fessed philosophers should thus place philo- 
sophy above revelation — and that even those 
who profess to believe in Christianity as a 
divine revelation, should adopt as their canon 
of interpretation, that we must admit nothing 
which revelation contains, as truth, unless 
we can find it in our own consciousness as an 
innate idea, or a priori conception of the 
pure reason. But Cousin who professes to 
believe in Christianity ^ is often driven by his 
reasonings from this principle, into positions 
so obviously infidel and pantheistic, that in 
order to prevent himself from being consider- 
ed an infidel, he frequently amidst the diffi- 
culties of reconciling his religion with his 
philosophy, cries out in his very loudest ac- 
cents, that he is a Christian philosopher. 
We can smile at the philosopher who thus 
rolls his stone to the top of the hill, and is 
then carried down by its weight back again 
to the bottom. But very different are our 
feelings, towards those rational theologians 



396 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

who with lusty, though unavailing efforts are 
striving to clamber up the lofty, but cloud- 
capped summits of the transcendental philos- 
phy, to see whether they cannot descry from 
the lofty peaks, by the light of reason, the ob- 
jects of that distant region, where only the 
light of revelation penetrates, while the high- 
er they ascend the thicker is the darkness ; 
and who at last become so habituated to seeing 
nothing on account of the darkness, that they 
mistake the figments of their own imagina- 
tions for the objects of that distant region. 
And we know that some, who are so firmly 
convinced by its external evidences, that 
Christianity is a divine revelation, as to be 
unable to throw off the belief, after becom- 
ing captivated by the optimistical philosophy 
of Cousin, and following it with enthusiasm, 
in its vain endeavour to subordinate Christi- 
anity to philosophy, have at last become so 
well aware of its infidel tendencies, that in a 
moment of despondency, they have precipi- 
tated themselves down into the broad abyss 
of Roman Catholic credulity, exclaiming as 
as they fall, "that nothing can be made in- 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 397 

trinsically evident to reason, whose intrinsic 
truth transcends reason, or, what is the same 
thing, is not naturally knowable by reason" ! 
and maddened by this sophism, strive to be- 
lieve, that bread and wine are flesh and blood, 
as taught by the infallible Church, which 
sees not with its eyes, but with an inward 
grace. 

During the middle ages, the philosophy of 
Aristotle exerted a most pernicious influence 
over Christianity. Substituting its empty 
forms, for the substance of christian doctrine, 
it moulded the simple truths of the gospel 
mixed with platonism culled from the fathers, 
into a system of theological conundrums far 
more fit, to sharpen the wits of polemics, than 
to soften the hearts of sinners. Weaving its 
subtle web through the entire scheme of scho- 
lastic theology, and drawing its meshes tight- 
est around the most vital truths, it crippled 
Christianity in its holy power over the human 
heart. And man left to wander in the zig- 
zag mazes of a logical creed, was soon bewil- 
dered in his reason ; and thus prepared, to 

believe every folly and to worship every su- 
34 



398 THE BACOJNIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

perstition, which Aristotle sitting in the place 
of Paul ; proclaimed in the name of Christ. 

In the earliest ages of Christianity also, 
the various sects of philosophers of that day, 
the Judaizing sects who maintained a sensu- 
ous philosophy of the lowest grade, as well 
as those sects who maintained a speculative 
idealistic system, resting upon an a priori 
foundation, perverted Christiany, by making 
its doctrines conform to their respective pre- 
conceived philosophical notions. These in- 
terpreters set out with these notions, and 
searching through the scriptures for some- 
thing to support them, seized upon individu- 
al passages, and dissevering them from their 
historical and logical context, made them 
mean what suited their preconceived notions, 
because the words taken by themselves were 
capable of such signification. They could 
not bring themselves to limit their specula- 
tions by the definite facts of revelation. 
The Platonists, for instance, instead of con- 
ceiving God, as the scriptures represent him, 
as a personal God who created all things from 
nothing, and who upholds and controls all 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 399 

things, and has a care for every individual as 
well as the whole, brought into Christianity 
the God of their speculative conceptions, 
their 'o, from whence all existence eternally 
flows by a necessity, under the guidance of 
the reason. That Judaizing sect, the Ebion- 
ites, also brought their carnal Jewish notions 
into the interpretation of scripture; and made 
the whole Christian scheme conform to them. 
They considered the Messiah, according to 
the Jewish representation of him, as a man 
who had been chosen Messiah by a decree of 
God's council, and furnished with the requi- 
site divine powers, for the accomplishment of 
his office. And though this sect maintained 
a sensuous philosophy of the lowest grade 3 
and not a speculative one, yet they made an 
a priori application of it to the interpretation 
of scripture ; and thus perverted scripture in 
the same way that the idealistic philosophers 
did. 

But the most extravagant example of 
perverting scripture by forcing upon it the 
speculative opinions of a spurious a priori 
philosophy, is that of the Gnostics. These 



400 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

speculators gave themselves up, in the inter- 
pretation of scripture, to the most unbridled 
license, despising the letter, idealizing every 
thing, and striving to look by the light of rea- 
son beyond scripture and the natural world, 
and dive into the mysteries of those things 
which lie beyond the ken of man, and prop- 
erly belong to the things which rest upon that 
faith which reposes upon the authority of 
God. This gnosticism, not even content with 
the wide range of Platonic speculation, gave 
itself up to still wilder fancies. They intro- 
duced the notions of the oriental theosophy 
into the interpretation of Christianity, and 
made a theosophical Christianity. They found 
in Christianity what they thought resem- 
blances to their theosophical doctrines, and 
seizing upon these resemblances, they forced 
them according to their spurious method of 
interpretation, into full harmony with their 
preconceived notions. And thus while they 
thought they were interpreting scripture, for 
they were firm believers in Christianity, they 
were in reality developing their own theoso- 
phical notions. Christianity did not soar e- 



THE BACONIAN 1 PHILOSOPHY. 401 

nough into supernatural regions for them. It 
dwelt too much among men — was two prac- 
tical. They wished to prove all things — to 
comprehend the incomprehensible. " The 
inquiries which chiefly occupied them/' says 
Neander, "were these : How is the transi- 
tion from infinite to finite ? How can man 
imagine to himself the beginning of creation? 
How can he think of God as the original pro- 
jector of a material world, so foreign to his 
own nature ? Whence come those wide dif- 
ferences of nature among men, from the man 
of truly goodly disposition, down to those 
w r ho appear to be given up entirely to blind 
desire, in whom no trace of the rational and 
the moral creature can be found ?" 

ec Now it was exactly here, ** continues 
Neander, Ci that Christianity made religious 
faith independent of speculation, and cut off 
at once all that would lead to those specula- 
tive cosmogonies by which the element of 
pure religious faith was only troubled, and 
the confusion between the ideas of God and 
nature furthered, inasmuch as it (Christiani- 
ty) directed the eye of the spirit beyond the 
34* 



402 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

whole extent of the visible world, where in 
the chain of cause and effect, one thing is 
constantly unfolding itself out of another, to 
an almighty work of creation performed by 
God, by which worlds were produced, and 
in virtue of which the visible did not spring 
out of that which appears, Heb. xi. 3. Crea- 
tion is received here as an incomprehensible 
fact under the constraint of a faith that raises 
itself above the position occupied by the un- 
derstanding, which wishes constantly to de- 
duce one thing from another, and to explain 
every thing, while it denies everything that 
is immediate. Gnosis would not acknowl- 
edge any such limits to speculation : she 
wished to explain and represent to the mind 
how God is the fountain and the source of 
all existence." And the Gnostics, in their 
attempts to explain these problems, built up 
the most fanciful system imaginable ; because 
their speculations were not limited by facts 
either in nature or revelation : but in the li- 
centious spirit of an a priori philosophy, they 
roamed at large over the boundless regions 



THE BACONIAN PIIILOSOPHF 403 

of fancy, and filled Christianity with the doc- 
trinal phantasmagora of their theosophy, 

But Platonism holds the most prominent 
place of any philosophy in the history of 
Christian theology. For it has been from 
the first ages of Christianity, and is even 
now, proclaimed as the philosophy peculiarly 
akin to Christianity. And some have de- 
clared, and do still declare, that Platonism 
was a forerunner of Christianity; and some 
going still further, maintain that, there was 
in Christ no other revelation, than such as 
occurred in Plato. Now all*this we conceive 
to be most pernicious error — from the first pro- 
position, that Platonism is akin to Christiani- 
ty, to the legitimate deduction from it, that 
there was in Christ no other revelation, than 
such as occurred in Plato. The Platonic 
philosophy with its a priori method and its 
transcendental conceptions, never did, and 
never can exercise wholesome influence upon 
Christian doctrine. It dwells too much on em- 
pyrean heights ever to affiliate with Christiani- 
ty in its humble walk in the strait and narrow 
way of life. It claims to have a mystic ladder 



404 



PHILOSOPHY 



by which it can ascend to the region of absolute 
truth; and have a clear intellectual perception 
of the real essence of things — -to have in fact; as 
great an abundance of revelations^ as the a- 
postle Paul had; when he was caught up to 
the third heaven. It professes to have a 
knowledge which transcends the bounds of 
those truths which are received from extern- 
al impressions and internal suggestions — 
in fact, to know after God's manner of 
knowing. It thus; like every other a priori 
philosophy ; poisons knowledge at its very 
source; by teaching that general truths are 
objects of direct cognition; and that partic- 
ulars are known by reasoning from these 
general truths.* With these high assump- 
tions; Platonism has made ; and cannot but 
make Christianity a system of doctrine to be 
tested and explained by its own principles, 
and to be moulded in accordance with its own 



♦Note. If should be continually borne in mind, that this is a purely logical 
treatise ; and that it merely points out the inconsistency of Platonism with 
Christianity on logical grounds. It might be easily shown, that the fundamental 
moral doctrines of Plato, are also inconsistent with Christianity. The exem- 
plar of moral character required by Platonism is just the reverse of that re- 
quired by Christianity. The little child, is the heavenly pattern pointed out 
by Christianity, while the Philosopher, is that pointed out by Platonism. The 
spirit of Christianity is humility, that of Platonism is pride. 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 405 

knowlege oi absolute truth. When carried 
to its ultimate deductions, it cannot but main- 
tain that there was in Christ no other reve- 
lation than such as occurred in Plato : be- 
cause Plato knew absolute truth by direct 
cognition — " by employing the naked thought 
(says Plato) alone, without any mixture, and 
so endeavoring to trace the pure and general 
essence of things without the ministry of the 
eyes or ears ; the soul being, if I may so 
speak, entirely disengaged from the whole 
mass of the body, which only encumbers the 
soul and cramps it in the quest of wisdom 
and truth, as often as it is admitted to any 
the least correspondence with it." Accord- 
ing to this doctrine, the reason of Plato was 
equal to the divinity of Christ. What then 
is to be done with the declaration of the 
Apostle : — u For other foundations can no 
man lay than is laid, which is Jesus Christ ?" 
It is true, that at an early period of Chris- 
tianity, Christian doctrine took a wider range 
and more discursive flights in the theology of 
the Platonic schools of Alexandria, than in 
that of the cotemporary schools, where differ- 



406 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

ent modes of thought prevailed; and in look- 
ing back over that period of history, we are 
apt to be captivated by the false show of Al- 
exandrian theology. But we apprehend, that 
it is at least doubtful, whether the impulse 
which proceeded from the Alexandrian schools 
had a tendency to advance sound scriptural 
interpretation, and pure Christian doctrine. 
For no fact in church history is more certain, 
than that the fathers of the first centuries per- 
verted Christian doctrine by calling into their 
aid the platonic philosophy in the interpreta- 
tion of scripture. And that many of them 
believed and endeavoured to make others be- 
lieve, that most if not all the mysteries of 
their religion had been set forth in the writ- 
ings of Plato. Chrysostom declaimed against 
these efforts; and the unsophisticated Tertul- 
lian declared that the seeds of heresies were 
scattered in Plato's doctrine of ideas. And 
it was Platonism culled from the writings of 
the fathers, that furnished the schoolmen with 
the extravagance of the matter of their the- 
ology, as the logic of Aristotle did the subtle- 
ty of its form. So that at every period of 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 407 

the progress of Christianity, Platonism has 
been one of the chief sources of its corrup- 
tion. 

And it is manifest that the great Apostle 
to the Gentiles, who was so eminently quali- 
fied for his high mission, by his gentile as well 
as Hebrew learning, did not think that the 
Platonic philosophy was in any way kindred 
to Christianity. For in his first epistle to the 
Corinthians, he denounces the Greek philos- 
ophy as foolishness, and takes great pains to 
place Christianity in open hostility to it. 
And throughout this whole epistle, he never 
once attempts to elucidate" any doctrine of 
Christianity by the teachings of the Greek 
philosophy, though the epistle was addressed 
to Greeks. And yet, it is one of the most 
striking features of the mode of instruction 
used by Christ and his Apostles, to graft their 
doctrines upon those notions of their hearers 
which have any affinity whatever with the 
doctrines which they taught, This we see 
strikingly exemplified by the Apostle Paul 
when he was writing to his own countrymen 
the Jews, in the epistle to the Hebrews. In 



408 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

the very opening of the epistle he shows that 
Christianity is the continuation of the sys- 
tem of instruction, which God had employed 
towards their fathers, by the prophets. And 
in the eleventh chapter, he shows at great 
length, and with deep earnestness, that faith 
was the vital principle of religion under the 
old dispensation as well as under the new : 
thus showing that the great central doctrine 
of Christianity, u the just shall live by faith ," 
was also the central doctrine of the religion 
of their fathers. But never once in all his 
epistles to the Gentiles, though we find him 
saying that certain of their poets had said 
what he was then teaching, do we find him 
saying that Greek philosophy, whether Pla- 
tonism or any other form of it, taught simi- 
lar doctrines with those of Christianity. But 
on the contrary, his whole drift is to show 
that this philosophy was antagonist to Chris- 
tianity. And indeed; we do not recollect any 
instance in all his writings, where the Apostle 
ever attempts to liken the great doctrines of 
revelation to any thing in the natural world — 
to any doctrine of philosophy — except when 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 409 

he speaks, in the fifteenth chapter of first Cor- 
inthians, of the resurrection of the dead. 
But even there, he does not attempt to prove 
the doctrine of the resurrection, by analogies 
from nature which he adduces ; but merely to 
illustrate what he taught. For the analogies, 
are not philosophical analogies from which 
an inductive inference can be drawn as to 
the truth of the great doctrine discussed, but 
merely rhetorical analogies illustrative of his 
meaning. And it is contrary to the funda- 
mental idea proclaimed in Christianity as a 
supernatural revelation, to prove its doctrines 
by the light of nature — to search in the anal- 
ogies of nature for a key to its mysteries. 
For as the doctrines taught do not lie within 
the range of experience — within the province 
of nature — the mode of proof was by mira- 
cle; thereby bringing supernatural things, 
though not within the province of nature, 
yet within that of experience ; by making, 
for instance, the supernatural fact of the res- 
urrection a fact in experience, by the res- 
urrection of Christ. And when Paul stood 

upon Mars Hill, which overlooks the proud 
35 



410 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

city of Athens, prouder perhaps of her philos- 
ophy, than any thing else, he did not eulo- 
gize that philosophy, and say that it was kin- 
dred to the great doctrines which he taught, 
and thereby gain a favourable hearing ; but 
proclaimed that he had come to declare unto 
them the God whom they ignorantly worship- 
ped. How differently does the Apostle act 
from the fathers. of the first centuries of the 
Christian church, who were continually en- 
deavouring to show that Platonism contained 
almost all Christian doctrine. 

With these facts forcing themselves upon 
any but the most superficial student of the 
scriptures, how can it be pretended, that 
Platonism has any affinity with Christianity ? 
For the Apostle does not except Platonism 
from his censures of the Greek philosophy • 
as he undoubtedly would have done, if he 
had not intended to include it in his denun- 
ciations. And it can not be maintained that 
the Apostle was not acquainted with the Pla- 
tonic philosophy ; when he was familiar with 
general Greek literature. 

We have now, we submit, shown that Pla- 



THE BACONIAN rHILOSOPHY. 411 

tonism, with every form of the a priori phi- 
losophy, is utterly at war in its very funda- 
mental conceptions, in its whole view of the 
capacity of the human mind, with the genius of 
Christianity as a revelation from God lying 
beyond the province of reason, and to be 
found only in his word contained in the Holy 
Scriptures. For every system of a priori 
philosophy when carried out to its legitimate 
deductions, must like Platonism, virtually sur- 
persede revelation, in its assumption that man 
by virtue of his natural union with the Di- 
vinity, is able to apprehend intuitively all the 
spiritual truths which concern him ; and thus 
confound all distinction between the natural 
and supernatural orders of things — between 
philosophy and revelation. 

We now propose to show, that there is a 
philosophy which is consistent both in its 
method of investigation, and its principles 
with Christianity — a philosophy, which, hum- 
bling itself before Christianity, acknowledges 
it to be a revelation of a knowledge that lies 
beyond and above its province. This is the 
Inductive or Baconian philosophy. 



412 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

That there is a philosophy, or rather psy- 
chology, which accords with Christianity — 
is assumed in it — is very obvious. We say 
psychology, because we have heretofore shown 
that revelation throws no light upon physics — 
teaches nothing in regard to them' — but is 
confined to the spiritual part of nature — the 
nature and destiny of man, which lies prop- 
erly within the province of psychology. 
There is, therefore, a psychology which is 
in accordance with Christianty, and which is 
assumed in it, because there must be a corres- 
pondence I vlween man and revelation. Man 
must be such as revelation represents him to 
be — else revelation is false. And revelation 
must be adapted to man — must assume a cor- 
rect view of his nature. The laws of his 
mind, must be such as revelation assumes. 
If his mind were like that of the beasts of 
the field, for example, revelation would be 
altogether unfitted to it. Because such is 
the constitution of the mind (if we may use 
the word in such an application,) of a beast, 
that moral truth cannot operate upon it. 
There are no notions in his mind, no percep- 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 413 

tions in his instincts ; upon which the doc- 
trines of revelation can be grafted, and the 
inspirations of God applied as the ward of 
the key to the form of the lock, to open his 
understanding so as to comprehend them. 
The process of enlightenment and regenera- 
tion set forth in the scriptures would be unfit- 
ted to such a nature ; because they could not 
operate upon it — its very laws forbid it. For 
how could moral truth, which is the great and 
only instrument by which the spirit of God 
operates upon the mind of man in bringing 
it from a state of sin to one of holiness, oper- 
ate upon the mind of a beast which has no 
moral perceptions ? There would have 
to be a new creation — the beast would have 
to be changed, or rather created into a 
man — would have to be endowed with all the 
capabilities of an intellectual, moral being — 
before the doctrines of revelation could oper- 
ate upon it. But such is the nature of man 
that the doctrines of revelation can operate 
upon his mind ; because it was founded upon 
a correct view of the laws of his mental con- 
stitution — it assumes a correct theory of his 
35* 



414 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

mind. The theory of mind is a legitimate 
object of philosophical inquiry — is a branch 
of philosophy which we call psychology. 
There must be then, according to this analy- 
sis, a theory of mind, a psychology, assumed 
in Christianity ; and this theory of mind 
whether it be possible to ascertain it or not, 
is just as true as Christianity itself, which as- 
sumes its truth as its own foundation as a 
scheme of salvation for man. 

It is therefore legitimate, in the interpreta- 
tion of scripture, as we have before shown 
when we had this topic in hand in another 
part of this chapter, after we have carefully 
examined the doctrines of revelation, to 
search in psychology to see whether we can 
find any thing there confirmatory of our con- 
clusions, or anything which clearly forbibs 
them. But it cannot be too constantly and too 
carefully borne in mind, that we must not 
iorce our psychology upon scripture. For 
there is much danger of doing it, even when 
we make the psychological inquiry the last 
in the process of interpretation ; but not the 
hundreth part as much, as when we carry our 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 415 

preconceived psychological notions into the 
inquiry according to the a priori method ; 
thus making the psychological inquiry the 
first in the process of interpretation. For 
let it not be supposed, that we imagine that 
any one would in the interpretation of scrip- 
ture, first look into psychology and then into 
scripture ; for all that we mean, by making 
the psychological inquiry the first in the order 
of the investigation, is, that they will carry 
their preconceived psychological notions into 
the interpretation ; which is the same in effect^ 
as first examining into psychology for the 
doctrine to be found in scripture. For so 
clearly is it contrary to all sound canons of in- 
terpretation, to force our preconceived notions 
upon scripture, that we cannot even take the 
abstract meaning of a word and force it upon 
that word in a passage contrary to the import 
of the context • as is strikingly exemplified 
in 1st. Cor. iv, 3, where v«s* (day) is used 
in the metonymical sense of judgement, con- 
trary to its universal signification. 

What then, is the psychology ; or theory of 
mind assumed in Christianity ? We have in 



416 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY 

the second chapter of the second part of this 
discourse, shown, that it is the theory, that all 
our knowledge is founded upon experience; 
and is acquired through the light of nature, or 
the light of revelation. This is the psychology 
with all its doctrines which is assumed in 
Christianity. We have in that chapter shown, 
that the theory of mind, that all our knowl- 
edge is founded on experience, is true ac- 
cording to the light of nature or psychologi- 
cal phenomena, and we have also there 
shown, that it is assumed in Christianity as a 
scheme of instruction. When, therefore, 
there are more than one view of the genius 
and cardinal doctrines of Christianity, deriv- 
ed from different interpretations of scripture, 
it will be legitimate according to the princi- 
ple developed in this part of our discourse, 
to enquire which view accords best with the 
established principles of psychology. And 
we think, that it will appear in the sequel, 
that the evangelical theology will accord best 
with these principles. 

According to the theory of mind which we 
maintain as the true one, revelation teaches a 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 417 

^knowledge which nature does not: and all 
our knowledge is derived from one or the 
other of these two sources. If this be so, 
then of course we must look to the scriptures 
which are the records of that revelation for 
the doctrines which it teaches; just as we 
look to nature for philosophy. And it is man- 
ifest that such perversion of scripture could 
never result from this method of interpreta- 
tion, as from the a priori method which we 
have shown to have been so great a source of 
error. Because this method of interpreta- 
tion is limited in all its speculations by the de- 
finite facts of revelation, and does not pretend 
to see beyond. And this inductive method 
of interpretation corresponds with the nature 
of Christianity. For Christianity is given to 
us not in the form of a system demonstrated 
in all its parts; but it is presented in facts and 
doctrines which are to be. generalized, and 
the unity of its doctrines to be ascertained 
and developed by an examination of all their 
various representations and applications set 
forth in the scriptures. This constitutes the 
glory of Christianity. This makes it that 



418 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 



practical^ popular system adapted to the wants 
of every grade of intelligence, just as the 
light of nature, or rather its phenomena, are 
adapted to every grade of intelligence, from 
the peasant to the philosopher, from the child 
to the man. If Christianity had been pro- 
mulgated as a dogmatic system developed in 
all its logical concatenations, the ignorant 
could never have profited by its teachings, ex- 
cept through the instructions of the learned. 
And it would have been an esoteric ; priestly 
system, known only to a priesthood whose 
divine right it would have been to monopolize 
the oracles of God ; and thus to hold the keys 
of heaven. But it is presented in such a 
form that every 'man can appropriate it to 
himself in his own way- — can understand its 
doctrines set forth in a practical mode, in so 
many various applications to the conduct of 
individuals of every grade and character, and 
condition. Its very form teaches the great 
Protestant doctrine of private judgment. 

For the first time then in the history of 
man, the esoteric and the exoteric are united 
are harmonized. The philosopher and the 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 419 

multitude have the same religious doctrines. 
Faith and knowledge have become reconcil- 
ed — knowledge has confessed its ignorance, 
and admitted it must build upon faith as its 
only sure foundation in theology as well as in 
philosophy. The Greek has renounced his 
wisdom, and espoused the foolishness of the 
Jew. And thus is realized, what appeared 
to the ancients an impossibility, a religion 
that unites all men with one another : " A 
man must be very weak," says Celsus, (< to 
imagine that Greeks and Barbarians in Asia, 
Europe and Lybia, can ever unite under one 
religion." 

How distinctly at every step in the forego- 
ing analysis do we see that the psychological 
doctrines which are developed in the induc- 
tive philosophy, are those which harmonize 
with the nature of Christianity, as a mode of 
instruction to mankind. It is seen that Chris- 
tianity makes faith occupy a position higher 
than reasoning. That reasoning must set 
out from faith, just as in nature we must 
set out from simple belief. And the facts 
which are the legitimate objects of faith, 



420 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

must be ascertained, by induction employ- 
ed in the secondary way we have before 
mentioned, in the examination of scripture 
under the guide of the rules of gramma- 
tical and logical interpretation. Neander, in 
speaking of Apelles, an oriental theoso- 
phist, who embraced Christianity, says : 
" Appelles, finding no satisfactory conclusion 
in his speculations upon the incomprehensi- 
ble, took refuge in the faith which obeys an 
inward necessity without being able to solve 
every difficulty to itself, (difficulties which in 
his case met him even in that which he could 
not choose but to recognise,) he could do no 
other, he said ; he felt himself obliged to be- 
lieve in one eternal God, as the original cause 
of all existence, but he could not scientifical- 
ly prove how all existence was necessarily to 
be traced back to the one original principle. 
The church-teacher, Rhodon, to whom he 
made these communications in confidence, 
laughed at him as one who pretended to be a 
teacher, but only believed what he taught ; 
and acknowledged that he could not prove it ; 
but one is inclined to ask, whether the laugh- 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 421 

er in this case was wiser than the man whom 
he laughed at, and whether Rhodon himself,in 
the strict sense of the word, could prove that 
which Apelles avowed that he only believed?" 
What Neander says of Apelles, " he took 
refuge in the faith which obeys an inward 
necessity, without being able to solve every 
difficulty," is the true psychological doctrine 
developed by Reid, as is shown in the second 
chapter of the second part of this discourse. 
Here then is shown the doctrinal identity, 
of the true psychological doctrine that we 
believe by an inward necessity independent of 
ratiocination, and the psychology which is 
assumed in Christianity. And thus is shown 
that the faith of Christianity is adapted to 
the nature of man — is in conformity to the 
laws of his mind. 

But as faith is the great central doctrine of 
Christianity, we will develop its psychologi- 
cal foundation still further. It is a psycho- 
logical fact, that the knowledge of every phil- 
osophical truth increases the ability of the 
mind to apprehend still more recondite truths. 

The more philosophy we learn, the greater 
36 



422 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

is our ability to learn other truths; and the 
knowledge of truth invigorates the mind — . 
quickens and enlightens the mental eye, gives 
it a wider view and a deeper penetration. 
And it is another psychological fact, as we 
have shown in the first part of this discourse, 
that there is an intimate connection between 
the feelings and the intellect — that it is a law 
of our mental constitution, that every emo- 
tion is allied to some object of perception, 
or memory or imagination, and is dependent 
upon it as its antecedent or cause ; and the 
emotion can never be excited in the mind 
except by its appropriate object being in the 
view of the mind ; and can never cease to 
exist in the mind until the object is forgotten 
or removed from its view. We see then, 
how it is that philosophical truth operates 
upon the moral and sesthetical parts of our 
nature, quickening and improving both the 
sensibility to the moral and beautiful. We 
will now show that we have here developed 
the psychological foundation of religious faith; 
and that the doctrine that we are saved by 
faith, is one adapted to the nature of man. 



THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 423 

Through faith we are saved ; and that not 
of ourselves. As it is the truth which is the 
proper object of faith ; it is the truth which , 
by the agency of the spirit of God, operates 
upon man, enlightening his mind, and quick- 
ening and purifying his moral sensibility^ ac- 
cording to the psychological laws above indi- 
cated, by which truth operates upon our 
moral and aesthetical nature. The truth is 
given to us by God, and by an inward neces- 
sity, we believe, when it is discerned by us. 
True faith is accompanied with a spiritual 
communion between the heart and the doc- 
trine believed^ according to the psychological 
law of the connection between the feelings 
and the intellect ; and hence there is generat- 
ed in the heart a condition kindred to the 
truth believed. The truth enters into the 
spiritual life, and becomes its forming and fash- 
ioning principle, by which the whole inward 
man is changed according to the psychologi- 
cal law, into conformity with it. By true 
faith we enter into communion with divine 
things ; and this is different from that faith 
which rests merely upon authority, and clings 



424 THE BACOiNIAN PHILOSOPHY 

only to outward things. This last is not a 
belief in the truth by its own impression upon 
the mind, but a belief in the authority; and 
is therefore a mere logical inference that 
the doctrine to which the authority is given 
is true. It is not a perception of the truth 
by its own light. It is not spiritual discern- 
ment — a perception of the truth accompani- 
ed by its correspondent holy emotion. Be- 
lieving the miracles of the gospel is nothing 
in itself, the devils believe and tremble — but 
the belief of its truths is every thing. 

We see then, that according to psychologi- 
cal laws, it is through faith, having truth for 
its object, that we are changed from wicked- 
ness to holiness — that the love of sin is turn- 
ed into the love of holiness ; and it is the 
truth by the agency of the Spirit of God, 
which changes us, and not we of ourselves. 
Faith works by love ; because the truth which 
produces faith, converts our hatred of holy 
things into love of them ; and love becomes 
the condition of faith — the impulse of the 
soul generated or quickened into life by faith, 
is love ; and of course the heart then works 



'HE BACOXIAX PHILOSOPHY 



425 



by love. And thus is shown, according to 
psychological laws, the nature of the doctrine 
that faith works by love. 

We see, then, by this analysis, how the 
evangelical view of Christianity, which makes 
faith and truth the great paramount matters 
in the scheme of redemption, is explained 
and supported by those psychological laws 
which have been established by a rigid induc- 
tion of phenomena ; and this is strong confir- 
mation, that this is the correct view of Chris- 
tianity. 

It can now be seen, that the doctrine pro- 
claimed in the very opening of the Analyti- 
cal Introduction to this discourse, that the 
Baconian philosophy is emphatically the philo- 
sophy of protestantism, was no unmeaning- 
declaration. We have seen, that this philo- 
sophy makes scripture, the infallible rule of 
its own interpretation. And that repudiating 
the notion that Christianity is an esoteric sys- 
tem, and that any class of men have the keys 
of heaven, it proclaims the great doctrine of 
private judgement. And the very theory of 
mind which this philosophy has established, 



426 THE BACONIAN PHILOSOPHY. 

the psychological laws which it has devel- 
oped, confirm the protestant view of Christi- 
anity, that it is the truth, and not the sacra- 
ments, which is the great means of converting 
men. In a word, this philosophy takes the 
same view of the mission of Christ as he 
himself did, when he said to Pilate : " To this 
end was I born, and for this cause came I into 
the world, that I should bear witness unto the 
truth" 

And, when we look back and survey the 
wide field of discussion over which we have 
passed, and see how constantly, the inductive 
method of investigation has led to truth in 
every department of thought, we cannot but 
believe, that it is the true method. While 
on the other hand, when we see how univer- 
sally, in all ages and in all regions of thought 
— in revelation, as well as in nature — the a 
priori method has led to error, it would 
almost appear as though that method were 
the very Organon of Satan. 

THE END. 

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